SOCIAL CAPITAL IN THE PHILIPPINES: RESULTS FROM A NATIONAL SURVEY*

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Two major notions of social capital, namely networks and trust, take center stage in this review of findings from a national survey conducted by the Social Weather Stations. The major findings fall into three general themes: first, the pervasiveness in Philippine society of network contacts with close family and friends, or bonding social capital; second, the paucity of associational ties, or bridging social capital, among adult Filipinos; and third, the asymmetry of social capital, in that those who bond more and trust more are more likely to come from the ranks of the privileged. These findings suggest that discussions on social capital, in concept and practice, must take into account the sociological forces that lay down the blueprints for distributing scarce goods in society.

OVERVIEW OF THE CONCEPT

Social capital makes sense as a public good or a private good. Robert Putnam and Francis Fukuyama, two influential interpreters of the concept, see it as a public good, or as cultural forces that make groups cohesive enough to pursue common goals. To Putnam (1993:167; also see Putnam 1996:56), social capital has thus come to mean the "features of social organizations, such as trust, norms, and networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions." To Fukuyama (1995:26, 159), one form of social capital, namely mutual trust, or what he calls "spontaneous sociability," gives members of a community a "prior moral consensus" that makes unnecessary extensive contractual and legal regulation of their social relations. Trust, in this sense, has replaced the rule book or the office manual. In contrast, the works of Pierre Bourdieu (1986) and James Coleman (1988) see social capital as a "private good," or a set of assets or resources that a person or group invests in to secure economic transactions, acquire other forms of capital, or succeed in competitive rivalries. Or as Nan Lin (2000:25) puts it, social capital represents those "resources embedded in social networks accessed and used by actors for actions." Similarly, Ronald Burt (1992:8-9; also see Burt 1997) sees an investment in social capital, or one's "relationships with other players, as the "final arbiter of competitive success" in market transactions.

Both positions are persuasive. But because scholars still find the concept elusive, no standard definition of the concept prevails in the literature. One route to reconcile these views, says Adler and Kwon (2000), is to take a "neutral" stance, namely to view social capital as both a public good and a private good,

or what they call the concept's external and internal dimensions, and to adopt a definition that fits both perspectives. They then propose to let social capital stand for "the sum of resources available to an individual or group by virtue of their location in the structure of their more or less durable social relations (Alder and Kwon 2000:9)." The suggestion echoes Micheal Woolcock's (1998:153) earlier definition of social capital simply as "the information, trust, and norms of reciprocity inhering in one's networks." Woolcock maintains the neutral stance in a subsequent work (Woolcock 2002:22-23; also see Woolcock and Narayan 2000:226) where social capital means "the norms and networks that enable people to act collectively." Likewise, Robert Putnam (2002:8), in a later discernment, concedes that that social capital does not merely possess "investment value" (a private good) but also provide "direct consumption value" (a public good). He then advances a view of social capital as the "social networks and the associated forms of reciprocity" that create value for individual or collective gain. Yet there is still no wide consensus on this neutral position. In a relatively recent review of the literature, Ostrom and Ahn (2003: *xiv*) define social capital "an attribute of individuals and of their relationships that enhances their ability to solve collective action problems." Not only does the definition stress social capital as a public good, it also proposes that an *individual* attribute, in this case trustworthiness, is also a form of *social* capital.

Unsettled these views may be, social capital remains in wide use. One reason is that studies have consistently shown that social capital matters much in social life. Studies of *human capital* may show that "what you know" (skills, knowledge) and "what you have" (wealth, credentials, property) make a difference in one's social state. Studies of *social capital* posit, however, that "who you know" also make as much, if not more, of a difference because "what you know," and "what you have," depend largely on "who you know" (Lin 1999; Marsden and Hurlbert 1988). Moreover, social capital makes a difference in effecting a "private return" (e.g., increased income opportunities) or a "public effect" (e.g., national economic success). Or as Woolcock (2002:20) puts it: "one's family, friends, and associates constitute an important asset, one that can be called upon in a crisis, enjoyed for its own sake, or leveraged for material gain."

Indeed, social capital—taken to mean as involvement in groups, and the amount of solidarity and trust that this involvement generates—shows affinities with, among others, citizen participation and democratic governance (Putnam 1993, 1995; Fukuyama 1995; Badescu and Uslaner 2003; Body-Gendrot and Gittell 2003), as well as have direct policy relevance in areas such as education, health, crime, and welfare (e.g., Coleman 1988, 1990; Fukuyama 1995; Campbell 2000; Barbera 2005). Studies of development also reveal that communities blessed with a "rich stock of social networks and civic associations" are better able to confront poverty, resolve disputes, and successfully implement development projects (e.g., Isham et al. 2002; Woolcock 2002; Trigilia 2001; Woolcock and Narayan 2000).

Likewise, social capital indicators such as networks, trust, and civic norms

also correlate with an impressive economic performance on the macro-level (Knack and Keefer 1997; Dasgupta 2002) and with indicators of modernization (Ingelhart 1997). The concept of networks has also helped economists in the study of market performance (Rauch and Casella 2001; also see Isham et al. 2002 and Grabher and Powell 2004). Conversely, the absence of social capital signals social exclusion, among its manifestations being poverty, vulnerability, and powerlessness (Narayan 2000; Phillipson et al. 2004). So impressive, in fact, does the availability of social capital benefit societies, and its unavailability spelling social disaster that the World Bank has adopted social capital as a major cornerstone of their development strategy with a website devoted to this concern.

Social capital, however, has its "downsides." Strong social ties, according to Portes (1998), can also make excessive claims on group membership, restrict individual autonomy, and create a self-perpetuating opposition to the social mainstream. Portes and Landolt (1996) add that social networks which are isolated, parochial, or working at cross purposes to society's common interests (like drug cartels, corruption rings, or rebel groups) can actually hamper economic and social development. Clearly, then, what is social capital to some means social exclusion, oppression, and underdevelopment to others (Harriss and de Renzio 1997). The same ties that bind, as Narayan (2002) puts it, also exclude.

The existence of social capital's downsides—also called "anti-social capital" (Streeten 2001), negative social capital, or the concept's "dark side" (Schuller et al. 2001)—represents a criticism of social capital, one that the concept's defenders have sought to account for in their analyses. Woolcock (1998, 2002), for instance, introduces the concept of "linking social capital" to describe ties between poor people and those in positions of influence. In another paper, Woolcock (2002) stresses the need to look at the institutional context of social capital and make connections between social ties and social structure. None of these efforts, however, satisfy critics like John Harriss (2002:113) who see the concept of social capital, as used at least by Woolcock and his colleagues at the World Bank, to be "a way of talking about 'changing social relations' – but without seriously questioning power relations and property rights." Without this recognition of political and distributional issues, Harriss argues, social capital offers nothing. The critical edge, Harriss adds, that Pierre Bourdieu (1986) originally gave to the concept, namely that social capital is an instrument of power used to differentiate classes, gets blunted in the World Bank's handling of the phenomenon.

Schuller et al. (2000) as well as Ostrom and Ahn (2003) cite other difficulties of the concept. In addition to definitional diversity, already noted above, the concept suffers, among others, from over-versatility, i.e., meaning many things to different researchers, and methodological imprecision. For Fine and Green (2000; also see Fine 2001), these limitations dispel notions that social capital is the "Trojan horse" that is capable of challenging the development agenda of the World Bank's individualistically oriented economists. In fact,

for this and other reasons, Foley and Edwards (1999) have already made a case for "disinvesting" in social capital.

Despite these criticisms, Schuller et al. (2000:35-38) believe that despite its "adolescent characteristics," social capital still offers much promise as a concept for understanding the social world. The concept shifts the focus of analysis from individual agents to patterns of relationships, links different levels of analysis, and reasserts issues of value (trust, sharing and social support, among others) in social scientific discourse. What is now needed, as Ostrom and Ahn (2003:xxxiv-xxxv) urge, is more research to establish basic causal relations, refine definitions, and construct a coherent framework to study economic and political outcomes.

OBJECTIVE AND DATA

It is this need for more research, particularly in the context of nations in the global South, that prompts this investigation of social capital. No formal definition of social capital is advanced, though an open one that accounts for social capital as both public and private good makes sense in this exploratory exercise. The paper's main interest is to describe, using survey data, how two key notions related to social capital, namely networks and trust, configure in Philippine society. Both these notions cut across the diverse literature on social capital (Schuller et al. 2002:14), have its own research tradition (see, for example, Misztal 1996 and Stompka 1999 on trust; Scott 2000 and Grabher and Powell 2004 on networks), and are less contentious as concepts compared to social capital itself (Koniordos 2005:4). As well, the two notions also represent the two major divisions of the World Bank's attempt to operationalize the concept in questionnaire form: one being the kinds of groups where people belong, and the other division being people's perceptions of the reciprocities that surround efforts to work together and solve problems (Grootaert et al. 2004:3). Trust is one of those reciprocities, belonging to one's stock of "cognitive" social capital; networks, in turn, constitute a large part of one's "structural" capital (Krishna and Uphoff 2002 cited in Grootaert 2004:3).

Our data on social capital come from a national survey on Social Relations, conducted in 2001 by the Social Weather Stations (SWS) as part of its work with the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), a consortium of 26 nations engaged in an annual survey on a common topic. While not explicitly about social capital, the survey contains several items on networks and trust, as well as items on social support, beliefs, and political efficacy that relate to trust and networks. No previous analysis has been made on this data set.

This 2001 SWS/ISSP national survey, administered to a random sample of 1,200 Filipino adults aged 18 years and over, had a sampling error of +/-3 percent. Appendix A summarizes the general demographic profile of the sample. The survey drew equal proportions of respondents (n = 300) from each of the four regional areas: National Capital Region, Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao. For this paper, these subtotals were made more representative of the population by weighing them according to census figures on the actual number of adult population in these areas. The

weights were not used, however, to project the figures on a national scale, thus keeping the base total of 1,200 persons intact.

The sample respondents are split evenly between females and males, a deliberate sampling strategy to neutralize the gender bias in responses. Other than these, following Appendix A, the sample of adult Filipinos shows a preponderance of ever-married persons (90%), Roman Catholics (78%), persons between 18-45 years old (64%), persons living in households with 6 or less people (78%), residents of rural areas (61%), and long-term dwellers in their community (a mean of 26 years). Most have had completed high school education and under (75%), are working in manual occupations (56%), and employed on a full-time basis (40%). Their mean monthly family income is P8,710, with a median of P5,000.

The data on social networks cover the adult Filipino's ties to family and friends, their ties to the larger community via organizations, the kinds of assistance given and received, as well as the extent of the respondent's agreement to statements about family life and friendship. In turn, the data on trust, center on three measures of "generalized trust." This paper will first describe general patterns in the distribution of these survey items, and because social capital resources are "neither brokered equitably nor distributed evenly (Foley and Edwards 1998:2)," this paper will then crosstabulate key items on networks and trust with selected demographic characteristics, specifically gender, life cycle variables (age and marital status), socioeconomic status (education and family income), and rural-urban residence. Previous research on social capital, as well as studies on Philippine society and culture, will help contextualize the observations.

SOCIAL NETWORKS

Social networks are "sets of linkages among an identified group of people" (Bowling et al.1991, cited in Phillipson 2004:37), or "patterns of relationships connecting organizations, groups, and individuals (Stockard 2000:101-102)." One can thus imagine social networks as occurring on various levels: between large bodies such as nations or corporations, between smaller groups such as church organizations and kin groups, or between individual people (Marsden 1990). This paper's focus lies, however, in a "personal social network" which may be understood as the set of ties an individual has with organizations, groups, or other individuals.

These ties may be strong or weak: "strong ties" are contacts to people characterized by high levels of emotional intensity and intimacy, and "weak ties" are contacts to people not necessarily characterized by high levels of emotional intensity and intimacy (Granovetter 1973). In social capital literature, strong ties are synonymous with the notion of "bonding social capital," while "weak ties" represent "bridging social capital." Bonding social capital cover ties to people with similar demographic characteristics such as family members, close friends, neighbors and work colleagues, while bridging social capital mean ties to more distant associates and colleagues who have dissimilar demographic characteristics (Gittel and

Vidal 1998, cited in Grootaert et al. 2004:4; Narayan 2002; Woolcock 2002).

Social networks also have a directional dimension. Putnam (1993:173), for instance, talks about "horizontal networks" that assemble people of similar status and power, and "vertical networks" that bring together persons with asymmetrical status and power, thus resulting in relations characterized by hierarchy and dependence. Bonding and bridging social capital, as described above, may represent horizontal networks: they simply imply tight or loose connections between people. In contrast, a concept called "linking social capital"—understood here as ties to people in positions of authority and influence such as representatives of public institutions (state agencies, political parties) or private organizations (banks, business firms)— is synonymous with vertical social networks (Woolcock 1999, 2002; World Bank 2000).

While networks vary in size, density, tie strength, efficiency and effectiveness (Burt 1992; Scott 2000) as well as in the kinds of relationships among the members, all networks share two traits: a shared culture and an agreement among the members to operate within that shared culture (Phillipson et al. 2001:10). A high degree of agreement within the network, so the logic of social capital goes, elicits other forms of social capital—trust, norms of cooperation, obligations, and so on—that may yield (or withhold) benefits for persons and groups. In this sense, social networks may be seen as "structures of opportunity" that aid people to gain access to different sorts of resources (Phillipson 2001:1). However, these same networks, if they are vertical in nature with strong ties among its members, may fail to generate enough trust to spill out into the larger society. For this reason, many scholars agree that a dense horizontal network, one with overlapping weak ties, carries more weight than network with very strong ties in sustaining social stability, civic engagement, and collective action (e.g., Granovetter 1973; Putnam 1993; Badescu 2003; Åberg and Sandberg 2003).

In the Philippines, formal social network analysis, or the attempt to explore the impact of network ties and network configuration on people's lives (see Scott 2000, 2002 for reviews), are few in number (e.g., Martinez-Esquillo 1978; Matiasz 1980; Vancio 1981). What appears abundantly are works that deal with specific types of social networks, though not formally identified as such (Abad 2000). Three types prevail. "Kin-based networks," the most documented, center on family and household arrangements that operate to provide social and economic support to its members (e.g., Porio et al. 1978; Castillo 1979, Miralao 1994, Medina 2001). "Non-kin-based networks" focus on friendship relations (e.g., Morais 1980, 1981; Dumont 1995), organizations (e.g., Po and Montiel 1980; Almirol 1986; Korten and Siy 1989; Jimenez, n.d.), and economic or work-based arrangements (e.g., Szanton 1970) that take care of people's needs. A third type, known as the "alliance system" (e.g., Lynch 1959, 1973; Hollnsteiner 1963; Schlegel 1964) combines kin and non-kin members in a network geared to provide support in times of need and to enhance one's social position. The use of "compadrazco" or ritual kinship is an essential part of this

crafting of alliances (e.g., Arce 1973; Potter 1974; Hart 1977). The importance of social networks, or social capital in general, to social development is also implicit in studies of community organizing and people's participation (see Abad and Eviota 1985:173-184), and is the subject of three ongoing researches (Estuar 2005; Romero 2005; Orpiada 2005). In addition, an investigation into the kinds of social capital generated in cyberspace, networks and trust among them, has also appeared (Balmes and Tomboc 2002).

The SWS/ISSP survey module on Social Relations can address matters pertaining to personal networks involving family and friends as well as to links with organizations but precludes discussion on the alliance system since no data are available on the socioeconomic position of the respondent's contacts.

Kin Networks: The Immediate Family

Tables 1 and 2 present data on the frequency of contact made by respondents with immediate family members, namely parents, children, siblings. Tables 1 focuses on the frequency of *face-to-face* contact with these close relatives. Table 2 deals with contacts other than a face-to-face, personal visit.

Face-to-face contacts. *"How often,"* the SWS/ISSP 2001 survey asked, "*do you see or visit your (brother or sister/ daughter or son/ father or mother)?"* The replies, summarized in Table 1, show that on a *daily* basis—including relatives who live with respondents in the same household—adult Filipinos have the most frequent contact with their children (75%), followed by with their parents (fathers, 48 percent; mothers, 46 percent), and then with their siblings or brothers and sisters (35%).

Table 1. Percent Distribution of Frequency of Face to Face Contact with Immediate Family Members - Philippines, SWS September 1-18, 2001 Survey

Frequency of visit	How often do you see or visit your...			
	Brother or sister	Daughter or son	Father	Mother
Lives in the same household	9%	51%	20%	20%
Daily	26	24	28	26
Several times a week	10	4	5	6
At least once a week	9	4	6	5
At least once a month	14	3	11	10
Several times a year	13	7	8	9
Less often	18	7	21	23
Never	-	-	2	1
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
(N)	(1,082)	(467)	(501)	(729)
NAP, no contact	118	733	12	3
Deceased	-	-	687	468
Total sample	1,200	1,200	1,200	1,200

The weekly figures are more impressive. Cumulating the percentages, Table 1 also shows that more than one-half to over four-fifths of the respondents see or visit an immediate family member *at least once a week*. Table 1 shows that about 83 percent see their children at least once a week, 59 percent have weekly contact with their fathers, 57 percent with their mothers, and over half or 54 percent see their siblings. On a scale of 0 to 10, with 0 representing "never (have any contact)" and 10 representing "daily" contact and "lives in same household," the means are 8.4 for children, 6.8 for fathers, 6.6 for mothers, and 5.7 for siblings. Overall, then, the focal points of face-to-face contact for adult Filipinos are children and parents.

How do these overall patterns vary by social location? Several cross-tabulations, not shown here (see Abad 2006 for the tables), disaggregate the overall results by comparing the mean scores across the categories of selected demographic and geographical factors, all indicators of social location. The demographic indicators are gender, age, marital status, educational attainment, and monthly family income. The geographical indicators are place of residence and distance to mother's home.

The disaggregated results (Abad 2006) show that regardless of social location, adult Filipinos generally have more contact with their children, followed by parents, and then siblings. Some exceptions, to this pattern, however, can be highlighted:

- Marital status does make a difference. Never married people, as a rule, have no children, and so focus their face-to-face contacts on parents and their siblings. In turn, married and once married people (the widowed, separated, and divorced) have more contact with their children and less so with parents and siblings – in short, with their family of procreation more than their family of orientation.
- Age differences reflect the marital status pattern. Younger people, those in the 18-24 age bracket, most of whom are also unmarried, are more likely than people in older age groups, many of whom are or have been married, to have more face-to-face contact with their siblings and their parents. The tendency for young and unmarried Filipinos, who have already reached adulthood, to live with their parents and their siblings may help explain these age differences.
- Distance to mother's residence also affects face-to-face contacts with parents and siblings. The shorter time it takes to reach the mother's home, the more frequent the contact. If we assume that fathers live in the same dwelling place as mothers, we find the same pattern: the shorter the time to get to the parents' house, the more frequent the contact with one's father.

Indeed, many adult Filipinos live relatively close to their parents. Survey results show–more than a third of the sample (38%) are less than 30 minutes away from their mother's house. In turn, 52 percent are an hour or less away, and nearly two thirds or 66 percent are under three hours away from their mother's home. This relative proximity enhances contact with parents and other members of one's family of orientation.

Contact via other means. Where personal visits are not possible, respondents may also reach their parents

through other means. *"How often, "*the 2001 survey asked, *"do you have contact with your (brother or sister/daughter or son/father or mother) other than visiting?"* The "other means" refer to contact through letters, telephone, fax, internet, and the like.

Table 2 shows that while over a third (38%) contact their children at least once a week through other means, about 30 percent make a similar weekly contact with their fathers, 26 percent do the same with mothers, and 29 percent with siblings. On a scale of 0 to 10, with "0" representing no contact at all and "10" daily contact, adult Filipinos score an average of 3.9 for children, 3.7 for fathers, 3.4 for mothers, and a lower 3.1 for siblings. These means do not vary much when cross-classified with indicators of social location (see Abad 2006 for the disaggregated results). They are also lower than the averages obtained for personal visits. But perhaps people who often see close family members face-to-face do not greatly need to contact them through other means.

The general impression, then, is one of substantial contact between respondents and immediate family members, with adult Filipinos using other means such as letters or phones to supplement face-to-face contact. Stated conceptually, a strong amount of "bonding social capital" thrives among Filipinos. The fact that most adult Filipinos live a short distance away from close relatives helps to foster these ties. The other fact that Filipinos, in general, have resided in their communities for a relatively long time, a mean of 26 years (see Appendix A), also fosters close family

Table 2. Percent distribution of frequency of contact with immediate family other than visiting - Philippines, SWS September 1-18, 2001 Survey

Frequency of visit	***How often do you have contact with your ____ besides visiting...?***			
	Brother or sister	Daughter or son	Father	Mother
Daily	12%	22%	15%	12%
Several times a week	8	8	7	7
At least once a week	9	9	8	8
At least once a month	12	10	11	10
Several times a year	11	10	10	9
Less often	48	42	24	27
Never	-	-	26	27
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
(N)	(930)	(212)	(403)	(581)
Missing/NAP	270	988	797	619
Total sample	1,200	1,200	1,200	1,200

Note: This question was asked only of family members who did not live in the same household as R. Those cases were excluded from this table and would partly account for column subtotals less than 1,200. The balance of the missing cases would represent cases where the family members have lost contact with the respondent or are deceased.

ties. As past studies have shown (e.g., Höllinger and Haller 1990), long-term residence results in the dominance of "ascribed" networks centered on family and neighbors. The tendency for adult unmarried children to live with parents and siblings also increase the likelihood of face-to-face contact among immediate family members.

Will similar patterns hold for members of one's non-immediate family?

Kin Networks: Non-Immediate Family Members

The 2001 SWS/ISSP survey asked respondents about the amount of contact (by personal visits or other means) they had with non-immediate family members – specifically , uncles or aunts, cousins, parents-in-law, brothers or sisters in law, nieces and nephews, and godparents. Table 3 shows that the most frequent contacts, at the rate of more than twice in the last four weeks, were made with nephews and nieces (58%), followed by brothers or sisters-in-law (42%), parents-in-law (39%), cousins (38%), and uncles or aunts (31%). Less frequently reached were godparents (18%). On a scale of 0 to 10, with "0" representing no contact within the last month, and "10" representing very frequent contact or more than twice in the last month, the mean contact scores are, as above, highest for nephews and nieces (7.0) and lowest for godparents (2.7). These mean scores are as a whole lower than those found for intimate family members (a range from 5.7 to 8.4). Thus, contacts with non-immediate family members, including ritual kin, while occurring often enough, do not take place as intensely as contacts with close family members. They do reflect, however, the depth of the Filipino's family network.

Table 3. Percent distribution of frequency of contact with non-immediate family members - Philippines, SWS September 1-18, 2001 Survey

Frequency of contact	How often do you have contact with your ____?					
	Uncles or aunts	Cousins	Parents-in-law	Brothers or sisters-in-law	Nieces & nephews	Godparents
More than twice in the last 4 weeks	31%	38%	39%	42%	58%	18%
Once or twice in the last 4 weeks	22	26	16	23	24	18
Not at all in the last 4 weeks	48	36	45	35	18	64
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
(N)	(1,021)	(1,152)	(682)	(1,072)	(1,140)	(787)
No such relative	179	48	518	128	60	473
Total sample	1,200	1,200	1,200	1,200	1,200	1,200

Disaggregated results, not presented here (see Abad 2006), retain the overall pattern showing that in meeting non-immediate family members, adult Filipinos have the most contacts with nephews and nieces and least with godparents. Key variations in frequency of contact, however, appear by age, marital status, and place of residence.

- Regarding *age,* those under 30 years old are significantly more likely to make more contact with non-immediate relatives than persons in older age brackets.
- Regarding *marital status*, unmarried persons are also more likely to make contact with non-immediate family members compared to the presently married and once married. This pattern largely reflects the age differences cited above. As expected perhaps, married people have more contact with their in-laws compared to the once married – or widowed, separated, and divorced persons.
- Regarding *residence*, Filipinos living in urban areas tend to make significantly more contacts with non-immediate relatives compared to those residing in suburban areas or rural villages. This may suggest the geographical stability of kin relations in urban areas as opposed to those in rural areas.

Friends

In Philippine culture, close friends are vital to people's emotional life and constitute an important set of affiliations among Filipinos. Family ties, though close and deeply personal, often lock people in a web of duties and obligations, some of which may be difficult to refuse because of the strong authoritarian mode in familial relations. Under these conditions, friendship bonds offer an escape or refuge from the strains of family life; as well as ensure a reciprocity of affection, support, and material assistance in times of need. These bonds , however, may also lock people in a web of duties and obligations that can compete with family demands (Dumont 1993, 1995; Morais 1980, 1981; Keifer 1968).

Several survey items pertained to friendship. The 2001 SWS/ISSP survey first enjoined respondents to think about people in their work places, in their neighborhood or district, and in other places like churches and clubs, people other than family or relatives, and asked for each place: *How many of these are close friend(s) of yours?* The results, displayed in Table 4, indicate the presence a wide friendship network among Filipinos. Nearly 95 percent of the respondents have at least one or two close friends, 50 percent have between one to eight friends, and a third or 33 percent say that they have eleven or more close friends. The median is 7, the mean is 10, and the large standard deviation of 12 indicates a distributional skew towards a greater number of friends.

And where do Filipinos find their friends? Survey data show that respondents tend to acquire friends where they spend most of their time in: close to home (mean of 4.6 friends) or in the workplace (mean of 4.0) rather in other places (mean of 3.3). The differences among these means are statistically significant using the Friedman test (c^2, 2df = 80.1, $p < .001$). For adult Filipinos, then, as well as for many non-Filipinos, propinquity begets friendship.

Table 4. Percent distribution of number of friends by location - Philippines, SWS September 1-18, 2001 Survey

Number of friends	Location of friends			
	At work place	Living near respondent	In other places	ALL PLACES
None	17%	13%	39%	5%
1-2	32	31	22	13
3-4	19	19	12	13
5-6	15	17	11	14
7-8	3	3	2	10
9-10	9	11	8	12
11 or more	4	6	5	33
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
(N)	*(754)*	*(1,197)*	*(1,198)*	*(750)*
Missing	446	3	2	450
Total Sample	1,200	1,200	1,200	1,200
Median	3.0	3.0	2.0	7.0
Mean	4.0	4.6	3.3	10.4
S.D.	5.8	5.8	5.3	11.9

Note: Missing cases mean that the respondent does not work so the question is not applicable, or that the respondent did not give an answer to the question

Disaggregated results, again not shown here (see Abad 2006), compares the mean number of friends in each of these three settings by selected demographic characteristics. Three of these characteristics—gender, age, and educational attainment—have the strongest influence on the number of friends:

- In general, males tend to have more friends than females: the overall means are 12.5 for males vs. 8.3 for females, with significant differences between them found on the mean number of friends in the work place and nearby one's residence.
- Age also exerts some effect as older people, specifically those 35 years old (mean of 8.6) and above have, on the average, more friends than those under 34 years old (mean of 11.4). The significant difference only applies, however, to friends living close to home rather than friends at work or in other places.
- In turn, persons with higher level of schooling are more likely to have more friends compared to those with lower levels of educational attainment. The differences are particularly sharp between college-educated persons (a mean of 13.1 friends) against those who entered high school (mean of 9.4) and those in the elementary level or below (mean of 9.8). The differences are particularly striking for friends in the

work place and in other places suggesting that education introduces people to contacts outside one's kin world.

The survey also asked respondents if their *best friend* is a male or female, and if that friend is a relative or not. Spouses or lovers are excluded from the selection. The total column of Table 5 notes that the majority or 64 percent (32.3 + 31.6) of best friends are non-relatives, while over a third or 36 percent are kin relations. By gender, females are slightly more likely than males to be selected as best friends (52 vs. 48 percent). Moreover, males are more likely to choose females as best friends (9.1 percent) than it is for females to select males as close friends (4.6 percent). But the general gender pattern follows the principle of homogamy: male respondents are more likely to have best friends who are males (91 percent of the time), while female respondents are more likely to have best friends who are also females (96 percent of the time). The association between respondent's gender and the gender of the respondent's closest friend is very strong (*phi* = .87) and statistically significant (c_y^2, 1df = 858.5).

Contacts with best friends are also substantial. The SWS survey asked: *how often do you see or visit your friend (the friend you feel closest to)?* Again, spouses and lovers cannot be named as best friends. The replies, arrayed in Table 6, shows that nearly half the sample or 49 percent report that they see or visit their friends *daily* (including those whose declared close friend lives in the same household), while about a large 81 percent say they have face-to-face contact with their best friend *at least once a week or more*. On a scale of 0 to 10, with "0" representing no contact with one's best friend and "10" standing for daily contact with a best friend, adult Filipinos obtain a mean score of 7.9. This score compares favorably with the sample's mean face-to-face contact scores with children (8.4), nieces and nephews (7.0), father (6.7), and mother (6.6). Next to their children, then, adult Filipinos see their friends the most frequently.

Table 5. Percent Distribution of Gender and Relation of Best/close Friend by Respondent's Gender - Philippines, SWS September 1-18, 2001 Survey

Gender and relation	***Respondent's Gender***		
of best friend	Total	Male	Female
Male	48%	91%	4%
Relative	15	29	2.1
Non- relative	32	62	1.9
Female	52	9	96
Relative	21	4	38
Non- relative	32	5	58
Total	100%	100%	100%
(N)	(1,141)	(572)	*(569)*

Note: Missing from the table are respondents(N = 59 of the total sample) who reported having no close friends.

Table 6. Percent Distributions of Frequency of Visit to Close Friend and Contact with Close Friend through other Means - Philippines, SWS September 1-18, 2001 Survey

Frequency of visit/contact	Questions	
	How often do you visit your close friend?	*How often do you have contact with your close friend besides visiting?*
Live in the same household	2%	—
Daily	47	19%
Several times a week	19	13
At least once a week	13	9
At least once a month	7	7
Several times a year	2	3
Less often	8	14
Never	2	35
Total	100%	100%
(N)	(1,139)	(1,121)
NAP/Missing	61	79
Total sample	*1,200*	*1,200*

Note: The second question was asked only of respondents whose friends did not live in the same household.

The SWS survey also asked. "*And how often do you have any contact with this friend aside from visiting, either by telephone, letter, fax, or email?"* Table 7 shows that about 19 percent do so daily, while almost twice that figure, or 40 percent, makes other kinds of contact at least once a week or more. On a scale of 0 to 10, the mean contact score for friends using other means is 4.3 for the total sample, a figure that is higher than any of the mean contact score using other means for close family members: children (3.9), father (3.7), mother (3.4), and siblings (3.1). Thus, not only do adult Filipinos see their friends very regularly, they also find time to reach them through telephone, letter, fax or the internet more often than they do the same to their parents, siblings, or children.

How does the mean contact score for friends look when disaggregated by demographic statuses? The cross-tabulations, again not shown here (see Abad 2006), reveal that gender, age, and marital status apparently have little effect on the frequency of contact with friends, either by face-to-face meeting or by some long distance connection. But socio-economic status and place of residence have some effect, particularly in contacting friends using other means. Respondents who have higher educational attainment, belong higher family incomes, or live in large cities are more likely to contact their friends using other means – the telephone, fax, or the internet, for example.

Table 7. Mean Contact Scores for Friends by Demographic Characteristics - Philippines, SWS September 1-18, 2001 Survey

Characteristics	Mean contact scores	
	Face-to-face *(N = 1,139)*	Other Means *(N = 1,121)*
TOTAL	7.9	4.3
Gender		
Male	8.0	4.4
Female	7.8	4.2
eta	*.04, ns*	*.02,ns*
Age		
18-24	7.7	4.6
25-34	7.9	4.2
35-44	8.1	4.4
45 & over	7.7	4.1
eta	*.07, ns*	*.04, ns*
Marital status		
Unmarried	7.8	4.6
Presently married	7.9	4.3
Once married	7.8	3.4
eta	*.02,ns*	*.07,ns*
Educational attainment		
None or elementary	8.2	3.9
High school /Vocational	7.8	3.9
College / Post college	7.6	5.4
eta	*.08**	*.14****
Family income level		
Under P3,000/month	8.1	3.4
P3,000-5000	8.0	3.7
P5,001-10,000	7.9	4.5
Over P10,000	7.6	5.5
eta	*.08, ns*	*.20****
Place of residence		
Rural village	8.3	3.6
Small city, suburb	7.3	4.0
Large city	7.1	5.6
eta	*.19****	*.15****

Notes: Mean contact scores range from 0 to 10.
Statistical significance of means determined by the one-way F-test.
*p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001 ns = not significant

Ties to close friends represent another type of network that generates a great deal of bonding social capital. Like ties to family, these bonds are emotional, geared towards loyalty, affection, and social support. In this context, it is understandable why, when asked to rate key characteristics of friends, respondents rated personal traits like "intelligence" less important (a margin of +36 percent, see Table 8) than the friend's ability to "really understand" (+ 65 percent), to be "enjoyable company" (+ 61 percent) and to "help get things done" (+ 49 percent).

Attitudes about friends and family

Responses to two normative statements on friendship confirm these points. Table 9 reveals, for example, that a huge 88 percent of the sample strongly agree or agree that *"people who are better off should help friends who are less well off."* This strong agreement, with a margin of 85 percent, reflects the pledge of mutual support among friends, and the ability of friendships to bridge gaps in material inequality. One is reminded here of Kerkvliet's (1990:196-197, 250; also see Cannel 1999:27-254) observation that while poor Filipinos are keenly aware of the material gaps between themselves and others, they also believe that all Filipinos are alike in dignity, and worthy of assistance from fellow citizens. Friendship apparently operates on similar rules: two friends may stand on opposite rungs of the stratification ladder but have a moral obligation to help each other in times of need. There is, in Philippine culture, a striving for harmony despite hierarchy, or what Cannel (1999:254) calls "unequal relations for people of equal value."

Because of the expectation of mutual support, friendships may have personal or strategic uses. Many Filipinos seem to agree this to be the case. Table 9 also points out that some 55 percent of the respondents strongly agree or agree that *"it is all right to develop friendships with people just because you know they can be of use to you."* While a sizable 33

Table 8. Percent Distribution of Important Characteristics of a Close Friend - Philippines, SWS September 1-18, 2001 Survey

Importance	Characteristics of friends			
	Intelligence	Helps get things done	Really understands	Enjoyable company
Extremely important	38%	50%	65%	62%
Very important	36	36	28	29
Fairly important	12	9	5	6
Not too important	13	4	1	2
Not at all important	2	1	1	1
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
(N)	*(1,200)*	*(1,200)*	*(1,200)*	*(1,200)*
Margin	+36%	+49%	+64%	+61%

Note: The margin is the difference in percentage points between the two tails of the response categories, in this case between "Extremely important" and "Not at all important."

percent of the sample disagree or strongly disagree with the statement, the margin of difference (+22) stays positive or in favor of agreement.

This strategic view of friendship must be understood in the context of the "alliance system" and the quest for survival in Philippine society. As Lynch (1959) observes, a Filipino strategy to attain a respectable place in the social hierarchy is to build a network of family and friends who can be called upon for support in times of need. Filipinos who form a large network of allies, which ideally includes a large number of influential or wealthy persons, possess great "prowess" in the community. Having influential godparents during baptisms and weddings, new allies or friends in one's network, is part of this process of building "vertical networks" or "linking social capital," a process that marks religious ceremonies like baptisms or weddings, and the feasting that follows these rites, as "performances" in prowess (Mathews 1974; Pertierra 1997).

But families are more stable than friendships as refuges of security, and Filipinos seek many ways to maintain that stability. One is to expect children to take care of their parents. Table 9 reveals that an overwhelming majority of respondents, 91 percent of them, agree or strongly agree that *"adult children have a duty to look after their elderly parents."* Just as telling is extent to which Filipinos will go to in support of their families. Table 9 again shows that an equally

Table 9. Percent Distribution of Extent of Agreement on Statements Regarding Family and Friendship — Philippines, SWS September 1-18, 2001 Survey

Reply	Statements			
	Adult children have a duty to look after their elderly parents.	You should take care of yourself and your family first, before helping other people.	*People who are better off should help friends who are less well off.*	*It is all right to develop friend-ships with people just because you know they can be of use to you.*
Strongly agree/ Agree	91%	93%	88%	55%
Neither agree nor disagree	5	5	9	12
Disagree/Strongly disagree	4	2	3	33
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
(N)	*(1,199)*	*(1,199)*	*(1,199)*	*(1,199)*
Margin	+87%	+91%	+85%	+22%

Notes: The margin is the difference between the extreme response categories of a question, in this case between the "Strongly agree/Agree" category and the "Disagree/Strongly disagree" category. A positive sign means that the responses favor agreement, while a negative sign indicates the responses lean towards disagreement.

The missing cases replied "Can't choose" or had no answer to the question.

substantial proportion of Filipinos, 93 percent, agree or strongly agree that "*you should take care of yourself and your family first before helping other people."* Many observers have asserted that while this norm of familism strengthens family ties, an extreme expression of this norm, which "affirms familial concerns at the expense of the public good" (Zialcita 1997:42; also see Carroll 1993; Miralao 1997; and Mulder 1997) can also be detrimental to the formation of a strong civic consciousness. In turn, a lack of civic consciousness, or an active associational life, makes it difficult for societies to obtain what Putnam (1993, 2002) and Fukuyama (1995) refer to as the "public goods" of social capital, among them a flourishing democracy or a general sense of well-being.

How do Filipinos stand in their associational life? How does their "bonding social capital" compare with their bridging" social capital?"

Organizations

Involvement in organizations is one form of bridging social capital as it enables citizens to establish mutual trust and norms of cooperation with persons outside the confines of private networks (e.g., Putnam 1993, 1995, 2002; Fukuyama 1995; Badescu and Uslaner 2003; Body-Gendrot and Gittell 2003). This associational vigor, which results in what Narayan (2002) a density of "cross-cutting ties," has been found to be a consistent presence in flourishing democracies.

The SWS survey presented respondents with a list of seven types of associations—political, trade union, church, sports, charitable, neighborhood, and other types—and asked them: *"Please tell me whether you have participated in the activities of this group in the past 12 months."* The response choices were: *"does not belong to this group," "belongs to but never participates," "attend meetings once or twice,"* and *"attend meetings more than twice."* The organizations are not identified as governmental or non-governmental, voluntary or involuntary, local or international. Thus, it is not possible to isolate those organizations that comprise what is known as "civil society," or those groups which are distinct from family or friendship groups on one hand, and the state and market on the other (Ferrer 1997), the kind of associational life that is often associated with civic engagement. This paper can only address in a general way the notion of organizational ties, and its distribution across demographic locations, though at some point a distinction will be made about organizations that belong to the private and public spheres.

Membership in Organizations. The survey item enables us to distinguish respondents who join associations (those who belong to at least one type of organization) and those who do not join associations (persons who do not belong to any of the seven types of groups asked for in the survey). Table 10 presents the final tally: it shows that 47 percent of adult Filipinos do not belong to any organization, while a slight majority or 53 percent are members of at least one type of organization. Of those who are members of an organization, over a third or 36 percent belong to one or two types of organizations, and some 15 percent belong to three or more types of organizations.

Table 10. Ever a Member of an Organization-Philippines, SWS September 1-18, 2001 Survey

No. of types of organizations	*Percent Member of at least one type of organization*
None	47%
At least one	53
One	24
Two	14
Three	7
Four	4
Five	2
Six	1
Seven	1
Total	100%
(N)	*(1,200)*

In turn, Table 11 offers data on membership in specific types of organizations, regardless of one's level of participation in each type. First, membership by type of organization ranges from a low seven percent in trade unions to 35 percent for church-related groups. These proportions suggest that adult Filipinos who are members of an organization do not cluster in one or a few types but are instead spread out over a wide variety of groups. Second, as suggested above, Filipinos are more likely to belong to church groups than any other type. Membership in a church group commands 35 percent or over a third of the sample. A distant second come sports groups and neighborhood associations that capture about 18 percent of the sample.

In an analysis of cross-national survey data, Haerpfer et al. (2005:255-259; also Knack and Keefer 1977) distinguish two types of organizations related to social capital. "Type One" organizations, the authors say, pertain more to the private sphere, specifically to personal beliefs, personal morality, arts, culture, leisure, charities, and social concerns like the environment or women's rights. "Type Two" organizations, in turn, relate more to the politics and economics, groups associated with the public realm, among them political parties, trade unions. Of these two, Filipinos are more likely to belong to Type One organizations—church groups, sports groups, neighborhood associations, and charitable organizations—than they are to be members of Type Two organizations like political groups and labor unions.

But what subgroups in the population are more likely to belong to particular types of organizations - and thus more likely to own this form of bridging social capital?

Table 12 cross-classifies overall membership in an organization with selected demographic characteristics. The figures disclose that in general, people with a higher socio-economic status are more likely than those in lower socio-economic status to belong to organizations. A person's chances of being a member of an organization, for instance, increases with education (G = .39, $p < .001$) and family income (G = .17, $p < .001$). Place of residence also matters: those who live in small or large cities are more likely than those who live in farms or rural villages to be members of an association ($G = .17$, $p < .001$). Gender, however, is not a factor: while males (56%) are more likely than females (51%) to become members of an organization, the percentage difference is not statistically significant.

Table 11. Percent Distribution of Frequency of Participation in Organizations by Type of Group - Philippines, SWS September 1-18, 2001 Survey

Frequency of participation in the past 12 months	People sometimes belong to different kinds of groups or associations. The list below contains different types of groups. For each type of group, please tell me whether you have participated in the activities of this group in the past 12 months.						
	Political party	Trade union or professional association	Church or religious group	Sports group	Charitable organization	Neighborhood group	Other associations
Member	11%	7%	35%	19%	13%	18%	12%
Attends meetings more than twice	3	2	13	6	4	5	4
Attends meetings once or twice	4	3	14	7	5	8	4
Belongs to, but never participates	4	2	8	6	4	5	4
Non-member	*89*	*93*	*65*	*82*	*87*	*82*	*88*
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
(N)	(1,200)	(1,200)	(1,200)	(1,200)	(1,200)	(1,200)	(1,200)

Age, as well, is not associated with membership.

But do these patterns hold for *specific types* of organization? Seven types were considered: political, trade, church, sports, charitable, neighborhood, and other associations. The disaggregated results (not presented here) present three main findings:

- First, whatever the type of organization, the two indicators of socioeconomic status, namely educational attainment and family income, remain significant correlates of organizational membership. The higher the socioeconomic status, the greater the likelihood of membership in Type One and Type Two organizations. Place of residence also makes a significant difference in membership in five of seven types of organization, the exceptions being political groups and trade unions. Despite these exceptions, the results reinforce the previous impression that elite status and urban residence stand out as among the strongest predictors of organizational membership.
- Second, gender differences now appear important than they did in the aggregated results shown on Table 12. This time, the disaggregated data show that males are more likely than females to be members in five of seven types of organizations, and significantly likely to be members in four of these five types: political groups, trade unions, sports groups, charitable organizations, and other associations. While females are more likely than males to be members of church groups, a reverse pattern in the gender set, the difference is not statistically significant. In general, then, males are more likely to dominate groups that concern both the private (Type One) and the public (Type Two) spheres.
- Third, age has some importance. Previously unrelated to overall membership (see Table 12), age now exhibits significant relationships in two of the seven types of organizations: sports and neighborhood groups. In contrast, the reverse holds for neighborhood groups, where older people more likely than young people to be members. The positive and negative effects of age cancelled each other out and did not register as a significant factor in the aggregated table.

In sum, while a little more than half the sample belongs to an organization, the chances of becoming a member vary according to their social locations. People who are well off are more likely to join associations than those who are not so well off. Males are more likely to join organizations than females, and urban residents are more likely to be members of groups than those who live in the suburbs or rural villages. In turn, the membership of young or old people varies by the type of organization: sports for the young, neighborhood groups for the older set.

Will the patterns of *membership* in associations differ from the patterns of participation in these organizations?

Participation in Organizations. The respondent's degree of participation was measured on a scale from 0 to 10, with a score of "0" standing for not belonging to an organization" and a score of "10" for "attending meetings twice or more" within the past 12 months. Each respondent had a set of seven such scores, one for each type of organization. The total was then divided by seven (the seven

Table 12. Organizational Membership by Demographic Characteristics – Philippines, SWS September 1-18, 2001 Survey

Characteristics	Percentage Member of an organization	Gamma
TOTAL	53	--
Gender		
Male	56	
Female	51	-.10, ns
Age		
18-24	54	
25-34	51	
35-44	54	
45 & over	54	.02, ns
Marital status		
Unmarried	65	
Presently married	51	
Once married	55	-.13*
Educational attainment		
None or elementary	41	
High school /Vocational	53	
College / Post college	74	.39***
Monthly family income		
Under P3,000/month	48	
P3,000-5000	48	
P5,001-10,000	54	
Over P10,000	63	.17***
Place of residence		
Rural village	49	
Small city, suburb	58	
Large city	61	.17***

Notes: Statistical significance determined by the z-test.
**p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001 ns = not significant*

types of associations asked for in the survey), and a mean score derived. This average represents a respondent's "organizational participation score." Thus calculated, the overall mean participation score for adult Filipinos is a low 1.1, with a fairly narrow standard deviation of 1.5

How will the overall organizational participation score vary by indicators of social location? Table 13 echoes results for organizational membership. Again, measures of socioeconomic status, specifically educational attainment (*eta* = .27, $p < .001$) and family income (*eta* = .17, $p < .001$), are significant correlates of organizational participation. The higher the level of education and the greater the family income, the greater will be the likelihood of active participation in organizations. Similarly, urban

residence (*eta* = .12, $p < .001$) significantly increases the chances of active participation. Gender also affects participation with males having a higher mean score of 1.2 compared to the female's score of 0.9 (*eta* = .08, $p < .01$). Age, however, is again unrelated to participation – at least in overall, aggregated terms.

How do these overall patterns fare out when disaggregated by type of organization? The disaggregated results (table not presented here) reinforce earlier results:

- First, Filipinos are more active in church groups (mean of 2.5), followed by sports groups (1.2), neighborhood groups (1.2), and charitable organizations (0.9). They are least active in political groups (0.7) and trade unions (0.4). Following Haerpfer et al.'s (2005) distinction, Filipinos are more active in Type One organizations that relate to the private sphere than in Type Two organizations that pertain to the political and economic realms.
- Second, socio-economic status remains a strong predictor of participation in organizations. Persons with high educational attainment are more likely than people with lower educational attainment to participate actively in organizations. This relationship is statistically significant across all seven types of organization, notably sports groups and charitable organizations. Similarly, persons whose family income levels are in the upper quartiles are more likely than those who belong to the lower quartiles to participate actively in associations. This relationship occurs in all seven types of organizations, and is statistically significant in five of these seven groups, notably charitable associations and sports groups.
- Third, urban residence increases the probability of participation in some groups but not in others. In general, urban residents have larger mean participation scores than those from suburban areas and rural villages, specifically in three of the seven associations: neighborhood groups, and charitable groups, and church groups.
- Fourth, males are in general more active than females in organizations. Males have higher mean scores than females in six of seven types of organizations. In five of these six organizations, the results are statistically significant, with the sharpest differences found in sports groups. The reverse pattern appears, however, for church groups where females participate a little more actively than males do.
- Fifth, the effect of age on participation varies by type of organization. The data disclose that in five of the seven types, older people participate more actively in groups than younger people do. In three of these five organizations, the differences are statistically significant: church groups, charitable organizations, and other associations. In contrast, younger people have higher participation scores than older people when it comes to political organizations and sports groups. However, it is only in sports groups where the age differences are statistically significant in favor of younger persons.

In summary, Filipinos appear to underuse organizations as a source of social capital. While a little more than half or 53 percent of adult Filipinos are

Table 13. Mean Overall Organizational Participation Scores by Demographic Characteristics – Philippines, SWS September 1-18, 2001 Survey

Characteristics	Mean Organizational Participation Score	eta
TOTAL	1.1	--
Gender		
Male	1.2	
Female	0.9	.08**
Age		
18-24	1.1	
25-34	1.0	
35-44	1.1	
45 & over	1.2	.04, ns
Marital status		
Unmarried	1.4	
Presently married	1.1	
Once married	1.1	.08*
Educational attainment		
None or elementary	0.7	
High school /Vocational	1.1	
College / Post college	1.8	.27***
Monthly family income		
Under P3,000/month	0.8	
P3,000-5,000	0.9	
P5,001-10,000	1.2	
Over P10,000	1.5	.17***
Place of residence		
Rural village	0.9	
Small city, suburb	1.2	
Large city	1.4	.12***

Notes: Mean contact scores range from 0 to 10.
Statistical significance of means determined by the one-way F-test
*$p < .05$ **$p < .01$ ***$p < .001$ *ns = not significant*

members of at least one organization, only between 7 to 27 percent can be considered participating members, while a smaller proportion, between 3 to 13 percent depending on the type of organization, are "active members." Most Filipinos are either non-members or nominal members, and the mean participation score, on a scale of 0 to 10, is a very modest 1.1. The organization that attracts the most members is church-related groups. About a third or 35 percent of the sample are members of church groups, with 27 percent reporting to be active members. The high level of religiosity among Filipinos (Abad 1994,

2002) relate perhaps to the comparatively high level of membership and relatively high level of participation among Filipinos in church groups.

Observed differences in membership and participation by social location show that bridging social capital is not equally distributed in society: certain groups in the population are more likely than others to possess it (see Putnam 2002; Foley and Edwards 1998; Degenne et al. 1997). In Philippine society, persons with more years of schooling and larger family incomes, for instance, as well as those who live in urban areas, are most likely to join and be active in organizations. As well, the dominance of males in most types of organizations reflect the gender divisions in traditional Philippine society where males dominate the public realm while females are expected to operate within society's private sphere – the world of home and family (Pertierra 1993). The Church, in fact, may also be seen as an extension of the private sphere, the world of personal devotions that lie separate from the outer-worldly concerns of state and market, the traditional domains of men. Hence, church participation is significantly higher for females than males, and serves as a source of moral power that women may assert in the private or public domain. In turn, older people are generally more advantaged than younger people are, and this pattern replays itself in several types of organizations where older people play more active roles than young people do. Young people only have the edge over older people in sports groups.

According to the social capital literature, these kinds of patterns in organizational membership and participation do not augur well for the formation of a strong civil society (see, for example, Body-Gendrot and Gittell 2003). In this light, efforts of development agencies to persuade the poor to organize into cooperatives, savings group, credit unions, agricultural teams, and the like are laudable since these resources can help release disadvantaged groups from the tentacles of social exclusion. Some of these disadvantaged groups have benefited from participation in associations (e.g., Korten and Siy 1989; Jimenez, n.d.). Others, however, find that many organizations exert tight control over their members (Ruiz 1987) or have been formed in compliance of a mandate from central government (Po and Montiel 1980; de Guzman 2000) – conditions that do not exactly generate a vibrant associational life. Despite these, the Philippines, as Serrano (2003) observes, continues to have a plethora or civil society organizations. How to reconcile the prominence of civil society groups in the country with the low amount of bridging social capital in large pockets of the population requires further study. Serrano (2003:112) suggests that more than additional civil society organizations, Philippine needs "appropriate enframing institutions and cultural practices" to generate a stronger impact on society.

The strength of bonding over bridging social capital among Filipinos, or the pervasiveness of strong ties over weak ties, again comes to the fore when looking at sources of social support for Filipinos.

NETWORKS AND SOCIAL SUPPORT

The SWS/ISSP 2001 survey included three sets of items to learn about the kinds

of assistance people received and gave to others. The first set of items asked people who they would approach for assistance when they are in need. The second set concerned sources of information about jobs. The third set dealt with types of assistance people gave to others within the past year. Who or what group people will tap in these situations will reveal their reliance on particular networks.

Seeking help from others

Three specific survey items sought to find out who people would turn to if they found themselves in situations that required help from others. The items placed respondents in three hypothetical situations: getting sick, needing a large sum of money, and feeling depressed.

Getting sick. The first situation posed this question: "(S)*uppose you had the flu and had to stay in bed for a few days and needed help around the house, with shopping and so on. Who would you turn to first for help?* A list of possible responses was shown to the respondent, and after he or she made a choice, a follow-up question was asked: "*And who would you turn to second if you had the flu and needed help around the house?*

Table 14 presents the results for both choices for the total sample and then by marital status. In times of physical distress, the figures show that overall, people will first turn to their spouses (58%) and their mothers (15%) for help, while their next choices would be parents, siblings, and even children. Patterns by marital status will expectedly differ from this general pattern. For their first choice, unmarried persons, because they have no spouses, prefer to turn to their parents, specifically their mothers (52%), and then their siblings, specifically sisters (14%) over brothers (5%). In turn, three-fourths or 75 percent of currently married persons first choose their spouses, while 57 percent of the once married—persons separated, widowed, or divorced—turn to their children, and more often the daughter (39%) more than the son (18%). The first preference for mother over father, daughter over son, and even sister over brother across all marital status categories reflects gender norms at work, norms that equip females with skills in nurturing and domestic tasks.

How about the respondent's second choices? Table 14 shows that the never married who first turned to their mothers, now turn to their fathers as their second choice (19%) along with their siblings, again selecting sisters (19%) over brothers (14%). The presently married who first chose their spouses, now select as second choice, their mothers (20%) over their fathers (4%), then daughters (17%) over sons (10%). In turn, once married persons, who largely went first to their daughters more than their sons, now as second choice, go to their sons (24%) more than their daughters (8%). Overall, then, in times of physical distress, adult Filipinos seek assistance from members of the immediate family, preferably female members who are expected to possess greater care giving qualities. Only perhaps when female family members are unavailable do persons turn to close male relatives for assistance.

Borrowing money. The second situation concerns finances. The survey question asked respondents: *"Now, suppose you needed to borrow a large*

Table 14. Percent Distribution of Source of Help when Ill: First Two Choices by Respondent's Marital Status, Philippines, SWS September 1-18, 2001 Survey

Source of help	*Suppose you had the flu and had to stay in bed for a few days and needed help around the house, with shopping and so on. Who would you turn to first for help? And who would you turn to second?*							
	First choice by marital status				Second choice by marital status			
	Total	Never Married	Currently Married	Once Married	Total	Never Married	Currently Married	Once Married
No one	< 1%	0%	< 1%	< 1%	10%	12%	9%	17%
Immediate family								
Spouse/partner	58	5	75	3	5	< 1	6	< 1
Mother	15	52	9	12	17	7	20	3
Father	2	5	1	2	6	19	4	< 1
Daughter	8	< 1	5	39	14	0	17	8
Son	4	0	3	18	10	2	10	24
Sister	4	14	2	5	10	19	9	8
Brother	< 1	5	< 1	2	5	14	3	3
Other relatives								
Other blood relative	3	10	1	6	4	9	4	5
In-laws	1	0	1	5	2	0	2	4
Godparents	< 1	0	< 1	< 1	< 1	3	< 1	3
Non family								
Close friend	1	5	< 1	2	5	8	4	10
Neighbor	1	< 1	< 1	3	6	3	6	5
Someone you pay to help	< 1	< 1	< 1	0	< 1	0	< 1	< 1
Someone you work with	0	0	0	0	< 1	< 1	< 1	0
Social services agency	0	0	0	0	< 1	0	< 1	< 1
Someone else	< 1	< 1	< 1	< 1	2	2	2	3
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
(n)	(1,200)	(152)	(928)	(120)	(1,200)	(155)	(926)	(119)

sum of money. Who would you turn to first for help?" A list of choices was presented to the respondent who, after selecting, was asked: *"And who would you turn to second if you needed to borrow a large sum of money?"* The same list of response choices was again shown.

Table 15 displays the results, again for the total sample and then broken down by marital status. The total figures reveal that overall, respondents first approach members of the immediate family – notably the mother (14%), the spouse (11%), and the sister (12%). This time, however, respondents are also starting to open up to persons outside that intimate unit, specifically other blood relatives (8%) and close friends (7%), to seek help.

Variations by marital status appear. When they need to borrow a large sum of money, never married persons first turn to their parents, a combined total of 37 percent, preferring to go to the mother (26%) than the father (11%). They then see siblings, preferring the sister (14%) to the brother (9%), and then to other blood relatives (14%). The second choice for unmarried persons again centers on parents, siblings and a new source, close friend (14%). The gender factor surfaces once more as respondents prefer sisters over brothers, and mothers over fathers.

Presently married people first turn to their siblings (18%), choosing sisters (12%) over brother (6%); then go their parents, preferring mothers (13%) over fathers (3%), and then their spouse (14%). About 7 percent each turn to other blood relatives and close friends. The second choice for currently married people remains with siblings, with a larger preference for sisters (11%), mothers (9%), close friends (10%), and other blood relatives (8%). Again, respondents favor sisters over brothers, and mothers over fathers.

Once married people—the widowed, separated, and divorced—first turn to their children, a total of 31 percent, with a slightly higher preference for daughters over sons; then siblings (14 percent, with a clear preference for sisters over brothers), and then close friend (9%). Their second choice stay with other children and siblings, then close friends and other blood relatives. As above, respondents choose close female relatives more often than close male relations.

In sum, when needing to borrow a large sum of money, adult Filipinos first turn to their immediate family members, but do not hesitate to approach other blood relations or close friends when necessary. The gender factor, observed earlier, remains a crucial factor: across all marital status categories: Filipinos tend to choose female relatives over male relatives when they need help. The cultural expectation that females often act as the treasurer of the household, or that wives generally control the household's purse strings, or that females have greater abilities in handling money may also underlie the preference for approaching females over males when borrowing a large sum of money (Medina 2001:161-181).

Of equal interest in Table 15 is the low turnout of public agencies as sources of funds. Only two percent of the sample, for example, would first go the bank or credit union, while only one percent would first approach a government or

Table 15. Percent Distribution of Source of Money in Times of Need: First Two Choices by Respondent's Marital Status Philippines, SWS September 1-18, 2001 Survey

Source of help	Now, suppose you needed to borrow a large sum of money. Who would you turn to first for help? And who would you turn to second?							
	First choice by marital status				Second choice by marital status			
	Total	Never Married	Currently Married	Once Married	Total	Never Married	Currently Married	Once Married
No one	8%	5%	8%	12%	19%	15%	19%	27%
Immediate family								
Spouse/partner	11	3	14	0	3	0	3	0
Mother	14	26	13	5	8	12	9	< 1
Father	4	11	3	< 1	6	12	5	0
Daughter	6	2	5	17	4	0	5	8
Son	5	1	5	14	5	6	5	11
Sister	12	14	12	10	11	13	11	12
Brother	6	9	6	3	8	9	8	4
Other relatives								
Other blood relative	8	14	7	5	8	8	8	9
In-laws	3	1	4	< 1	4	2	5	8
Godparents	< 1	0	< 1	0	< 1	< 1	< 1	0
Non family								
Close friend	7	7	7	9	11	14	10	9
Neighbor	4	< 1	4	8	4	1	5	6
Someone you work with	1	1	1	0	2	3	2	< 1
Employer	3	1	3	4	1	1	< 1	< 1
Gov't/soc. services agency	1	< 1	1	3	< 1	< 1	< 1	0
Bank or credit union	2	1	3	2	1	< 1	1	< 1
Private money lender	2	< 1	2	4	2	< 1	1	3
Someone else	2	1	2	2	< 1	< 1	< 1	0
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
(n)	(1,200)	(153)	(926)	(119)	(1,102)	(144)	(851)	(107)

social service agency. Only three percent of the sample selected these agencies their second choice. The main sources of funds thus remain locked in a private network of family and friends. Even the decision to tap private moneylenders, an option for two percent of the sample, may still be considered part of an informal financial network. A source of bridging social capital for funds, namely links with institutions and groups outside the family network, remains distant for many adult Filipinos.

Feeling depressed. Do the same patterns appear when people search out others for help when they feel depressed? The SWS/ISSP survey made these inquiries: *Now suppose you felt just a bit down or depressed, and you wanted to talk about it. Who would you turn to first for help?* After the respondents has made a choice based on a list of possible answers, the survey then asked: *And who would you turn to second if you felt a bit down or depressed and wanted to talk about it?*

Table 16 presents the results, again for the total sample and by marital status. Overall, adult Filipinos first turn towards their spouse (46%) or a close friend (15%) for help. Their second choice would be a close friend (16%), and then female family members – mothers (15%), sisters (11%), and daughters (9%). The relatively strong presence of friends, usually persons outside the immediate family unit, in difficult emotional situations is a noteworthy addition to the network.

Marital status differences are sharp across the three categories. Unmarried or single people first turn to friends (41%), then go to parents, again preferring the mother (25%) over the father (4%); and then to siblings, where sisters (12%) are chosen over brothers (4%). Siblings, friends, and parents are also top second choices, with female relatives generally chosen over male relatives.

The majority of respondents (i.e., currently married persons) largely turn to their spouses (58%), after whom they approach close friends (10%), and then parents, more the mother (8%) than the father (< 1 or 0.5 percent). Second choices follow the same pattern, with parents, and mothers in particular (16%), getting a slight edge over friends (15%) and daughters (10%). In turn, the once married group tends to approach their children first, daughters in particular (30%), then close friends (16%) and sisters (11%). Their second choices are largely sons, perhaps because they have already been to daughters and then close friends (12%).

All in all, when feeling depressed, or when seeking help while one is ill or in need of money, adult Filipinos tap a private network of significant others, a web of immediate family members and friends, for assistance. The gender factor remains an important source of social support with respondents who generally prefer to approach mothers over fathers, sisters over brothers, daughters over sons. The cultural belief that expressive character traits such as warmth, sensitivity to the needs of others, and the ability to express tender feelings are more likely to reside in females over males (Lamanna and Reidman 1994, cited in Medina 2001) underlie the gender differences observed here. What has been observed as sources of assistance when feeling depressed echoes findings for the other two hypothetical situations, getting sick

Table 16. Percent Distribution of Source of Assistance when Depressed: First Two Choices by Respondent's Marital Status - Philippines, SWS September 1-18, 2001 Survey

Source of help	*Now suppose you felt just a bit down or depressed, and you wanted to talk about it. Who would you turn to first for help? And who would you turn to second?*							
	First choice by marital status				Second choice by marital status			
	Total	Never Married	Currently Married	Once Married	Total	Never Married	Currently Married	Once Married
No one	3%	4%	3%	7%	14%	12%	14%	21%
Immediate family								
Spouse/partner	46	3	58	2	6	1	8	< 1
Mother	10	24	8	6	15	16	16	4
Father	1	4	< 1	< 1	3	5	3	< 1
Daughter	6	< 1	4	30	9	2	10	7
Son	2	< 1	2	8	7	0	6	2
Sister	6	12	5	11	10	15	10	8
Brother	2	4	2	2	5	12	4	5
Other relatives								
Other blood relative	3	3	2	8	5	6	5	6
In-laws	1	0	1	3	3	3	3	4
Non-family								
Close friend	15	41	10	16	16	21	15	12
Neighbor	2	1	2	6	4	2	4	7
Someone you work with	< 1	< 1	< 1	0	< 1	3	< 1	0
Priest or member of clergy	< 1	< 1	< 1	0	< 1	< 1	< 1	0
Psychologist	< 1	0	< 1	0	< 1	0	< 1	2
Self-help group	< 1	< 1	< 1	0	< 1	< 1	< 1	< 1
Someone else	1	< 1	1	2	< 1	< 1	< 1	< 1
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
(n)	(1,200)	(154)	(927)	(119)	(1,161)	(146)	(901)	(114)

and needing a large sum of money. The near invisibility of formal, professional or official sources of assistance again reflect the relative scarcity of non-family contacts, or bridging social capital, among Filipinos.

Sources of information about jobs

Another aspect of seeking assistance lies in obtaining information about jobs. The SWS/ISSP survey posed this item: *There are many ways people hear about jobs – from other people, from advertisements or employment agencies, and so on. Please indicate how you first found out about work at your present employer.* The interviewer then presented to respondents a show card containing possible answers. Moreover, if the respondent did not have a present job, the interviewer was instructed to ask the respondent about her or his last job.

Where then do people acquire information about their present jobs, or if they have no present jobs, their last job? The total column of Table 17 shows that overall, one half or 50 percent of the sample obtained work-related information from family members: 32 percent from immediate family members and 18 percent from other relatives. Important sources also included close friends (22%), and acquaintances (13%). Less important were public sources like employment agencies, schools, advertisements, and the like: each was each used less than 3 percent of the time. In turn, about 6 percent obtained the information themselves by calling and asking for work.

Differences by educational attainment reveal the impact of class in gaining access to information. While family sources are widely used among respondents regardless of education attainment, Table 17 shows that those with lower level of schooling tend to rely more on the family as source of information about jobs compared to those with higher levels of schooling. The comparative figures are 61 percent for these with elementary education or less, 47 percent for those high school backgrounds, and 34 percent of those who finished college or beyond. In turn, the use of close friends is a more likely occurrence for those with high school and college backgrounds than those with less education: 15 percent for elementary or no schooling, 26 percent for high school, and 27 percent for college.

A similar pattern applies to the use of formal sources like employment agencies or schools. In these cases, those with college education are more likely than those with high school or elementary education to get information about jobs from public or private employment agencies, schools, or from advertisements or signs. The finding reinforces earlier observations about organizations, namely, that while Filipinos have modest reserves of bridging social capital, this form of social capital is generally more accessible to people of higher social status. In this case, while the use of formal agencies in not popular overall, and whatever uses it has largely falls in the hands of people with more schooling.

In a classic work on social networks, Granovetter (1973) distinguishes between "strong ties" and "weak ties." Strong ties are contacts to people characterized by high levels of emotional intensity and intimacy, such as contacts with significant others, while a weak ties being contacts

Table 17. Percent Distribution of Source of Information about Jobs, Total Sample and by Educational Attainment - Philippines, SWS September 1-18, 2001 Survey

Source of information	Total Percent	Educational attainment: None/ Elementary	High School/ Vocational	College/ Post college
Family				
Immediate family	32%	44%	27%	20%
Other relatives	18	18	20	14
Non-family				
Close friend	22	15	26	27
Acquaintance	12	14	14	12
Public employment agency	3	< 1	1	8
Private employment agency	2	1	2	3
School or university office	2	0	< 1	3
Advertisement or sign	3	< 1	2	7
Contacted by employer	2	2	1	2
Called or asked for work	6	5	7	6
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
(N)	(1,034)	(442)	(494)	(265)

Note: Excluded from the table are those who had never worked at the time of the survey as well as those who did not answer the question.

to people not characterized as such, such as links with less intimate or impersonal sources. These weak ties, however, have the advantage of being connected with many more networks, particularly those outside the world of family and friends, and serve to increase a person's chance of acquiring scare resources, like information for possible employment, as Granovetter (1973) argues, or the likelihood of obtaining cultural capital (Bourdieu 1986; Southerton 2004). In societies where people lack weak ties, a dependence on strong ties for many needs becomes necessary to survive. The Philippine situation illustrates such a lack: strong ties are more frequently used than weak ties as the source of information about jobs. Moreover, many kinds of weak ties available in networks, especially those obtained by joining associations, fall in the laps of privileged people.

Because Filipinos often rely on a network of family and close friends to meet basic needs and reach goals, the demands made on them by family members, other relatives and friends may be an onerous one to bear. One item in the SWS survey asked respondents: *Do you feel that your family, relatives, and/ or friends make too many demands on you?* The replies (see Table 18) show that only 18 percent of the sample says that kin members and friends do not, or never

make, many demands on them. But while the majority admits that many demands are made upon them, the pressures are not severe: a plurality of 44 percent say the demands are "seldom" made, while 29 percent report that the demands are made "sometimes." About 8 percent say the demands come "often," but only a tiny one percent admits that the demands are made "very often." These patterns do not vary by gender, age, socio-economic status, and other demographic characteristics.

Table 18. Percent Distribution of R's Perception of Family Demands – Philippines, SWS September 1-18, 2001 Survey

Do you experience too many demands from family members and relatives?	**Percent**
No, never	18%
Yes, but seldom	44
Yes, sometimes	29
Yes, often	8
Yes, very often	1
Total	100%
(N)	(1,200)

Assistance given to others

In addition to items about assistance sought from others, the SWS/ISSP survey also inquired about the forms of assistance given to others. The survey question was: *During the past 12 months, how often have you done any of the following things for people you know personally, such as relatives, friends, neighbors or other acquaintances?* Four kinds of assistance were considered: helped someone outside of your household with housework or shopping, lent quite a bit of money to another person, spent time talking with someone who was a bit down or depressed, and helped somebody to find a job. The six reply categories ranged from "more than once a week" to "not at all in the past year."

Are Filipinos, by and large, helpful towards other people? The results shown in Table 19 suggest that the answer depends on the situation. On a scale of 0 to 10, with the lowest score of "0," standing for not helping anyone at all during the past year, and the highest score of "10" standing for helping others more than once a week, Filipinos are relatively more helpful when it comes to talking with someone who is depressed (mean = 4.4) and least helpful when it comes to lending money (mean = 1.9). The mean scores for the other two situations fall between these two ends, with Filipinos more likely to help with housework (mean = 3.4) than helping someone find a job (mean = 2.4). The overall average based on these four situations is 3.1, which is at the low end of a scale of 10, as it stands for helping others be somewhere "between 1-3 times a year."

But which group is more likely to help others? The statistically significant results of several cross-tabulations, not shown here, show these:

- Males are significantly more helpful than females but only in helping someone get a job. On all other situations, gender is not a significant factor.
- Older people are more helpful than younger people only in helping others find a job. In the other two situations, helping with housework and talking to someone who is depressed, younger people have the edge.

- The results for socio-economic status replay earlier observations: people who are better off in life are more likely to help others. In all four situations, those with more education are significantly more likely to help with housework, lend money , talk to a friend, and help someone find a job. Likewise, persons in higher income families have a greater probability to help others than those in lower family income levels. This difference applies to all help situations but remains statistically significant only in three instances: lending money, talking to a friend, and helping someone to find work.
- Living in cities also makes a significant difference in three of the four situations. Persons residing in large or small cities are more likely than those who live in rural villages to lend money, talk to a friend, and help someone find a job.

Thus, people and groups with more resources (including information resources) do tend to help other people more often than those with lesser resources. While we have no information on the magnitude of this assistance, or on the kinds of people helped the available data reveal that the amount of social capital arising from involvement in social networks is unevenly distributed in the population. However, before suggesting ways to understand this inequality further, let us take a brief look at "trust," another key component of social capital, and how it pans out across population subgroups.

Trust

Trust, says Piotr Sztompka (1999:25), is a "bet about the future contingent actions of others." Ostrom and Ahn's (2003:xvi; also see Misztal 1996 and Gambetta 2000) definition follows Sztompka's: "a particular level of subjective probability with which an agent assesses that another agent or group of agents will perform a particular action." This bet or assessment entails a belief and a commitment. Thus, by saying "I trust that person," states Sztompka (1999:18-24), we mean two things: first, a belief that the other person will act well towards me, and second, a commitment to act favorably towards that person, as in "I trust that person, so I will lend her my cell phone." The commitment to act is done with full awareness that it entails a risk or loss, but also represents an opportunity for both trustor and trustee to enhance their welfare (Ostrom and Ahn, 2003: *xvi-xvii*). Trust, Sztompka (1999:24) also argues, differs from "hope" or "confidence," both of which fall within the "discourse of fate," referring to something good happening without our active participation. In contrast, trust falls within the "discourse of agency" demanding that we actively anticipate and face an unknown future, take a risk, and make a bet to act favorably towards the other.

In social capital literature, trust is often viewed as the "lubricant" of social relations or as the "glue" in the social bond (Koniordos 2005:4). In this sense, trust does improve the efficiency of society, to echo Putnam's definition of social capital, by enabling people to engage in collective action. Fukuyama (1995:26) sees trust as "the expectation that arises within a community of regular, honest, and cooperative behavior based on commonly shared norms," a quality of social relations that, when applied to the workplace, represents a new form of discipline, one that is internalized and

self-maintaining (Schuller et al. 2000:37). This is the kind of trust developed between people in modern, highly differentiated societies, what is called "institutional trust" (Koniordos 2005:5) or "extended trust" (Raiser 1999, cited in Haerpfer 2005:244). Thus, in societies characterized by a high degree of institutional or extended trust, one can expect higher levels of civic engagement, as Putnam (1993) demonstrates, or experience higher levels of economic performance, as Fukuyama (1995) contends. In contrast, societies characterized as hierarchical or rigidly stratified will exhibit low trust (Seligman 1997:36-37, 41; also Putnam 1993), and following the logic of Putnam's and Fukuyama's theses, will more likely have weaker democracies and lower levels of economic growth.

It is debatable, however, whether trust should be seen as a form of social capital, or the *independent variable* that leads to a particular kind of collective action, or as an outgrowth of a form of social capital, hence an *intervening variable* that links forms of social capital (like social network) and collective action. Ostrom and Ahn (2003: *xvi-xix*) endorse the notion of trust as the intervening variable, though there is still no consensus among scholars on this matter.

One should also be alert, however, to the "downside" of trust. As a "lubricant" of social relations, trust can foster civic participation and economic prosperity, just as much as it can spawn social apathy and economic underdevelopment. Similarly, as Kovalainen (2005) forewarns, trust in its operation is far from being gender-blind: levels of trust shown to men, for example, may be higher than those shown to women. Structures of power and wealth, after all, shape trust relations (Fox 1974, cited in Schuller et al. 2002:18-19), and these forces can militate against the expansion of trust in a system.

Table 19. Percent Distribution of Frequency of Help R Gave Others – Philippines, SWS September 1-18, 2001 Survey

Frequency of help	**During the past 12 months, how often have you done any of the following things for people you know personally, such as relatives, friends, neighbors or other acquaintances?**			
	Helped with housework	Lent money	Talked with someone depressed	Helped someone find a job
More than once a week	8%	1%	10%	3%
Once a week	9	5	15	7
Once a month	15	9	17	10
At least 2-3 times in past year	18	14	21	17
Once in past year	15	17	15	15
Not at all in past year	35	54	22	48
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
(N)	(1,200)	(1,200)	(1,200)	(1,200)

Several ways of measuring trust appear in the literature. The most widely used are measures of "generalized trust," also called "interpersonal trust," or the extent to which one trusts strangers or people in general (Badescu 2003: 128-130). By defining this "radius of trust" (Fukuyama 1995) as extending beyond face-to face ties, measures of generalized trust draw attention to the conditions essential for trust to reach out throughout the system. In this sense, measures of generalized trust serves as a "baseline expectation" (Yamagishi 2001:143, cited in Ostrom and Ahn 2003: *xx*) of systemic or extended trust. Another measure of trust may be termed "particularized trust," also called "institutional trust," or the extent of trust towards specific kinds of people or institutions, among them, trust in members of one's immediate environment, political officials, trust in agencies, and trust in a business community (Narayan and Cassidy 2001; Badescu 2003; Uslaner 2003).

The SWS/ISSP Survey on Social Relations included three measures of generalized trust. All three were statements which respondents rated on a five-point Likert agreement-disagreement scale. *"To what extent,"* the survey asked, *"do you agree or disagree with the following statements?"* The first statement was direct: *There are only a few people I can trust completely.* The second statement sought to corroborate the first: *If you are not careful, other people will take advantage of you.* The third statement accentuated the positive as it sought for more corroboration: *Most of the time you can be sure that other people want the best for you.*

Table 20 shows the results. On the first statement, over three-fourths or 76 percent of the sample "agree" or "agree strongly" that there are only a few people that they trust completely. About 14 percent said that they disagreed or disagree strongly with the statement, giving a margin of agreement of around 62 percent. The second statement reinforces the first, at least at first glance. Similar to the above results, more than three-fourths or 77 percent of the sample agreed or strongly agreed that one can trust only a few people and that one must be careful in dealing with others, lest those people take advantage of you. As well, 16 percent disagreed or disagreed strongly with each of the two statements. The margin of agreement is again a high +61 percent. The second item corroborates the first: Filipinos are not generally trusting of strangers.

Because of the similarity of the percentage distributions in these two items, one suspects a strong correlation between these two measures. Not so. Cross-classifying the two items did yield a positive and significant correlation ($G = .45$, $p < .001$), but the size of the coefficient is not large enough to say that one measure is a mirror image of the other. Moreover, a reliability analysis of the two items yielded a Cronbach's alpha value of .45, a coefficient below the acceptable value of .70 for constructing an index of the two measures. The two questions apparently convey different meanings to respondents,

This image of Filipinos as persons not highly trusting other people gets confounded, however, with replies to the question about how much respondents agreed with the statement *"Most of the*

time, you can be sure that other people want the best for you." Now, since most respondents agreed that they can completely trust only a few people and also, that we must be careful of people lest they take advantage of us, one expects that a similarly large proportion will *disagree* with this third statement. But the results reveal the contrary. Only about 17 percent of the sample did disagree or strongly disagree; the majority or 63 percent had favorable, trust-inducing impressions of other people. The margin of agreement remains a respectably high positive value, +46 percent. Filipinos may thus feel that they cannot put their trust in many people and fear that others may take advantage of them, but also perceive, oddly enough, that other people in general want the best for them. What explains this seeming inconsistency?

In his sociological theory of trust, Sztompka (1999:26) distinguishes the concept of "distrust" from that of "mistrust." Distrust, he says, is the negative mirror image of trust. It connotes "negative expectations about the actions of others" and a kind of "negative defensive commitment" whose manifestations include avoidance, escape, distancing of self, or taking protective measures. By comparison, "mistrust" refers to a "neutral position, when both trust and distrust are suspended." It means "the lack of clear expectations" or belief and at the same time, a "hesitation about committing oneself." This formulation suggests that Filipinos do not really distrust other people – after all, many feel that other persons want the best for them. Filipinos, however, may tend to *mistrust* other people, initially suspicious of the other people's intentions and a bit cautious in committing themselves to act favorably towards other people.

Do levels of trust vary according to certain groups in the population? To facilitate these comparisons, mean scores were computed for each trust measure. These means range from 0 to 10, with the lowest score of "0" indicating the least amount of trust and the highest score of "10" representing the highest amount of trust. On this range, Filipinos obtained a mean of 2.6 in the item trusting other people, a mean of 2.4 in trusting people not to take advantage of you, and a relatively high 6.9 in perceiving that other people want the best of you.

How do these measures of generalized trust vary by social location? Table 21 presents the mean scores, and the key results are as follows:

- Gender, age, and marital status do not significantly affect levels of trust.
- The effect of education is fuzzy. In two of three indicators of generalized trust, those with elementary or no formal education have significantly higher trust scores than those who have had a high school or college education. However, no significant differences by education appear on the "trust few people" item.
- The effect of family income also shows mixed results. On two trust measures, persons with low family incomes have *higher* mean scores than those who come from families with higher income. However, on the "trust few people" item, those in lower family income levels have *lower* mean trust scores compared to those in high income levels.

- The effect of residence is consistent: on all three measures, those who live in large cities have higher trust scores than those in other places. The finding runs counter to Durkheim's (1964) notion that small communities have a stronger "moral density," and by inference, have people who are more trusting towards each other. Perhaps people in large cities, and to some extent small cities, have more reason than rural dwellers to engage in generalized trust in order to meet the demands of urban life.

What about institutional trust? Since the SWS/ISSP survey did not contain an item on institutional or extended trust, we turn to another data set, the World Values Survey (WVS), to answer this question. This national survey, also administered by the SWS in July 2001, had the same sample size of 1,200 adult Filipinos with a sampling error of +/- 3 percent. In this survey, respondents were presented with a list containing types of organization (e.g., churches, the press, the police, and so on), and were asked this question: *For each one, can you tell me how much confidence you have in them –is it a great deal, quite a lot, not very much, or not at all?* Now the word "confidence" in the question may not mean trust in Sztompka's (1999) understanding of the term, but the translation of the word "confidence" in Filipino, as used in the SWS interview situation, uses the root word *tiwala* which means trust. The same root word was used in the WVS questionnaire item on generalized or interpersonal trust. On linguistic grounds, then, we treat the question on institutional confidence as a measure of institutional trust.

Table 20. Percent Distribution of Indicators of Generalized Trust – Philippines, SWS September 1-18, 2001 Survey

Reply	To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?		
	(a) There are only a few people I can trust completely.	(b) If you are not careful, other people will take advantage of you.	(c) Most of the time you can be sure that other people want the best for you.
Agree strongly/Agree	76%	77%	63%
Neither agree nor disagree	10	7	20
Disagree/Disagree strongly	14	16	17
Total	100%	100%	100%
(N)	(1,200)	(1,200)	(1,200)
Margin	+62	+61	+46

Note: The margin of agreement represents the difference between the two agreement categories (strongly agree/agree) and the two disagreement categories (disagree/strongly disagree). A positive sign is favorable towards agreement.

To summarize the responses, we again transformed the answers into a range of scores from 0 to 10, with "0" standing for no confidence in the institution and "10" representing the highest level of confidence in that particular institution. Table 22 presents the mean trust score per institution, and shows that in general Filipinos put a great deal of trust in churches (8.5), followed by trust in nongovernmental organizations like the environmental protection movement (6.7) and the women's movement (6.6), and then the armed forces (6.6). Least trusted, relatively speaking, are political parties (4.8), the government in Manila (5.1), labor unions (5.4), and major companies (5.5). Filipinos thus appear more trusting of Type One organizations that belong to the private realm than to Type Two organizations that belong to the sphere of politics and economics.

One also notices that the mean scores, ranging from a low of 5.1 to a high of 8.5, surpasses the means for two measures generalized trust, the "trust few people" (2.6) and "take advantage" items (2.4), and is about par with the "want the best" item (6.9). Though the measures of interpersonal and institutional trust are not directly comparable, and use different samples, one still senses that that among adult Filipinos, the degree of institutional trust may be higher than the level of interpersonal trust.

Why Filipino rate institutional trust higher than interpersonal trust, and why Type One organizations are rated higher than Type Two groups are difficult to answer in this paper. Sztompka, however, suggests an approach. In adopting his theory to understand the fluctuations in trust in Poland, Sztompka (1999:151-190) finds that levels of trust dwindle under conditions of uncertainty and risk, as it did during the periods of communist rule and the anti-communist revolution, and rises when social conditions become more secure, as it did during the recent period of democratic consolidation. Now when interpersonal trust has reached low ebb, Sztompka (1999:115) adds, "the resulting vacuum will be filled with some alternative arrangements providing similar functions and meeting universal cravings for predictability, certainty, order, and the like."

One of these alternative arrangements, or "functional substitutes," is "paternalization," that is, a craving for a system that would restore order and security with a strong hand (Sztompka 1999:118). Or as Ekiert and Kubik (1997:26, cited in Sztompka 1999:163) say, there arises among the people an expectation that "the state is responsible for all aspects of economic and social life and, therefore should solve all problems." Based on this notion, it may be hypothesized that the higher trust scores that Filipinos give to institutions than to their interpersonal relations reflect some desire for paternal care, or a yearning of support from a powerful figure that will take care of needs unmet on the personal or family level.

The available data cannot test this hypothesis, only hint at this desire. The SWS/ISSP survey, for example, asked respondents two items indicative of paternalization: *On the whole, do you think it should or should not be the government's responsibility to provide… child care for everyone who wants it?, a decent standard of living for the old?*

Table 22. Mean Trust Scores to Selected Institutions – Philippines SWS/WVS July 9-27, 2001 Survey

Institution	*Mean trust score*
Churches	8.5
Environmental protection movement	6.7
Women's movement	6.6
Armed Forces	6.6
Television	6.5
Press	6.3
Civil Service	6.2
Police	5.8
Congress	5.7
Major companies	5.5
Labor unions	5.4
Government in Manila	5.1
Political parties	4.8

Note: Mean trust scores range from 0 to 1, with "0 "standing for least trust and "10" standing for most trust. The original categories were "a great deal," "quite a lot," "not very much," and "none at all."

Table 23 reports that nearly four-fifths of 79 percent said that it is "definitely" or "probably" the government's charge to provide childcare to everyone who wants it. As well, a more sizable 90 percent state the same preference for the state to provide a decent standard of living for the old. Similar claims for state support appeared in an earlier study of Filipino attitudes toward welfare and inequality (Abad 1995). In that study, the resounding expressions of state support among Filipinos paralleled the levels shown in socialist states and social democracies where citizens heavily depend on the state's welfare system to provide basic social services. In the context of Sztompka's theory of trust, however, this strong expectation of state intervention may reflect paternal dependence – a form of support that in countries like the Philippines may come in trickles, if at all, owing to tight government resources.

It is ironic that adult Filipinos expect so much from the state yet are relatively alienated from political life. The SWS/ISSP survey asked: *"To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement – People like me don't have any say about what the Government does."* A total of 39 percent strongly agreed or agreed to the statement, while 28 percent disagreed or strongly disagreed (see Table 24). This yields a margin of + 11 percent in favor of people saying, in effect, that they are relatively voiceless in state affairs. At the same time, people are not deeply immersed in political talk. Asked *"how often do you discuss politics with friends?,"* 6 percent replied "almost all of the time" while 21 percent said "almost never." This leaves a margin of -15% in favor of not being too engaged in political discussions; indeed, the majority or 66 percent discuss politics only occasionally.

Table 23. Percent Distribution of Attitudes toward Government Initiatives – Philippines, SWS September 1-18, 2001 Survey

Reply	On the whole, do you think it should or should not be the government's responsibility to provide...?	
	... child care for everyone who wants it	*... a decent standard of living for the old*
Definitely should be	53%	66%
Probably should be	26	24
Probably should not be	12	6
Definitely should not be	9	4
Total	100%	100%
(N)	*(1,194)*	*(1,196)*

Yet, despite having little say in government affairs and a relative disinterest in political talk, Filipinos still feel that they can do something to improve their situation. The SWS/ISSP survey posed this situation to respondents: *Suppose you wanted the local government to bring about some improvements in your local community, how likely is it that you would be able to do something about it?"* The results: 64 percent claimed that it is "very likely" or "somewhat likely" that they can do something about it, while 36 percent said it is "not very likely" or "not at all likely" that they can do something about it. This leaves a margin of +28 percent in favor of being able to effect a change. Is this a sign of political efficacy, or simply an expression of optimism?

Optimism is a sign of hope. So is happiness. And Filipinos are generally a happy lot. *If you were to consider your life in general these days,* the SWS/ISSP survey asked, *how happy or unhappy would you say you are on the whole*? Nearly three-fourths or 72 percent (see Table 25) claimed that they are "very happy" or "fairly happy." But hope is not a form of social capital, and as much hope can ease suffering, renew inner strength, or lead people to trust others more, it is not the kind of resource that will yield private returns and public effects. Hope may, in fact, represent a response to situations where social capital is wanting and scarce.

Table 25. Percent Distribution of R's Reported Happiness – Philippines,SWS September 1-18, 2001 Survey

If you were to consider your life in general these days, how happy or unhappy would you say you are, on the whole ?	Percent
Very happy	31
Fairly happy	53
Not very happy	12
Not at all happy	4
Total	100%
(N)	*(1,196)*

Table 24. Percent distribution of responses to indicators of political efficacy - Philippines, SWS September 1-18, 2001 Survey

Questions/Statement					
"How likely is it that you would be able to (bring about some improvement in your local community)?"	Percent	*"People like me don't have any say about what the Government does."*	Percent	*"How often do you discuss politics with your friends?"*	Percent
Very or Somewhat likely	64	Strongly agree/Agree	39	Almost all or Most the time	17
Not very ot not at all likely	36	Neither aqgree nor disagree	33	Occasionally	62
Not at all likely		Disagree/Strongly disagree	28	Almost never	21
Total	100%	Total	100%	Total	100%
(N)	(1,127)	(N)	(1,145)	(N)	(1,160)
Margin[a]	+28%	Margin[b]	+11%	Margin[c]	-4%

[a]The margin is the difference between the percentage of the "Very or Somewhat likely" category (64 percent) and the percentage of the "Not very/Not at all likely" category (36 percent).

[b]The margin represents the difference between the percentages in the extreme categories: the "Strongly agree/Agree" category (39 percent) and the percentage of the "Disagree/Strongly disagree category (28 percent).

[c]The margin is the difference between the percentages in the extreme categories: the "Almost all or Most of the time" category (17 percent) and the "Almost never" category (21 percent).

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This paper has explored the configurations of two key notions of social capital, social networks and trust, as revealed by national survey data on social relations. Its findings can be grouped into three themes. The first theme, entrenched in the Philippine social science literature, concerns the pervasiveness and strength of family and friendship ties—the "double F-connection" (Fawcett et al. 1987)—in Filipino society. What social scientists have noted five or so decades ago (see, for instance, Pal 1966; Carroll 1968) remain as strong in the new millennium. Then as now, Filipinos build strong binding social capital with family members and depend upon them for material, psychic, and symbolic needs throughout the life cycle. Close friends are part of this network of significant others; they can also be counted upon to provide what a family cannot offer or augment what the family can meagerly give (Morais 1980, 1981; Dumont 1995; Kiefer 1971).

Cultural norms support this exchange of assistance among network members, and few see these acts of service as repressive or burdensome, perhaps because these acts, as Ann Oakley (1992) has suggested for motherhood, are couched in the rhetoric of duty, love, and caring. It is a ripe situation for what Putnam (2000:136) calls "thick trust," or "trust embedded in personal relations that are strong, frequent, and embedded in wider networks." In such circumstances, a network of family and friends becomes important – and in the Philippine case, may be the only way to find a caregiver, secure funds, seek consolation, get a job, and even perhaps to gain a promotion. The weakness of strong ties, however, lies precisely in what may become an acute dependence among persons on family and friends (or on a paternal state) as well as an inability to build ties with persons outside this circle of significant others, an essential requirement of an active public life

Many studies point out that family relations, or strong kin ties, also take center stage in social networks across different societies. But the importance of these ties varies from one society to another. These strong ties, for example, are particularly striking in communities where trust is low (Cheale 2000), where people's options are relatively limited (Phillipson et al. 2004:11), where the "culture of the public world" is weak (Mulder 2000), and where the state is weak (Carroll 1993). All four apply to the Philippines, and so does another factor, and the second major theme of this paper, namely the relative lack of bridging social capital or ties to wider networks, among Filipinos, the kind of connections obtained from membership and participation in organizations. Filipinos have not taken much advantage of the strength of weak ties, one consequence perhaps being a general attitude of mistrust toward strangers.

Filipino involvement in associations, this data suggest, remains minimal despite the proliferation of civil society groups in the Philippines, and despite the tireless efforts of many public and private agencies to get people to organize into credit unions, agricultural groups, cooperatives, and the like. While slightly more than half the sample are members of an organization, only a quarter or so can be said to be active. Moreover,

Filipinos are more likely to participate in organizations that relate to the private realm of religion and sports, than in groups that relate to the realm of economics and politics, the realm that directly relates to improvements in material life. Why this is so remains an issue for subsequent research. It is enough to note here that in the social capital literature, civic engagement, or strong associational ties, is one solid marker for flourishing democracies. Indeed, part of the country's civic woes may lie in personalistic nature of political life – a state of affairs aided and abetted by an abundance of bonding social capital and the paucity of bridging social capital The woes also stem from the tendency among organizations, as suggested by this paper, to fall under the leadership and control of elite groups.

This point brings us to the paper's third major theme, namely the asymmetry of social capital. This report has consistently shown disparities by gender, socioeconomic status, and residence, and to some extent, inequalities by age, marital status. In general, people of privilege—males, urban residents, better educated persons, those with higher family incomes, and to some extent older people—possess a better stock of social capital than their less privileged counterparts. Other studies (e.g., Phillipson 2004) report different sources of disparities – by household type, for example, or by race, ethnicity, and even sexual orientation. Reviewing trends in social capital in eight advanced societies, Putnam (2002:414-415) observes the "growing inequality in the distribution of social capital." And the evidence keeps mounting: people who trust more, join more, and bond more tend to come from the ranks of the privileged. In turn, people least likely to trust more, join more, and connect more find themselves in the fringes of society, short of human capital and lacking access to financial capital. The penalty for diminished social capital is social exclusion.

Efforts to involve the poor and powerless in building social capital can help reduce or eliminate these disparities. If these efforts also succeed in altering the ways in which the larger society distributes scarce goods, then these disparities can be held in check for a longer period of time. Other things being equal, people with limited social capital will have lower life chances compared to those who are better connected. The task of change will thus come from expanding social capital at the bottom, and shaking the "other things" from above so that the system can dismantle its strategies of exclusion. The research task, from a sociological perspective, is to illuminate how social capital operates in the context of culture, structure, and an agency that is subject to, but not enticed by, culture and structure.

Appendix A Demographic Characteristics of Respondents SWS/ISSP 2001 National Survey on Social Relations

Characteristics	Percent or value	N
REGION *(population weight)*		
National Capital Region	*25*	*300*
Balance of Luzon	*25*	*300*
Visayas	*25*	*300*
Mindanao	*25*	*300*
PLACE OF RESIDENCE		
Large city	18	213
Small city, town, or suburb	21	255
Rural village	61	732
NO. OF PERSONS IN HOUSEHOLD		
1-2	12	140
3-4	34	410
5-6	32	384
7-8	15	183
9-10	5	64
11 or more	2	19
Median	*5.0*	-
Mean	*4.9*	-
S.D.	*2.2*	-
GENDER *(pre-determined)*		
Male	50	600
Female	50	600
AGE GROUP		
18-29	24	283
30-45	41	490
46-60	23	281
61 & more	12	147
Median Age	*40.0*	-
Mean	*41.4*	-
S.D.	*14.6*	-
MARITAL STATUS		
Never married	13	152
Presently married	77	928
Widowed, Separated, Divorced	10	120
RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION		
None	< 1	3
Roman Catholic	78	936
Islam	4	50
Protestant	5	57
Philippine church	2	29
Other Christian	7	83
Other non-Christian	3	39

Characteristics	Percent or value	N
EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT		
No formal education	2	28
Some elementary	15	176
Completed elementary	19	236
Some high school/vocational	16	188
Completed high school/vocational	26	306
Some college	9	114
Completed college/Post college	13	151
R's OCCUPATION		
Non-Manual	29	296
Upper Professionals	17	174
Lower Professionals	12	122
Manual	*55*	*567*
Upper Skilled	25	252
Lower Skilled	31	315
Farm, Fishing, Forestry	15	157
WORK STATUS		
Working		
Full-time	*40*	*478*
Part-time	18	220
Less than part-time	5	48
Unpaid family worker	< 1	7
Not working		
Unemployed	13	157
Housewife	17	207
Student	1	17
Retired	4	45
Disabled	< 1	5
Other, not in labor force	< 1	11
MONTHLY FAMILY INCOME		
P3,000 & below	22	262
P3,001-P5,000	29	348
P5,001-P10,000	26	308
Over P10,000	23	281
Median family income	*P5,000*	-
Mean	*P8,710*	-
S.D.	*P11,283*	-
PLACE OF RESIDENCE		
Rural village, farm	61	732
Small city, suburb	21	255
Large city	18	213
LENGTH OF STAY IN COMMUNITY		
Median	*25.1*	-
Mean	26.0	-
S.D.	18.3	-

NOTE

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OFW Remittances, Community, Social and Personal Services and the Growth of Social Capital

Leslie V. Advincula-Lopez

Remittances of Overseas Filipino Workers (OFW) constitute one of the most important sources of foreign revenues for the Philippines in the last 30 years. While having the most direct and far-reaching impact on OFW families, remittances seemed to have failed to create a substantial social development impact both at the national level and the community-sending localities. These conclusions stem from the observation that majority of the remittances are spent on consumer durables, dwellings, and education for their children with only a small percentage of remittances being channeled into real productive investments. This study argues that OFWs invest in social and personal services to strengthen their bonds with family and friends, thereby, increasing their social status/security in the community. Drawing on existing case studies of communities with known high concentration of overseas workers, the study examines the social context of OFWs' spending patterns and shows how these investments make sense if considered within the structure of their social relations. Utilizing the concept of social embeddedness and social capital, the study illustrates that seemingly non-productive investments are actually investments in constructing social capital (e.g., education support for children/relatives, sponsorships in weddings/baptisms, medical assistance for relatives) and the social security of their families left behind as well as when the migrant eventually retires. The results of the study indicate that remittances do have an important role in the development of social capital both at the household and community levels through the expansion of the community's social and personal services (CSPS).This could enhance the quality of life both at the individual and community levels but could also exacerbate the heavy burden borne by overseas workers.

BACKGROUND ON OFW REMITTANCES

The importance of OFW remittances to the national economy is well documented (Abella 1993; Alburo 1993; Go 1998 & 2000; Soriano 1996; Rodriguez 1996a and 1996b; Tan 2000; Porio 2006). Remittances propped up the economy during the crisis years of the 1980s and are partially responsible for the feeble economic growths experienced during the 1990s. The percentage share of remittances to the GNP has risen steadily from 2.38 percent in 1986 to 6.44 percent in 1995 (Lamberte and Llanto 1996 as cited in Go 1998). Latest figures reported remittance to GNP ratio to be 7.1 percent and remittances to export earnings ratio to be 16.7 percent (Tan 2000).

In 1995, dollar remittances of OFWs reached a record of $4.7 billion, which is a tremendous jump from the $103 million posted in 1975 (Soriano 1996). During the mid-1980s, remittances were large enough to cover all the trade deficits of the country and by 1988, they were large enough to still cover about two-thirds of this imbalance. They were also a significant component of the country's total export earnings (Rodriguez 1996a). In 1993, they were estimated to be equivalent to 22 percent of the total merchandise exports of the Philippines (Puri and Ritzema 2004). In 2000, remittances reached $6.0 billion (POEA 2004).

Considering these amounts, the actual contributions of remittances to the country's GNP and export earnings can be much more substantial. According to Tan (2000), the actual remittances volume could be double the official figures since the practice of many OFWs of sending money through informal networks such as friends going home and through other non-banking institutions are not reflected in the figures released by the Central Bank, which only measure remittances coursed through the formal banking system. The underestimation is most severe in the case of seafarers whose incomes were remitted directly to their respective families by their foreign agents (Tan 2000).

Sea-based workers dominated the expatriated labor in the 1970s. However, over time, a reversal of pattern was effected with the land-based workers overtaking the former before the decade was over. This pattern continued with land-based workers outnumbering the sea-based three to one in year 2000.

Since 1985, OFW remittances showed an over-all increasing trend. Some fluctuations however were also noted through the years. A case in point was the significant decrease in volume from 1995 to 1997. Battistella (1998) considered this downtrend in remittances as a temporary thing, an aftermath of the Flor Contemplacion[1] execution. The government at that time bowed to political pressures and implemented stringent policy regulations on entertainers planning to work abroad. This resulted in a substantial decrease in the number of OFW deployed. Consequently, the volume of money remitted decreased significantly.

Lately, the decline in the amount of remittances indicated labor saturation and increased competition from other developing countries sending workers abroad. Labor saturation is demonstrated by workers from developing countries like the Philippines and Bangladesh who were usually willing to take on jobs at a much lower salary pushing down the wage scale in the process. Roughly ten years ago, Rodriguez (1996a) already noted the decrease in the starting average incomes of overseas Filipino workers.

The total volume of money remitted home did not solely originate from migrant workers abroad. A substantial percentage was also recorded by a stock of permanent Filipino emigrants now residing in other countries, particularly the United States. In 1993, more than half (62.2%) of all official remittances from land-based migrants originated in the United States (Rodriguez 1996a).

The geographical distribution of OFW remittances indicated geographic concentration. Between 1985 and 1994,

Figure 1. Volume of remittances by province, 1985, 1991 and 1994



high remittance provinces included Pampanga, Pangasinan, Cavite, Laguna, Batangas and Bulacan (Figure 1). These provinces aside from being closest to the National Capital Region were also the most urbanized.

OFW REMITTANCES AND THE COMMUNITY, SOCIAL AND PERSONAL SERVICES

At about the same time that the country was experiencing a boom in remittances inflow, it also experienced a parallel decline in the industrial sector of the economy and the rise of other sectors including personal services. Since the middle of the 1980s, GNP contribution of the industrial sector was steadily decreasing and percentage wise, the output from the industrial sector has long been over taken by the services sector. From 1985 to 2000, 42 percent of the country's GNP came form the services sector.

Although the GNP shares coming from the personal services sector remained stable, it did not preclude employment expansion. There were indications that a substantial percentage of the country's labor force was located in the community, social and personal services sector (CSPS). Employment data from the National Statistics Office indicates that employment shares in the CSPS gradually increased from 1980 to 2000. But the fixed GNP shares coupled with the increased employment figures indicate employment saturation. Based on this observation, this study decomposes CSPS into two indicators—employment and output—to test the labor-saturation observed in certain sectors of the local economy (Gonzalez et al. 2001). This means that the additional employment in CSPS does not automatically translate into higher incomes or output. On the other hand, output in CSPS may require very little human intervention and would have very limited employment implications.

This study particularly focuses on the volume of social and personal services at the provincial level. These are consumption-oriented and respond to either collective or individual demands. The 1977 standard industry classification code defined community, social and personal services (CSPS) as any of the following activities: sanitary, educational, medical/dental/health, social and community services, research, social welfare, motion picture/entertainment, amusement/recreation, personal and household services, repair of motor vehicles, laundries, barber/beauty shops, photographic studios, restaurant and hotels, cafes and other eating places and lodging places.

Studies conducted in developing countries that included India, Papua New Guinea, Thailand, and parts of East Africa indicate that as much as 90 percent of the income derived from remittances is used for what might be considered "consumption" forms of expenditure, although it is difficult to fit many forms of expenditure, such as education, into one or the other category (Parnwell 1993). Specific to the Philippines, this study confirms the same strong association between expenditures on consumer items and OFW remittances flowing into the country.

The distribution of employment and output in the CSPS among provinces in the country indicate the OFW remittances–CSPS connection. In 1994, the provinces of Cebu, Davao del Sur, Negros Occidental, Cavite, Laguna, and Iloilo were highest in terms of output and employment shares in the CSPS sector (Figure 2). These provinces are largely similar to the provinces that posted the highest shares in OFW remittances in the 1980s and the 1990s as mentioned earlier in this paper.

In a general sense, shares in both employment and output in CSPS were of comparable magnitude. It is interesting

Figure 2. Percent Share in Employment and Revenue in CSPS, 1994



to note, however, that the substantial employment shares in some provinces (e.g., Pampanga, Albay, Pangasinan) were not coupled with an equally substantial output share. Again, this could be an initial indication of labor saturation in the personal services sector.

In the absence of significant growth in the industrial-manufacturing sector, this study points out the strong relationship between OFW remittances and personal services sector (CSPS), as indicated empirically by correlation results (Table 1). The correlation coefficients indicate that remittance shares per province are positively and strongly associated with output ($r = .64$, $p < .01$) and employment ($r = .66$, $p < .01$) in the personal services sector. This illustrates that an expansion in the volumes of employment and output took place together with the substantial flow of OFW remittances coming into the country. This association confirms the much criticized predisposition of overseas workers and their families to purchase non-durable consumer items.

There are continuing concerns regarding the lack of impact of remittances in correcting the structural imbalances of the economy as the major portion of the these remittances is spent on consumer durables, dwellings, and education and only a small percentage is being channeled into real productive investments. Criticisms regarding these consumption patterns, however, ignore the personal circumstances and structural conditions in which migrants and their families make their decisions. Given conditions like poor infrastructure and limited access to credit, the spending habits of migrants can be seen as rational. While these habits may be undesirable from the general development perspective of exporting countries, they are essentially consistent with the individual migrant worker's motivation for migration (Puri and Ritzema 2004). In the long term, the established lack of, and poor, employment opportunities may lead to further massive emigration to other countries with the pool of skilled workers representing potential international

Table 1. Correlation matrix of remittances and CSP (employment and output)

Variables		1	2	3
1. Remittances			.658**	.637**
	N	—	*	(75)
			(75)	
2. CSPS (emp)			—	.986**
			(75)	
3. CSPS (output)				—

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

migrants. This is important as it highlights the global-local nexus in shaping the economic landscape of the country.

REMITTANCES AS A FORM OF SOCIAL CAPITAL

By considering the social context of the families of OFWs, specifically their personal relations and the structures of social relations they find themselves in, the concept of social embeddedness seems appropriate in making sense of their seemingly purely economic decisions of how and where to invest money from remittances. In this sense, remittances and its utilization can be used to enhance social capital, or the webs of relationships and norms invoking mutual sense of trust and reciprocity that could enhance the quality of life both at the household and at the community levels (Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993).

A typology of social capital

The most widely accepted definition of social capital is the ability to secure resources by virtue of membership in social networks or larger social structures. This definition however does not come without problems. One, there is a tendency to confuse access to resources through networks with the resources itself. It presumes that access to resources automatically indicates presence of social capital. Second, there is a tendency to gloss over the positive rather than the negative consequences of social capital which may include exclusion of outsiders, excessive claims on group members, restrictions on individual freedoms and downward leveling of the norms. Third, the motivations of the providers of social capital in these transactions remain untheorised (Portes and Landolt 2000).

The lives of migrant workers and those of their families back home are linked through remittances. Sending remittances is considered the responsibility of the workers to their immediate household and to their relatives (Go 2001). They are used for the education of the children, daily sustenance, and home repairs, among others, that are all part of the community, social and personal services sector of the economy. Remittances are not only coping mechanisms for the precarious situation of families left behind but are also forms of insurance for the migrant, as these reinforce the obligations of the family toward the migrant in case he loses his/her job. The allocation of remittances, therefore, is not a purely economic decision. It is constrained by the social relations maintained by workers to their immediate and extended families and manifests the concept of social embeddedness.

The concept of social embeddedness argues that behavior and instititutions are constrained by ongoing social relations (Granovetter 1985). Therefore, the seemingly non-rational behavior can be appreciated better by considering the situational constraints faced by the decision-maker. In this light, the seemingly irrational investment decisions made by the migrant workers make much more sense when goals other than economic are considered. Keeping in mind sociability, status, and power, migrants' decisions in this context would seem more rational and instrumental, as these advance the migrants' social capital.

Coleman (1988) argues that the familial responsibility and obligations that tie the individuals to their families of orientation and birth also indicate social capital.

Earlier, Portes and Sensenbrenner (1993) identify four expectations linked to the utilization of remittances, making remittances a form of social capital. These are (1) *value introjection* or the fulfillment of value imperatives learned during the process of socialization; (2) *reciprocity transactions* or accumulation of "chits," which can be redeemed in the future when the need arises, when good deeds are done to others; (3) *bounded solidarity* or cohesion rooted in common adversities faced by a group of people and, (4) *enforceable trust* which is generating social trust through the individual members' disciplined compliance with group expectations in anticipation of acquiring "good standing" in a particular group.

In a later article, Portes and Landolt (2000) further classify these sources of social capital according to the presence or absence of overarching structures defining the transactions. Altruistic sources of capital include value introjection which is the granting of resources to others out of moral obligation and bounded solidarity to members of the same territorial, ethnic, or religious community. Meanwhile, instrumental sources of capital includes reciprocity transactions which are simple face-to-face reciprocity that carry the full expectation of commensurate return by the benefited party and enforceable trust which is embedded in larger social structures that act as guarantors of full returns either from the benefited party or the community at large. More importantly, this later analysis of social capital pointed out the possibility of both positive and negative consequences.

Social capital at the household level

In the Philippines, the family is the ultimate source of physical, psychological and financial security. Members of the family depend on one another during times of crisis. They are expected to provide assistance for mutual dependence and mutual sharing including material goods. The success of one member is considered the success of the whole family and this ongoing concern for the family partly explains the generosity and the great sacrifices endured by the OFWs for their respective families (Valerio 2002). The children at a very young age are socialized to consider the needs of the family as a unit before that of the individual. Because of this attitude, there is a blurring of boundaries where the individual ends and the family begins.

Many Filipino families are nuclear in structure but reciprocal obligations are provided to the extended family. According to Valerio (2002), assistance is usually provided according to the closeness of ties. Priority is given to lineal relatives (i.e., spouse, children, parents, and siblings), followed by collateral relatives (i.e., uncles, aunts, cousins, nephews, and nieces). Aside from this, assistance is likewise provided to non-relatives depending on the degree of closeness and frequency of interaction. This fluid definition of family plus the absence of either the father, mother or other household members who work abroad necessitate the creation of alternative-care taking arrangements,

which makes "household" a more appropriate unit of analysis (Porio 2006).[2]

According to Porio (2006), the re-constitution, maintenance and survival of the Filipino households in the last 30 years have increasingly relied on the global migration of OFWs. Accordingly, the massive movement not only of labor but also of capital, goods and information across multiple borders impinge on migrant's household formation and resource mobilization. The household members reconfigure these global processes in ways that are meaningful to the demands of their households and allied social networks. In short, these emerging global demands are negotiated by households through the creation of specific forms of social capital not only at the household but also at the community level.

In this study, the uses of remittances in the country are categorized by applying Portes and Sensenbrenner's (1993) concept of social capital in relation to remittances (Table 2). The utilization of remittances as cited in earlier studies (Pertierra et al. 1992; Arcinas and Banzon-Bautista 1986; Arcinas et al. 1989; Velazquez 1987) is mainly instrumental in origin and classified as either falling into any one of two forms of social capital. The first category of remittance use in the Philippines is *enforceable trust* which is reflected in the number of times migrant workers were asked to act as sponsors in weddings and baptisms, contribute to community projects, and, on their own, sponsor elaborate ritual ceremonies such as weddings and baptisms. In this sense, migration and the corresponding increase in income is completed by a greater honor and prestige accorded to the migrant

Table 2. Typology of Remittances Utilization in Filipino Households (Advincula-Lopez 2005)[3]

Use of Remittance	Enforceable Trust	Reciprocity Transactions
1. Daily Sustenance	X	
2. Payment of Debts	X	
3. Purchase of Consumer Durables (e.g., appliances)	X	
4. Sponsorship of events (e.g., weddings, baptisms, birthdays)	X	
5. Payment of Debts/Loans	X	
6. Contributions to community projects	X	
7. Housing Improvements/Purchase of House/House and Lot/Lot only	X	X
8. Education of other family members	X	X
9. Investment for jeepneys, tricycle and other micro-enterprise	X	X
10. Farm Inputs (e.g., chemicals, seedlings, fertilizers, tractor, pump, draft Animals)	X	X

worker by the rest of the community. The need for "status validation" also entails the projection of affluence and an improved lifestyle, which is reflected in the consumption of basic food items such as meat, fish, and canned goods.

Enforceable trust is illustrated when the ability to purchase the said goods uplifts the status of the migrant worker not only within his family but in the rest of the community as well. Investments in housing and housing improvements still remain very high in the expenditure priorities of migrant workers and their families. Migrants invest in housing because they feel that improved housing is similar to education in indicating social mobility. For them, housing investments are "monuments of hard-earned success," regardless of whether or not the migration experience had actually been successful (Arcinas and Banzon-Bautista 1986).

The second category of remittance use is reciprocity transactions which are manifested when families and friends who are at the receiving end of these expenditures feel a heightened sense of gratitude or indebtedness to the migrant worker or his family. In the process, the migrant worker or his family are able to accumulate "chits," which they could later use when they find themselves in need of help or assistance.

Other expenditures such as investments in housing improvements, household appliances, education of other family members, micro-enterprises, farm inputs such as fertilizers, chemicals, and machineries, and the purchase of vehicles, can be classified as a move for acquiring social capital that pertains to both *reciprocity transactions* and *enforceable trust*.

Another "investment" of choice is education for children and other family members. The insistence of migrants to continuously finance the education of their family members despite the limited prospects for employment should be seen within the cultural and social context in which migrants and their families are embedded. In the Philippines, education, especially college education, is an indication of upward social mobility (Arcinas and Banzon-Bautista 1986; Pertierra 1992). It is a form of human capital investment that determines the reproducibility of families in succeeding generations. Investing in children's education increases income potentials and is thus a seemingly rational decision. At the same time, parents who can afford to send their children to good schools are accorded more respect, not only by extended family members, but also by members of the community.

In short, the social constraints and expectations impinging not only on the overseas workers but their families as well create a particular pattern of remittance utilization. The prioritization of expenditures on housing construction, education of family members, the purchase of non-durable consumer items like food for daily sustenance and electronic appliances, and even the sponsorship of huge events, imply the expansion of the community and personal services rather than the industrial sector of the economy.

Aside from the utilization of remittances, social capital was also manifested in the adjustments made by the households to cope with the changing demands of increasingly transnational households. Unlike however with the

utilization of remittances, the latter seem to be more altruistic rather than instrumental in origin.

The emerging types of family support specifically involve the care of the children when the mother or father or both leave the country to work abroad as OFW. It is common to see households composed of grandparents with grandchildren or children left in the custody of married or unmarried aunts. Even when the father is around, there is still a need to tap on other female family members to fill up the role vacated by the natural mother because many husbands are unable or traditionally unprepared to take on the nurturing and home management roles vacated by their wives.

Although the motivation of migrants and their families in the allocation of remittances seem to be instrumental forms of social capital, the decision to take on the parenting role seems to be more altruistic form of social capital. Many of the interviewed grandmothers and aunts who took over these roles admitted that the material rewards are very minimal but they feel that it is their responsibility to take care of the children as it will eventually result into better chances of survival for the whole family (Añonuevo and Guerra 2002[4]).

The mutual dependence mentioned previously manifests itself through female relatives who are quite willing to take on the mothering role. More than the males, women in the Philippines are socialized to manage their households and to help out relatives in need, especially if it involves the welfare of children (Añonuevo and Guerra 2002). These alternative household arrangements do not come without concomitant costs. Although documented cases are few, the age-gap between grandparents and children could result in either too lenient or too strict disciplining style. Many caretakers are in a bind because they cannot make the final decisions especially on matters involving the children and the utilization of the remittances. Such an arrangement could be a potential source of conflict. Also, it is common for surrogate mothers to quit their respective jobs just to be able to take care of the children of their relatives working abroad. This could be the curtailment of individual freedom, which is one of the negative consequences of social capital as pointed out by Portes and Landolt (2000).

Meanwhile, the decision to work abroad and the eventual flow of remittances to the members of the family left behind also bring about another form of altruistic social capital. This refers to the network developed for the eventual migration of other family members. The importance given to the success of the whole family partly explains the motivation for migrants to facilitate the movements of other family members.

Filipino migrants, once settled in their area of destination are expected to facilitate the migration of other household members and close kin through direct sponsorship or referral to possible employment opportunities (Valerio 2000). The strategy remains basically the same with a mother or older sister going abroad first and who would later on send for the daughter and other younger siblings. Valerio's (2000) study include a migrant from Mabini, Batangas (a province south of Manila) who was able

to facilitate the movement of 70 relatives to Italy. Another migrant worker from Mindoro, an island province also south of Manila, was able to facilitate the movement of a total of 50 relatives, also to Italy.

Sometimes, in the absence of a close kin, a more distant kin, friends or even townmates may be assisted to migrate just to alleviate the sense of isolation and vulnerability felt by the earlier migrant. The arrival of friends and other town mates could help alleviate feelings of homesickness and at the same time provide an additional source of security. In this latter case, social capital is more instrumental rather than altruistic in form because it is characterized by more explicit returns on the part of the part of the initial migrants (as was the case of earlier migrant workers in the area).

Ultimately, the sources and utilization of remittances will be contingent on the types of households that are being created because of the challenges and opportunities afforded by international migration and the consequent flow of remittances from abroad. Utilizing the Family Income and Expenditure Survey, Porio (2006) compared non-remittance vis-à-vis remittance receiving households and found that there are more extended and non-relative members in remittance receiving households. There are also more single, widowed, divorced and separated among the remittance-receiving households. The patterns are indicative of the impact of working abroad on household structures. For those who are already married, marital stresses brought about by long term separation seem to result into heightened cases of separation. For those who are still single, postponement of marriage seems to be the emerging trend. It would be interesting to examine in future studies the actual reasons for this marriage postponement.

The discrepancy in terms of educational attainment and type of occupation is also glaring with remittance-receiving households being more educated and working in professional/technical types of jobs. In spite of their clearly advantageous position, there is also a lower participation rate among this type of households. These findings reinforce previous findings of over-dependency on the migrant workers and the erosion of the spirit of self-reliance on the household members left behind (Porio 2006).

In another study by Añonuevo (2002), one husband whose wife was in Italy actually admitted being jobless for the last five years. This is not an isolated case; many husbands who are left behind are jobless and are not seeking employment. Although many of the women were not originally the main household breadwinner, once they have migrated, many ended up in this role. Many have expressed their desires to come home permanently but are deterred by the conditions of over-dependency that developed in their absence. Far from being positive, this excessive claiming on successful members, is actually one of the negative consequences that can develop from having social capital. One return-migrant from Germany consciously decided to live quite a distance from her relatives just to be far from their pleas for help (Porio 2006).

Social Capital at the Community Level

There have been many authors (e.g., Putnam 1993) who equated social capital with "civicness" and viewed it as a feature of larger social aggregates such as communities, cities and even nations. They highlighted trust, norms and networks that can improve the efficiency of the collective. Portes and Landolt (2000) while recognizing the distinction between social capital at the individual and at the community level, believed that this aspect of social capital remains undertheorized. Social capital at the community level is treated both as cause and as an effect, which makes the argument tautological.

It seems, however, that in the case of remittances coming from overseas Filipino workers, the problem of cause and effect is not as severe. The actual comparison of communities receiving substantial remittances from abroad indicates a clear advantage over the other neighboring communities which do not have substantial sources of external resources.

The advantages gained by migrant-sending communities stem primarily from social networks. More specifically, there are organizations formed out of the conscious effort of the members to share the blessings that they have been receiving to the communities that originally nurtured them. In a town south of Manila, migrant workers to Italy, Spain, and Saudi Arabia decided to form various organizations to provide assistance to their home communities (Opiniano 2002). Their projects included the refurbishing of the chapel, which now boasts of a marble altar and more than ten gold chandeliers imported from Italy. The migrant workers also lent assistance to the village elementary school through the construction of basic physical infrastructure (e.g., deep well), provision of educational facilities and monetary support to various school activities. These types of expenditures at the community level as encouraged by the social relationships maintained by the overseas workers, fuel the expansion of small scale construction jobs that ultimately is linked with the community and personal services sector of the economy.

As in the household level, social capital at the community level cannot be neatly categorized as being instrumental or altruistic. Migrants, especially those who are parents know fully well that it is to their advantage to support activities catering to the youth. At the same time, the assistance they provide somehow alleviates the guilt that they feel in leaving their children behind. Meanwhile, there are also workers who help out of the belief that blessings, in this case, the opportunity to work abroad, must be shared with the community.

Aside from the various organizations of the migrant workers, the stream of assistance was also made possible through various forms of social networks that emerged through the years. These include coordination with the village council, the Parent-Teacher Association (PTA), and other relevant government agencies. Even the crossing of traditional religious divides with migrant Catholics providing assistance to Protestants was also documented (Opiniano 2002).

For these communities, the village council purposely helps out in alleviating the negative consequences of overseas

work especially among the children. They organize various support activities that included sports fest, public forum, and counseling to minimize the impact of migration on the youth left behind. These reciprocal actions on the part of the actors left behind are in a way indicative of instrumental forms of social capital. Freed from the burden of "economic responsibilities," community-members left behind have more free time to undertake community activities subsidized by the migrants.

CONCLUSION

Taking off from Portes and Sensenbrenner (1993) and Portes and Landolt (2000), this article highlighted the use of OFW remittances as a form of social capital, which could be altruistic, instrumental, or both in its origins. Earlier studies on Filipino migrant workers highlighted only the instrumental nature of social capital within the households. A more nuanced view taken by this paper also emphasized that social capital built from the inflow of OFW remittances can also take on a very altruistic character. Family members who are willing to forego opportunities, even jobs to take care of children left behind by these migrant workers illustrate this phenomenon.

A more balanced approach on social capital also highlighted both the positive and the negative consequences of OFW remittances. Interestingly, the inflow of remittances brings about a host of adjustments among Filipino households which lead to the creation of further types of social capital. According to Asis (2006), Filipinos are migration savvy with the ability to respond and adjust to the demands of the global labor market. These are manifested through the various forms of social capital that included the migration networks that facilitated the movements of kin and kindred to foreign lands. Alternative source of mothering and nurturing by grandmothers, aunts and other female relatives also developed through the years. At the same time, however, the same migration processes yielded negative forms of social capital that included curtailment of individual freedom and excessive imposition and dependency on the migrant workers. Some workers have verbalized the need to settle home permanently but the financial impositions of the family members deter them from doing this.

Although still in its infancy, the social capital created by the flow of remittances at the community level is also significant especially in the light of the increasing number of provinces and consequently communities, which are now incorporated into the whole migration process. Based on the cited case studies, communities with significant OFWs are able to access infrastructure that cannot be or inadequately provided by the government. This facilitates better access to basic services compared with other communities within the same locality. However, the limited case studies looking into these seem to gloss only on the positive rather than the negative consequences of social capital. A more comparative approach to contrast communities with substantial remittances versus those with negligible flows can be illustrative as to how the development of social capital in one can actually result in social exclusion and further social inequality for the other. The continued preference for members of one's locality

or ethnic group can very well result into more uneven migration opportunities even for members coming from adjacent communities.

In spite of these limitations, the cases of many communities in the Philippines illustrate the need to distinguish household from community-level social capital. The cases cited indicate the abundance of social capital at the household level. However, for many Filipinos it is still a challenge to go beyond the household as a unit of mutual assistance and consequently prioritize the needs of the larger social units. It might be illuminating to also look into as to what extent of the accumulated community-level social capital is actually based on trust and concern for the collective rather than a case of distinct households accidentally pursuing very similar objectives.

NOTES

1 A Filipino domestic helper executed in Singapore.

2 Household is not limited by blood or marriage relations. It is the principal locus of social relations not only for human reproduction but also for the material and psychological well-being and socio-cultural mores of its members. It is sometimes interpreted as an income-pooling or labor-pooling social unit which functions as a means for diversifying income sources and risk among its members (Folbre 1986 as cited in Douglass 2006).

3 Using Portes and Sensenbrenner's (1993) typology of social capital.

4 The studies of Añonouevo and Guerra (2002), Añonuevo (2002), and Valerio (2002) all came from a collection of case studies in E. Dizon-Añonuevo and A.T. Añonuevo's (eds.) *Coming Home: Women, Migration and Reintegration.* The studies utilized a combination of key informant interviews, case studies, focus group discussions and consultation meetings of around 20 children, 20 caretakers and 15 husbands in San Pablo City and Mabini, Batangas. About 20 cases of migrant returnees were also drawn.

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THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF COMMUNITY AMONG SMALL-SCALE FISHERS IN MERCEDES, CAMARINES NORTE*

Corazon B. Lamug

Community-based action research and other intervention programs have gained currency in such fields as forestry and natural resources. Many of these programs rely on old conceptualizations of community focusing on such features as territorial boundaries, common goals and even affective aspects. The paper offers an ethnomethodological understanding of community as an accomplishment; it proposes that the properties of social life which seem objective, factual and trans-situational, are actually managed accomplishments or achievements of local processes. The aim of the ethnomethodological inquiry is to analyze the situated conduct of fishers in order to see how "objective" properties of community are accomplished.

Narratives of small scale fishers in Mercedes, Camarines Norte are analyzed to illustrate how fishers are "doing community." Because fishing involves access to resources in the sea and competition among several fishers, the fishers have over time evolved a set of norms governing conduct that is centered on sharing. The paper discusses different categories of sharing – from negotiating access to marine resources to sharing of catch with fishing companions and village people. Sharing also includes treating friends and kin to drinks and food after a successful fishing event. Thus, sharing behavior is something that is accomplished through interaction with others, and community is an accomplishment involving the local management of fishers' conduct in relation to normative conceptions of appropriate attitudes and activities for particular fishing-related situations. It also cites implications of the use of the ethnomethodological perspective on community for intervention programs specifically in forestry and fisheries.

INTRODUCTION

Community is a complex concept whose utility has waxed and waned over the years. It has regained currency in recent years due in part to the recognition of the importance of local initiatives and participatory approaches to development. For example, in forestry and natural resources, many action research and other intervention programs often invoke community-based approaches. How community is conceptualized is essential to understanding why the approach seems appropriate for some programs but not necessarily so for others. The paper offers a not very popular conceptualization of community. It proposes community not as a static feature of collectivities but as an accomplishment or achievement of members through interaction processes in local situations.

The data for this paper are drawn from a bigger qualitative study that focused on intergenerational gender relations in fishing families (Lamug 2003). The study was conducted in two coastal barangays of the town of Mercedes in Camarines Norte, and examined fishing behavior in specific situations. The analysis of fishers' narratives shows patterns which are reflective of norms governing fishing in the barangays and illustrates the processes by which the fishers accomplish community in their fishing and related activities as they share the resources of the sea with other fishers, with kin and with other residents of the barangay. In the course of engaging in fishing for their livelihood, their interactions invoke rules as these apply to the everyday situations encountered in productive activities. In different situational events, the local management of the behavior of fishers results in the strengthening of social bonds and networks.

The paper is organized into four parts. The first presents different conceptualizations of community focusing on the ethnomethodological perspective. The second describes a study of fishers whose narratives were analyzed in this paper. The third part is on sharing and the thematically organized fishing-related practices representing the accomplishment of community. The paper ends with a discussion of the implications of the ethnomethodological perspective on community for forestry and natural resources programs.

AN ETHNOMETHODOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE ON COMMUNITY

Community is a concept that has taken different meanings in different contexts. The usage of the term is not entirely consistent even among sociologists. This situation is even compounded by the blurred traditional distinctions between rural and urban communities and the fast changes not only in the communities themselves but more so in the larger geopolitical contexts in which these are embedded.

Community, like any sociological concept, displays many different facets. It has been given different definitions most of which were for purposes of delineating manageable areas of research. Among the earliest definitions was the one given by MacIver (1917:107) where a community is "a social unity whose members recognize as common a sufficiency of interests to allow the interactivities of common life." Over the years the concept has undergone some subtle changes with emphasis on such aspects as co-occupancy of a given territory (Park 1929), sharing "a common culture, ... arranged in a social structure, and exhibit an awareness of their uniqueness and separate entity as a group" (Mercer 1956:27), effects of urbanization, industrialization, and bureaucratization leading to the "eclipse of community" (Stein 1060:107), non-utility of an areally bounded social entity in favor of a new form of "community without propinquity" (Webber 1963:23), interdependence of generalized activities in and through a set of institutions for its continuity as a social and economic unity (Schnore 1973; Castells 1996), social relations characterized by personal intimacy, emotional depth, social coherence, and continuity in time (Baltzell 1968; Nisbet 1969; Crow and Allan 1994; Etzioni 1997), a means of intervention and a process of participation in society (Steuart

1985; Wenger 1995) and community attachment as the social infrastructure to deal with such issues as out-migration and mobilization of residents for community action (Flora and Flora 1990; Allen and Dillman 1994; Lamug 2002).

How does the ethnomethodological perspective differ from all these? The best clue is provided by the word itself – *ology,* "study of"; *method*, "the methods [used by]"; and *ethno*, "folk or people." It is thus, concerned with the common methods people employ to create a sense of order about the situations in which they interact (Watson and Goulet 1998). The aim of ethnomethodology is the analysis of the situated actions of members of a society in order to see how the supposedly stable patterns of social life are achieved.

The popular sociological explanation for stable patterns of social behavior invokes the institutionalized systems of norms and values which are internalized by the members of society. Parsons (1937) in his theory of action maintains that members of a society are socialized to respond to external social forces and are consequently motivated by inner moral directives. These normative conceptions of our culture specifying the appropriate attitudes and activities for particular situations influence the local management of conduct in such situations (Coulon 1995). Heritage (1984) discusses accountability as the possibility of describing actions and circumstances in serious and consequential fashion. Societal members routinely describe activities in ways that take notice of those activities and placing them in a social framework. These activities are designed with an eye as to how they might be evaluated.

The ethnomethodological perspective's notion of accountability pertains to both the activities that conform to prevailing normative conceptions and those that deviate. Rather than focusing on conformity or deviance, the issue is the possible assessment of action on the basis of normative conceptions. In other words, the process of rendering something accountable is an interactional accomplishment. Accountability allows persons to conduct their activities in relation to their circumstances (Heritage 1984).

The alternative conceptualization provided by ethnomethodology is that the members of society "do social order" which is the consequence of the "particular, contingent accomplishments of the production and recognition work" conducted by participants (Zimmerman and Pollner 1970:94). Thus, the "objective" and "factual" properties of social life acquire their status as such through the situated conduct of societal members. In other words, the seemingly "objective" properties are produced by people through their language and interaction in specific situations (Gubrium and Holstein 2000).

The meaning of community, therefore, is dependent on the context in which it is invoked. Ethnomethodology addresses the question, how is community made visible through members' descriptions and accounts (Patton 2002)? It focuses on how members, by invoking rules and elaborating on their application to specific cases, describe and constitute their activities as rational, coherent, and orderly (Zimmerman 1970; Wieder 1998). In fishing barangays, for example,

the descriptions and stories of fishers of their interactions with one another in specific situations are taken to constitute "doing community." These interactions allow others to systematically take the circumstances of the fishers into account and recognize the activities for what they are. Their intelligibility therefore rests on a symmetry between the production of interactions on the one hand and their recognition of the influence of normative conceptions on the other (Heritage 1984; Schegloff 1992).

THE FISHERS OF MERCEDES

The coastal town of Mercedes is Bicol's largest fishing ground and the nation's third largest (Lorejo 2002). Its rich marine resources make the production and processing of fish the major source of livelihood for the people of Mercedes. This fourth-class municipality produces at least 1,000 tons of fish daily. Fishing thus accounts for 56 percent of the town's total revenues. As an established port of trading vessels, numerous fishing vessels of different tonnages and capacities drop anchor on the port during the fishing season.

A total of 26 barangays comprise the town of Mercedes. Of these, two coastal barangays served as the study sites. These are Mambungalon and Pambuan where a large percentage of the households cite small-scale capture fishery as their major source of livelihood similar to most coastal barangays in other parts of the country. For fishers in Mambungalon and Pambuan, San Miguel Bay is their fishing area although when the sea is calm, many go to fish in areas farther than San Miguel Bay. Many households own motorized boats and various kinds of nets and other gears. They catch a wide variety of fishes and crabs depending on the season. The fishers are all aware of the periodicity and differential availability of marine species. Some species caught have high value in the market while low value ones are consumed by the household. The unpredictable climate and frequency of typhoons are often mentioned as causes of variability in fish catch. Additional sources of variation are mobility of fish and competition with non-local fishers who operate with big boats and mechanized gears. Fishers consider their occupation as very risky. Many accidents and thefts happen at sea putting the lives and boats of the fishers at risk.

Five families, two in Mambungalon and three in Pambuan were the cases for the study. For this paper, the narratives on fishing were used to illustrate how the fishers accomplish community in different situations.

SHARING AND THEMES ON ACCOMPLISHING COMMUNITY

The conceptualization of sharing has taken different forms where each emphasizes a particular facet of sharing. This section presents a brief overview of a selection of these conceptualizations in order to relate these to community. One form characterizes sharing as a distinct mode of transaction (Woodburn 1998; Gell 1992; Gibson 1986). Examples were drawn from hunting and gathering societies where large game is shared following a set of sharing rules. This ethos of sharing is distinguished from, for example, exchange or reciprocity which implies indebtedness and expectation of return.

Sharing often evokes both the spirit of spontaneous generosity and the fair apportionment of what is shared. As a form of economic behavior it implies the logic of divestment as opposed to accumulation. People give without expectation of return. Because some people are in a better position to share than others, sharing brings prestige and social value to the individual sharer and serves to reaffirm his/her status in the group. Moreover, sharing reflects the general expectation in social relations among immediate kinship and neighbors of the obligation of those who have to those who have not. It is an expression of "correct sentiments" in the relationship (Gluckman 1965:45). While sharing may have the consequence of maintaining social hierarchy, on the one hand, it could on the other hand serve as a "leveling mechanism" towards forging egalitarian social relations (Woodburn 1998).

Sharing is concerned "symbolically with 'total inclusion', it is constitutive of social totality, in a most immediate and spontaneous sense" (Mangahas 2000:13). Unlike reciprocity which constitutes persons and dyadic relationships, sharing constitutes specific social wholes. According to Price (1975), reciprocity as involving "sides" is different from sharing which is a "within" relationship. An ethos of sharing is seen to assert a cultural principle of interdependence. It is essential for survival in places that uphold the subsistence ethic. As a survival strategy, it is represented as a way of coping with risk or as a form of insurance so as to be able to depend on others in future time of need (Scott 1976).

Complementary to the act of sharing is the act of taking or partaking. Thus, such questions as the following are raised 'What is to be shared?', 'To whom should it be shared?', 'Does sharing depend on need, demand or other factors?'

Having described some selected facets of sharing, the next section discusses specific themes in the lives of fishers that draw from the perspective of sharing to illustrate the particular ways by which their everyday interactions represent the accomplishment of community. These themes are sharing the resources of the sea, sharing with fishing companions, sharing the catch with people on the shore after a fishing trip, and commensality after a successful fishing event.

Sharing the resources of the sea

People who make a living from the sea often describe it, on the one hand, as unpredictable, changing with weather and seasonal conditions, treacherous, and generous, soothing and calm, vast and powerful, on the other. These seeming contradictions and tensions reflect the wide diversity by which people view the sea. One common viewpoint is that the sea is much like any common property resource. In this view, there is open access to the resource that may engender the "tragedy of the commons" (Hardin 1968). With unregulated use of the resource, the individual gains from the commons often outweigh the costs which are shared by all. Eventually the depletion of the resource necessitates a course of action to ensure subsistence especially in poverty stricken areas.

The view of the sea as a commons has been criticized as a short temporal perspective. Brox (1990) maintains that

this "initial" phase of open access is generally followed by a "closing" phase where the commons becomes a "desert." He proposed that the open access phase be described as a "frontier" providing opportunities for delineating identities and communities.

The sea as a resource from which fishers make a living is thus an important space for social interaction. Because there are no individual territorial boundaries, one would expect intense competition among the fishers. Such a scenario would indeed lead to uncontrolled resource exploitation and eventually the tragedy of the commons. But there is ample historical evidence showing that fishers in many different places have over time evolved institutions for control over the resources to avert the tragedy.

How do the fishers of Mercedes "share the sea" to avoid rabid competition and at the same time ensure the sustainability of their source of livelihood? How do the specific interactional processes of their sharing of the sea become accomplishments of community?

The small-scale fishers of Mercedes use small motorized boats and different kinds of nets and other fishing gears. Depending on the season, fishers usually go out to sea in late afternoon, leave their *pangke* (fishing net) in certain areas, and return to retrieve these in early morning. The pangke are supposed to have caught the fish to be harvested upon retrieval.

While such a fishing trip is an individual "project" by a fisher and his companion, each trip provides an opportunity for community making. The fishers in practice are governed by the principle of primacy (i.e., a fisher who arrives in a particular area first, stakes a claim on the area). This stake is respected by fellow fishers who lay their own stakes some distance from the first one. At sea, where there are no territorial markers, how is this principle upheld? According to Romeo, "Alam namin kung kaninong pangke ang nakikita sa laut kasi may kanya-kanya kaming ganito (pointing to a floater)." (We know to whom the nets belong because of the distinctiveness of the floaters.) So as each fisher steers his boat, he watches out for markers like floaters of nets, little flags of other kinds of gears. "Sa dilim, malayo pa kita na yung ilaw ng naunang bangka, kaya iwas na sa lugar na yon ang dumadating," (In the dark, we could see the light of the first boat, so the next boats keep their distance.) he adds. His son, Samuel explains that a low density of fish catching gears has to be maintained to avoid competition and to ensure that fishes are caught by only one set of gears and not by others. This principle of primacy is a common refrain of the different fishers in their narratives. No one, however, could tell how it evolved and when it started.

From an ethnomethodological perspective, observance of the principle of primacy in the everyday behavior of fishers at sea is a norm that averts competition among people who rely on a resource that is commonly shared. Such a rule reduces the likelihood of fellow fishers returning from sea with empty nets. It is a variant of the distributive rule where the benefits from a common resource are distributed among fishers. This form of sharing affirms a cultural principle of interdependence that is essential for the survival of fishers who uphold the subsistence ethic (Scott 1976).

Sharing of catch with fishing companion

"Mapanganib and pangingisda sa laut, kaya walang nagpapalaut na solo." (Sea fishing is dangerous that is why no fisher goes by himself.) This statement of Alvin embodies the risks faced by fishers. He adds, "Kung minsan, biglang lumalakas ang hangin at ulan. Nung isang taon ay nahold-up ang aking motor, palakaya, pati pang-ilaw ko sa laut. Mabuti na lang at hindi kami sinaktan." (There are times of sudden strong winds and rain. Last year, pirates took my boat motor, gears and light at sea. I am thankful they did not hurt us.)

It is thus the current practice to take a companion whenever a fisher goes out to sea. Because sea fishing is a male activity, the male fishers always take a male companion. In many cases the companion is an adult son. However, there are as many cases where non-family members serve as companion. Alvin's son Ferdinand often went to sea with his father, but there were times when Alvin took his godson with him on some occasions. Romeo maintains that when he was young, he was brave and went fishing by himself. He hastens to add that more recently no one does solo fishing anymore.

Sharing the catch for the day between the fishers is another theme that is illustrative of the accomplishment of community. For having helped in procuring the catch, the fishing companion is given a share of the catch. Expectedly, the boat owner who also owns the pangke and other gears takes the larger share of the catch relative to his companion. The quantity of the shares allocated depends on the volume and type of catch.

Roberto and Eduardo are fishers but do not own boats. It seems that their share of catch by being a companion to boat owners is adequate to provide for most of their subsistence needs. It should, however, be noted that all the fishers in the study were also farmers. Alvin says that because fishing is seasonal, there are times of the year when most households work on their farms. Thus, fishing families are also farming families.

How are fishing companions selected? "Kahit na paiba-iba ang kasama sa laut, kailangan ang kasama mo ay kapalagayang loob mo. Karaniwan, anak na lalaki, kumpare, inaanak o kapitbahay." (Even if we go with different companions out to the sea, it is important that one is at ease with one's companion. Often it is the son, fictive kin, godson or neighbor.) This is the reply of Romeo. He adds, "Maraming oras din na kayo lang dalawa sa bangka, at saka kung may peligro dapat maaasahan ang iyong kasama." (We spend many hours together in the boat, and in case of danger one should be able to rely on one's companion.)

Obviously, the fishing companion gains economically from the transaction. Roberto and Eduardo, for example make a living through this means. But more than a contractual form of exchange, the pairing and sharing strengthen personal bonds based on mutual obligation to kin and social network (Gluckman 1965; Woodburn 1998). Even as the pair climbs off the boat on the shore after a fishing trip, they already are making plans for the next trip. As evident in the sizes of their

respective shares, a stratified relationship obtains between the boat owner and his companion. "Mahal din kasi and bangka at motor kaya siyempre mas malaki ang bahagi sa huli ng may bangka," *(*The boat and motor are expensive, so expectedly the share in the fish catch of the boat owner is bigger.) Romeo argues.

The sharing may be in the form of fish or crabs, depending on the season, or in the form of cash. Romeo narrated that when he caught three big sting rays, he took the catch directly to the Mercedes fish port and sold these for P2,500.00. He gave some amount to his companion and part of the smaller fishes also caught. When fishers are late in returning to shore from sea fishing, they often had taken the day's catch to the buyers in the Mercedes fish port which means immediate cash for the family. "Pag maaga ang balik alam naming kaunti ang huli," (If they return early, we know the volume of catch is small.) says Monica, Romeo's wife.

Thus, the choice of companion for fishing trips and the sharing of catch are acts of accomplishing community. The multiple combinations of dyadic relationships on these fishing trips forge a network of social ties that in many cases extend beyond fishing related endeavors (Gluckman 1965; Woodburn 1998).

Sharing the catch with people on the shore after a fishing trip

Every morning during the fishing season is a social occasion in the study villages. This is commonly the time when the fishing boats return from the sea fishing trips. It is likewise an important interactional situation for sharing and community making.

The fishers return to shore with varying volume of catch. Somehow there is an equitable apportionment of the catch. Part of it is set aside for the boat owner fisher, part for the fishing companion, and another part for the people on the shore who "meet the boat." The allocation of part of the catch to the people on the shore represents a situation of sharing. It seems to be an extension of sharing the resources of the sea, this time in the form of entitlement to a part of the catch. This sharing activity is limited to the time the boat returns to shore and the people who are present at that particular time.

According to Kendrick (1993) this practice is related to "social equity" in access to resources; it is a way of enforcing a community's rights to resources they cannot otherwise access due to lack of technology or capital. Similarly, Mangahas (2000:20) maintains that "sharing is the characteristic expectation of what must be done with something you got by luck, just as gambling or games of chance; proper sharing legitimizes success, it is also intended to invite further good luck....It is the proper thing to do with things gotten by luck."

Who are the people who meet the boat on its return to shore? People who are present at the time or when the division of shares takes place get a share of the catch. Some refer to this share as the "fish giveaways." The relevant questions in this regard are who and what. Who are the people who meet the boat on the shore? Romeo's response is "Meron mga kamag-anak, kaibigan pati kapitbahay. Kung minsan may mga bata na sumasalubong para may ma pang-

ulam kasi maysakit ang tatay o nanay." (There are relatives, friends, including neighbors. Sometimes, there are children who meet the boat to have something to cook for a sick parent.) I saw a little girl standing alone on the shore some distance from the boat. One fisher looked at her, grabbed a handful of small fishes and said. "O iuwi mo itong pang-ulam sa nanay mo." (Take this to your mother for your food.) The fisher looked at me and said, "may sakit kasi ang nanay niya." (Her mother is sick.) The people seem to come forward to 'demand' their share. But even I who was observing the social event, was given a few pieces of fish as share. Alvin explains that strangers and visitors are included in the sharing as a gesture of hospitality and "maramdaman nila na sa amin hindi sila iba" (for them to feel that they are one of us).

According to Romeo, the sharing is not limited to those who did not go out to sea for fishing. "Karaniwan binibigyan din yung galing sa pangingisda na walang huli." (It is not uncommon to share the catch with fishers who had no catch.) "Walang nagugutom dito. Wala ka mang huli may lulutuin ka rin." Romeo adds. (No one goes hungry here. Even those without catch will have something to cook for food.) Sharing with fishers who have no catch is a practice that affirms interdependence among small-scale fishers considering the unpredictability and variability in fish catch (Mangahas 2000).

Roberto adds that not all villagers come to the shore to meet the boat. There are those who inhibit themselves out of a sense of shame or propriety. "Siyempre may mga mahihiya naman na makibahagi pa e hindi naman nila kailangan." (Of course, there are those who are ashame to share when they do not need this.) Thus, sharing seems to be more about who one is and less about who gets what.

The other question is what is given away? This is not an easy question to answer because the response is dependent on a number of factors. One factor is the volume of the catch. For a good catch, a significant proportion is sold for cash either in the Mercedes port or in the local market. But the part that is not sold is not insignificant. In many cases the part that is shared with those on the shore comprise the fishes which are either smaller in size or of low market value. Alvin claims that for fishers "alam naming kung gano ang patas at tamang dami nang binibigay sa mga sumasalubong." (We know what is a fair share to be given to those who meet the boat.) I interpret this to mean that their practices are governed by rules for determining the fair and proper apportionment (Woodburn 1998) of catch "from the shared resources of the sea."

COMMENSALITY AFTER A SUCCESSFUL FISHING EVENT

The sharing does not end with apportionment of the catch among fishers, the fishing companions and the people on the shore who meet the boat. A successful fishing trip is not complete without fishers eating and drinking with friends. Part of the catch is set aside to be cooked or prepared as *kinilaw (*a dish from raw fish). Carsten (1997) refers to the sharing of food or substance as a central symbol for "making kinship." This commensality is a standard practice among fishers after the boat's return from a successful fishing trip.

Romeo narrates that after he caught the three big sting rays and brought them to Mercedes, he treated his friends and kin, "maghapon at magdamag kaming nag-inuman na yung ding ibang isda na nahuli ang pinangpulutan namin." (All day and all night, we drank and ate some fish.) The commensality represents an extension of sharing with people who "hindi na iba sa amin at nakabahagi sa grasya nang dagat (are part of us and share in the graces of the sea.)

While a fishing companion expectedly gets a proportional share of the fish catch on successful fishing event, it is the boat owner who hosts the social event of sharing the food and drink with significant others. The fishing companion may bring a bottle of gin to add to the drinks prepared by the boat owner. The event marks, not only a sharing with people of the 'grace from the sea' but the practice also has the latent function of forging or strengthening social bonds with villagers (Gluckman 1965). It is an occasion for telling and retelling of stories of fishing trips both the successful ones and the risky ones that are attended with loss and danger.

IMPLICATIONS OF ETHNOMETHODOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE ON COMMUNITY FOR INTERVENTION PROGRAMS

The conceptualization of community as an accomplishment, accountable to interaction, implies that its emergence is located in social situations rather than in social collectivities. The task of rendering actions accountable arises recurrently across different situations and different forms of conduct. Thus, intervention programs, for example, in forestry and fisheries that invoke the community as vehicle for their implementation, may find it worth the try to shift the focus from a social structural framework to one that capitalizes on social situations that have through time been the site of practice for community making.

The ethnomethodological perspective implies that one cannot determine the relevance of community to social action apart from the context in which it is accomplished. The sharing that represents acts of accomplishing community differs significantly among fishing villagers, upland farmers or occupants of forest reserves. Their social situations, circumstances and normative structures vary widely so a blueprint approach to community-based interventions is often bound to fail.

Institutions as well as collectivities may be held accountable to normative conceptions of community. For example, the family or the people's organizations of fishers or upland farmers are held accountable to normative conceptions of community. What may seem to be an individualistic conduct of accomplishing community in specific situations is actually cut from the larger social fabric of cohesiveness, concern and interdependence. Thus, situated social action is central to our understanding of how community contributes to the reproduction of social organization and social structure.

NOTE

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THE DYNAMICS OF CIVIL SOCIETY FORMATION AND TRANSFORMATION IN THE PHILIPPINE PEACE MOVEMENT: THE BANGSAMORO STRUGGLE FOR A JUST AND LASTING PEACE[1]

Aileen Toohey

Civil society is recognised as comprising complex and multifaceted entities, resilient to and yet responsive to both the state apparatus and global market processes. Civil society in the Philippines, long regarded as one of the most vibrant, diverse and innovative in Asia, has emerged as a significant actor in the field of conflict resolution and peace-building during the past decade. Drawing on contemporary debates on the significance of key constructs in development and democratic discourses such as social capital, this paper interrogates the entanglements between civil society, the state and combatant groups and how such relationships have transformed the Philippine peace movement. In thinking about the work of peace, the effectiveness of civil society groups in mobilising societal awareness concerning the Bangsamoro struggle for a 'just and lasting peace' is examined. Questions pertaining to the effectiveness of such interventions in strengthening conflict prevention and peace-building are situated within contemporary debates concerning civil society's role in development and democratisation processes.

SITUATING SOCIAL CAPITAL

The efficiency of civil society groups in societal change and transformation has long been the subject of debate and controversy. Over the past decade, a more nuanced understanding of the formative processes that shape institutional relationships within and between groups has emerged through the deployment of constructs such as social capital, social cohesion, and social movements. Intrinsic to these debates has been a sustained engagement with long-held beliefs about voluntary associational practices and collective agency as well as political discourses on participatory processes vis-à-vis the state. These debates are also applicable in the Philippine context, perhaps more so, given the advocacy and mobilisation of civil society for socio-political transformation in the 1980s and 1990s.

The popularity of civil society in contemporary social and political discourses in some ways accounts for the diverse and sometimes incommensurate ways in which the concept has been deployed.[2] Jean and John Comaroff's (1999:1-43) caution on the inherent ambiguities associated with attempts to define civil society raises important questions as to the appropriateness of its deployment as an analytic concept. Instead, they suggest, civil society belongs to poetic ideology, as an idea imbued with a reformist spirit, rather than the rigor

of sociological analysis. Other theorists, particularly sociologists, have focused considerable effort on the means through which consensus on the definition, measurement and operationalisation of civil society may be reached. Many would support the Comaroffs' opinion that the concept itself remains elusive and somewhat difficult to categorise. Some political writers argue that the challenge in defining and analysing civil society formations and processes, in part, lies with the fluidity and dynamism of the relations within and between specific groupings linked with certain kinds of voluntary associational practices. While debates on civil society have been shaped by influential theorists writing from very different political viewpoints, it is perhaps not surprising that the concept, while instructive in interrogating how political discourses have impinged on the idea of civil society, is beset by ambiguities inherent in its conceptualisation.

Similar challenges have been encountered by economists and sociologists in their endeavours to define and examine the workings of social capital. While consensus exists on a general description of social capital as 'the norms and networks facilitating collective action for mutual benefit' (Woolcock 1998:155), considerable differences exist in how contemporary theorists interpret and interrogate its deployment. Most definitions are drawn from the writings of a small number of key theorists: Robert Putman, James Coleman and Pierre Bourdieu. Putnam (1993) defines social capital as those features of social organisation such as networks of individuals or households, and the associational norms and values that create externalities for the community as a whole (Grootaert and Bastelar 2002:2). Such externalities invariably relate to the cohesiveness and strength of a society (degree of trust, rules of civic behaviour practiced, and level of association). Coleman's (1988:98) conceptualisation of social capital encompasses "a variety of different entities [which] all consist of some aspect of social structure and [which] facilitate certain actions of actors —whether personal or corporate actors— within the structure." For Bourdieu, "social capital is the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalised relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition – or in other words, to membership in a group which provides each of its members with the backing of collectivity-owned capital" (1986:249; Edwards and Foley 2001:9).

Drawing from the writings of Putman and Coleman, development analysts such as North (1990) and Olson (1982) have sought to incorporate formalised institutional relationships and structures into their studies (cited by Grootaert and van Bastelaer 2002:3).[3] Other theorists such as Knack (2001:42) argue that it is important to differentiate between civil social capital and government social capital (i.e., institutions that influence people's ability to cooperate for mutual benefit such as the enforceability of contracts, the rule of law, and the extent of civil liberties). Uphoff (2000:218-221) has argued that social capital can be analysed on the basis of two components: structural social capital (information sharing, collective action and decision-making through established roles and social networks supplemented by rules, procedures and precedents); and

cognitive social capital (shared norms, values, trust, attitudes, and beliefs) (Grootaert and van Bastelaer 2002:3). World Bank analysts have identified proxy indicators for measuring these two types of social capital: structural capital is assessed on criteria such as membership in networks, the number and type of interactions in a group, prevalence of social networks, participation in decision-making, associational levels etc.; while cognitive social capital relates to measures of trust, norms of reciprocity and sharing. I argue that the contextualisation of social capital within groups and networks necessitates an examination of the processes of historical change within societies and the effectiveness of these networks. By tracing the entanglements of these durable networks of more or less institutionalised relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition through which formalised entities crystallise, dialogue and cooperate to work for peace, the paper attempts to highlight the dynamics of civil society formation within the Philippine peace movement.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE PHILIPPINES

The relationship between the Philippine state and civil society was recognised and legitimised in the Philippine Constitution created by means of a Constitutional Commission and ratified by plebiscite on 2 February 1987. The 1987 Philippine Constitution affirms that the state shall encourage non-governmental, community-based or sectoral organisations that promote the welfare of the nation and that independent people's organisations' pursuit of their legitimate and collective interests within the democratic framework is respected (1987 Philippine Constitution Section 23 Article II; Section 15 Article III). Today, civil society has grown to encompass self-help groups, community associations, religious and spiritual societies, professional associations, business foundations, local philanthropies, private voluntary organisations, non-government organisations (NGOs) and people's organisations (POs) from the various sectors (workers, farmers, fisherfolks, indigenous people, urban poor, elderly citizens, disabled people and youth).[4] The corporate sector has incorporated components that are in alignment with civil society interests such as the Philippine Business for Social Progress (PBSP), an influential NGO funded by business donations. The relationship between the media and the state is also more robust than in many other countries in the region. Qualification should also be made with regard to party-list groups as many are aligned with sectoral groups actively involved in civil society concerns.

Civil society's contribution to Philippine social life has been the subject of considerable debate and analyses by researchers, many of whom have been active participants in shaping civil society processes and practices. Mindful of the historical formulations of civil society in political discourses, Filipino writers and activists conceptualise the entity of civil society as an actualisation emerging through (often conflicting) interrelations with the state and the market. Writing on contemporary configurations within Philippine civil society, Karina Constantino-David (1997:22) categorises

"all organisations that intersect with the domain of the state but are not part of the state apparatus as civil society entities."[5] While this definition includes sectors such as the media and the market and would be considered by most analysts as too wide-ranging, Constantino-David does qualify her definition by limiting her analysis of civil society organisations (CSOs) to those active in societal critique and transformation. Her definition of civil society is useful in that she positions such entities within cultural, political and economic structures that in many instances contest and critique the state. This raises a very important issue within CSOs pertaining to the multiple dimensions through which conflict and armed violence have shaped civil society's engagement with the state apparatus and the effectiveness of conflict or the possibility of violence in implementing structural reforms to effect societal change. Cognisant of these issues, this paper focuses on the conceptualisation of peace by civil society groups and the implementation of practices by civil society groups that have contributed to bringing a peaceful resolution to armed conflict between specific Muslim groups and the Philippine government.

Invariably, transformations in Philippine associational life and the formation and growth of civil society groups have been linked to changes in religious and political structures and institutions particularly during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It is important to acknowledge that Philippine societies had a rich and complex associational life before the imposition of colonial rule, and such associational practices continue to inform how groups interface with institutional structures, particularly within Muslim and indigenous communities. In addition, organised groupings sponsored by benefactors of the state or operating outside of, and indeed in opposition to the state, have a long history in the Philippines. Nationalist and communist ideologies promoted a critical engagement with colonial and postcolonial rule. The *Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas*, the *Hukbalahap or Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon* (People's Army Against the Japanese) later renamed *Hukbong Magpapalaya ng Bayan* (the Liberation Army of the People) and the Communist People's Party of the Philippines fostered community awareness about organised resistance groups. As the subtleties of local associational practices in producing and reproducing identity and belongingness were obscured by the state's privileging of modernisation policies, so too were the practices, largely promoted by the Church, that facilitated the transition of 'congregations' to 'constituencies.' Intrinsic to this transition were government and/or church sponsored programmes during the 1940s and 1950s that sought to offset communist ideologies among the peasantry and working classes through the promotion of cooperatives often in conjunction with literacy programs (e.g., the Free Farmers Federation, Federation of Free Workers and the Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement). This process of obscuration is understandable given that discourses on civil society have inevitably tied the emergence of activist-oriented NGOs with the crystallisation of organised resistance to the state during the martial law era. Thus, CSOs in the decades

preceding martial law are described by many civil society activists as 'proto' organisations.

These alliances and allegiances began to unravel in the 1960s as the possibility of social change captured the imagination of the people. The edifice of Catholicism was shaken by new ideas such as liberation theology that critically engaged with theological precepts, particularly the privileging of the poor, and encouraged a form of political activism that was recognisable in Philippine colonial history, and yet was markedly different as it was influenced by the views espoused by the Second Vatican Council and the World Council of Churches. Energised by international social movements and mobilised by the perceived efficacy of social activism on behalf of the poor, groups with very different ideological backgrounds and interests were formed across the political spectrum. Coalescing around specific interests and causes, these emergent social movements were identified with student activism, feminism, labor and peasant issues. Influential organisations were established during this era such as the Philippine Ecumenical Council for Community Organising, the National Secretariat for Social Action and the Philippine Business for Social Progress. The declaration of martial law forced CSOs to interrogate their ways of operating, highlighting the vulnerability of certain forms of community organising and activism. Faced with a highly punitive state apparatus, sectoral leaders and activists who were not imprisoned effectively removed themselves through political exile or joined the growing underground movement. In such a climate, organisations previously vocal in societal critique were circumspect in their activities and opinions, while others supported President Marcos's policies (initially at least) or were co-opted by the state. During this period, groups (often sheltering under the institutional structures of the Church and the academy), strategized to countervail state modernisation policies enforced through militarism by supporting specific cause issues – human rights, indigenous people's rights, environmentalism, Muslim-Christian dialogue, etc. Astute in recognising the vulnerabilities of this activism, non-government groups mobilised to form networks to represent their interests and strengthen their position such as the National Association of Training Centers of Cooperatives (NATCCO) and the Philippine Partnership for the Development of Human Resources in Rural Areas (PHILDRRA) (Constantino-David 1997:27-29). The assassination of Benigno Aquino in 1983 mobilised mass action that precipitated civil disobedience campaigns that ultimately led to 'People Power' or the EDSA revolution. In the years following EDSA, activists and members of civil society explored possibilities for coalition-building to advance national platforms. In the words of Constantino-David (1997:31) national NGO networks "... learned to build a unity that was based on a recognition of differences, and consciously developed personal bonds of friendship, exorcising the ghosts of the past."

Networks were initially built through the amalgamation of interest-based groups that through a consultative processes, came together to form more formalised structures. The setting-up of civil society consortiums and national

networks during the 1990s was in part a consequence of the real-politick of Philippine politics. Such entities founded on participatory processes directed to consensus-building with member-ratified principles, missions and goals, were more likely through their public advocacy stance to dialogue with government departments, donor countries and multilateral agencies. For example, the Caucus of Development NGO Networks (CODE-NGO) established in 1991 by ten NGO networks, today numbers seven national networks and four regional networks, representing more than 2,500 organisations. Member networks of CODE-NGO include PHILDRRA, a network of 72 NGOs and the Mindanao Coalition of Development NGOs (MINCODE) established in 1991, a coalition of ten networks of NGOs and POs based in Mindanao.[6]

Over the past two decades civil society in the Philippines has undergone a process of internal institutional strengthening, expansion, and maturation. This process has been assisted by supportive donor countries and foreign-based CSOs interested in poverty alleviation and social concerns. The ineffectiveness of political institutions in implementing interventions to strengthen governance and increase economic growth continues to concern policy-makers. There is considerable speculation on whether political reform will address economic inequality, promote peace, and enhance social justice. The issue is complicated by the current initiative to amend the constitution (the infamous 'Cha-Cha' or charter change debate) in order to create a parliamentary system of governance that supposedly will significantly contribute to the prosperity of Mindanao. Recent developments within civil society institutional structures suggest the formation of highly strategic alliances that in some instances have quite strong overtones of interventionism into domestic political and economic decision-making; and the establishment of networks and coalitions across the Asia-Pacific region working on (but not restricted to) development, human rights, environment, women and children and peace-related issues.

THE BANGSAMORO PEACE PROCESS

Peace emerged as a crucial idea during the post-EDSA era embodying the desire for social justice. People's sense of political destabilisation was heightened in the late 1980s following numerous *coup d'état* attempts, in the process, strengthening their awareness to critically engage with peace (Garcia 1988:263-4). NGOs and POs concerned with civil liberties and peace, strategized to form enduring cross-society coalitions, often coalescing around social justice and societal reform. Linked to national networks, these groups established important peace-oriented coalitions.[7] As Coronel-Ferrer (1997:5) noted, groups and individuals engaged in societal reform realised that military responses to the different insurgencies (Communist People's Party [CPP], Moro National Liberation Front [MNLF] and Moro Islamic Liberation Front [MILF], the Rebolusyonaryong Alyansang Makabansa-Soldiers of the Filipino People -Young Officers' Union [RAM-SFP-YOU] and Cordillera People's Liberation Army [CPLA]) would not be effective and that alternative solutions were needed. The

Philippine peace movement is aware of the need to resolve insurgencies through formalised engagements with armed insurgency groups. Quintos-Deles (1995) has defined the Philippine peace movement as a "social movement which has focused on the specific issues of the peace process and which pursues the objective of a negotiated political settlement of the internal armed conflicts dividing the country" (cited by Coronel-Ferrer 1997:7). This process of engagement evolved into multifaceted negotiations between the government and different groups that resulted in peace talks with the CPP under the auspices of the National Democratic Front of the Philippines (NDFP) (protracted, currently stalled), military elements (1995), the MNLF (1996), the *Rebolusyonaryong Partido ng Manggagawa ng Mindanao* (Revolutionary Worker's Party-Mindanao) [on-going[8]]), and the MILF (ongoing).

The Bangsamoro struggle for self-determination has been described as a struggle that has spanned the centuries of Spanish, United States, Japanese and Filipino colonialism. The word, Bangsamoro, is itself an evocation of a colonial past. Moro, a derivative of 'Moor' was commonly used by Spanish missionaries and government officials to refer to all Muslims. The association of *bangsa* or country with the (derogatory) identity marker, Moro, imbued Bangsamoro with nationalist aspirations through identity with place or homeland, and conveyed the possibility of a return to some form of political autonomy or independence through the struggle for self-determination. An organised armed resistance group led by a cadre of young men educated in Islamic political thought, emerged during the 1970s resulting in the formation of the MNLF. The subsequent fragmentation of the MNLF led to the establishment of two additional groups, the MNLF-Reform group and the MILF. Following protracted negotiations between the Philippine government and the MNLF, a number of important agreements were reached including the Tripoli Agreement in 1976, with peace talks culminating in the 1996 Peace Agreement. The current status of this agreement is under review, at least by a number of factions within the MNLF who have expressed dissatisfaction with its implementation.[9] This dissatisfaction has been compounded by high levels of poverty in provinces under the regional government of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), the detention of MNLF Chairman Nur Misuari since January 2002 on rebellion charges, and at some level, emerging issues in the MILF peace negations that may impact on the 1996 Peace Agreement. Discussions between the MNLF and MILF leadership are suggestive of new understandings being forged between these groups but the resolution of outstanding issues remains uncertain.[10]

The commitment of time and resources in peace talks is often unrecognised by those not actively involved in them. Complex layers of negotiations have included: (1) high-level exploratory and formal negotiations between the two peace panels, (2) middle-level discussions with the government and MILF ceasefire committees, and (3) lower-level consultations with local monitoring teams and joint ceasefire monitoring posts. I have opted to provide a detailed summary of the MILF peace process in order to

reveal the protracted nature of these lengthy negotiations. It is also important to list these agreements as the rupturing of certain agreements such as ceasefire violations, which often activated CSOs intervention in the peace process.[11]

Shortly after the signing of the 1996 GRP-MNLF Peace Agreement, the MILF declared its departure from the Agreement and reaffirmed its commitment to independence. The period 1997 to 2003 was a time of conflict and violence escalating into major military offences between March-July 2000 and February-July 2003. Formative in the trajectory of peace negotiations were a number of important treaties and agreements reached between the disputing parties including:

18 July 1997	Agreement on the General Cessation of Hostilities
27 August 1997	General Framework of Agreement of Intent between the GRP and the MILF
12 September 1997	Implementing Administrative Guidelines on their Agreement on the General Cessation of Hostilities
14 November 1998	Implementing OperationalGuidelines of their Agreement on the General Cessation of Hostilities
10 February 1999	Joint GRP-MILF Acknowledgment, and an Agreement to Reaffirm the Pursuit of Peace
17 February 1999	Joint Statement on the Cessation of Hostilities
18 May 1999	Rules and Procedures in the Determination and Verification of the Coverage of the Cessation of Hostilities
2 September 1999	'September 1999 Agreement' to pursue a just, equitable and lasting peace
6 October 1999	'Second Joint GRP-MILF Acknowledgment' strengthening the authority and substance on the 'Agreement on the General Cessation of Hostilities.'

The opening of the first formal talks was held on 25 October 1999. However, President Estrada's announcement in January 2000 that a final peace settlement with the MILF must be reached by 30 June 2000 placed additional stress on the negotiations. Incidents involving government forces and the MILF resulted in armed conflicts in late 1999. The situation deteriorated into an 'all out war' during the first five months of 2000 following military assaults on MILF camps. These assaults were launched while the first round of the formal talks were taking place on 17-20 January 2000. Following months of armed conflict, the government and MILF peace panels agreed on 'Safety and Security Guarantees' on 9 March 2000 and in a meeting on 27 April 2000 studied proposals to 'normalise' the situation. Military attacks during 2000 led to a further deterioration in relations between the parties and on 21 August 2000 the MILF disbanded its peace panel, effectively cancelling pending peace

talks. The MILF stated its case in its 'Position Papers of Technical Working Groups on Six (6) Clustered Agenda Items' of 14 June 2000. Both the government and the MILF employed a range of strategies during this period of highly politicised talks, with pressure placed on the MILF leadership to reformulate their stance away from secession to autonomy. In a climate of mistrust, the MILF subsequently insisted that peace talks be held under the auspices of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference or a member of the conference.

Possibilities for peace improved following the adoption of the 'Six Paths to Peace' by President Macagapal-Arroyo. This policy drew on the earlier policies developed under the Ramos administration. Peace negotiations recommenced in 2001 with the active involvement of the Malaysian government. The 'General Framework for the Resumption of Peace Talks between the GRP and the MILF' was signed in Malaysia on 24 March 2001, contributing to the signing of the crucial 'Agreement of Peace between the GRP and the MILF' on 22 June 2001 at Tripoli, Libya. The agreement listed three major agenda items: security, rehabilitation and ancestral domain. Subsequent agreements on security were signed including the 'Joint Communique between the GRP-MILF' on 6 May 2002, and 'Implementing Guidelines on the Humanitarian, Rehabilitation and Development Aspects of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001' on 7 May 2002. It was this agreement that facilitated the 'Implementing Guidelines on the Security Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement of Peace of 2001' signed on 7 August 2001.

While negotiations lead to the signing of important agreements concerning security and peace-building initiatives during this period, the situation on the ground rapidly worsen following the military campaign launched allegedly against the Pentagon gang on 11 February 2003. The campaign resulted in the death of many MILF combatants and the evacuations of civilians from the towns of Pagalungan and Pikit in Maguindanao province. This was followed by the bombing of Davao International Airport in Davao City on 4 March 2003 and the Sasa wharf bombings on 2 April 2003 that killed 38 people and injured many others. These incidents disrupted the peace negotiations and created considerable ill-will towards the MILF. While the MILF refuted responsibility for the bombings, the government stated that the bombings were the work of the MILF and charged senior members of the MILF with multiple murder and frustrated multiple murder.[12] Yet, despite these difficulties informal talks were held in Malaysia in March 2003. Presidential Macapagal-Arroyo's order in May 2003 for 'extraordinary punitive force' against 'embedded terrorist cells' in Mindanao was perceived by many to include the MILF groups as the government has previously claimed that the MILF had links with terrorists groups. In response the MILF issued a statement rejecting terrorism and terrorist links in June 2003.[13] On 19 July 2003, the government and the MILF signed a bilateral cease-fire as part of confidence building measures for the resumption of formal talks.

During these hostilities, talks continued with a Joint Statement signed on 28 March 2003, reiterating both parties willingness to achieve a comprehensive, just and lasting political settlement and to undertake appropriate steps for the resumption of formal negotiations. Informal talks resumed on 4 August 2003. Although formal talks had stalled during October 2001, backdoor negotiations and exploratory talks continued during 2002 to 2004 resulting in a series of GRP-MILF exploratory talks held in Kuala Lumpur. These exploratory talks continued during 2005 and 2006 although the period was also marked by serious violations to the ceasefire agreement.[14] The focus of the exploratory talks was the issue of ancestral domain (concept, territory, resources, and governance), in particular, the determination and delimitation of areas to be placed under the prospective Bangsamoro Judicial Entity. Charting the progress of the talks, the MILF spokesperson, Jun Mantawil in late January 2007 described discussions on this issue over the past year as already having encountered three impasses. The progress of the proposals and counter-proposals submitted through the Malaysian Secretariat has been widely reported in the national media, particularly the concept and meaning of the 'right to self-determination' put forward by the Government's panel. The announcement by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, General Esperon Jr., that a final peace agreement would be signed in March or April 2007 was dismissed by the MILF spokesperson, Jun Mantawil, who stated that no agreement had yet been reached. While the talks have not resumed officially, it is anticipated that the next scheduled talks, known as the 14th exploratory talks, will be held during the latter months of 2007. Also uncertain is the impact, if any, of the recent re-organisation of the GRP Peace Panel.

THE ENTRY OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE GRP-MILF PEACE PROCESS

It is important to realise that CSOs engagement with the ongoing GRP-MILF peace process has been shaped by the GRP-MNLF 1996 Peace Agreement and political and economic developments that have impacted on its implementation.[15] While CSOs had been active in the region during the 1980s and 1990s, many groups stated that they were not consulted during the talks and that the GRP-MNLF 1996 Peace Agreement was presented as a *fait accompli.* Opportunities for CSOs to participate more actively in peace and development emerged with the channelling of financial assistance to the regional government of ARMM, local government units (that report to the national government) and eligible agencies working in the area. Multilateral and bilateral funding facilitated this process, particularly the United Nations Multi-Donor Umbrella Programme (Phases 1-3) tasked to provide funding assistance to post-conflict communities within the Special Zones of Peace and Development (SZOPAD) including but not restricted to ARMM.

National and regional CSOs strategised to established linkages with local and provincial governments, including the regional government of ARMM, and sought to create new linkages with communities and ex-combatant and combatant groups. In turn,

national, provincial and local governments were supportive of peace-building interventions by NGOs to POs and other grassroots organisations. To avail of funding opportunities, Manila-based NGOs set up regional offices or formed linkages with regional CSOs based in Davao City or the smaller regional cities. Retaining their national face, they became important conduits for project development design and funding in SZOPAD. Local NGOs increasingly directed their activities towards conflict interventions and peace building, upgrading the skills of their staff through training courses and workshops often run by Catholic Relief Services and the Mennonite Central Committee or peace institutes affiliated with local or national universities. Local NGOs in conjunction with national NGOs successfully sourced for international and national funds for peace-building and development, further strengthening individual NGOs and POs and the networks between them. Civil society groups with large Muslim memberships or NGOs and POs set up by local Muslim or Indigenous groups although few in number, were favourably positioned to avail of funding opportunities.

The 'all out war' during early 2000 following the military offensive on MILF camps in Central Mindanao precipitated the evacuation of at least 934,340 persons, the destruction/damage of 9,068 homes and the death of at least 517 civilians, of whom many died in evacuation centers (DSWD cited by World Bank 2005:20). The military assault on MILF camps in 2003 in Central Mindanao displaced at least 411,004 persons (many had been displaced by the war of 2000), the destruction/damage of 6,908 homes and the deaths of at least 238 civilians (DWSW-TFDP cited by World Bank 2005:20). Media coverage of the evacuations revealed the hardship experienced by communities forced to flee their homes and lands. National CSOs mobilised to provide humanitarian and welfare-related assistance to internally displaced families and communities. Working with the Islamic Development Bank, the Department of Social Welfare and Development with the assistance of local government officials, NGOs and religious institutions and in consultation with the Armed Forces of the Philippines, set up evacuation centres for internally displaced families. In many instances, the communities affected by or displaced by violence had limited POs or NGOs participation and thus lacked the expertise to avail of humanitarian assistance. Compounding these organisational challenges were linguistic, religious, social and cultural differences as many NGO personnel had little, if any previous contact with the local communities. In these circumstances it is not unexpected that many of the underlying precepts concerning the work of peace are more aligned with Christian worldviews.

International civil society organisations (ICSOs) working in the region has grown, with a sharp increase in the number establishing offices or expanding their activities following the GRP-MNLF 1996 Peace Agreement. The mass displacements of persons in Central Mindanao following the 2000 and 2003 military offensives precipitated the entry of humanitarian ICSOs such as the International Red Cross. In effect, new spaces were created through which civil society groups could enter and a new

constituency identified as the potential recipients of services and training. ICSOs funded by religious institutions including the Dutch-based Catholic Organisation for Relief and Development Aid, the Catholic Relief Services, the Catholic Agency for Overseas Development and the Mennonite Central Committee have been active in Mindanao for many decades. More recently, ICSOs such as Save the Children-US and Save the Children-UK, Accion Contra el Hambre, Oxfam-Great Britain implemented projects in the region. Accompanying this transition were newly formed alliances and networks between national CSOs, ICSOs, government and donor countries, with the Department of Social Welfare and Development playing a pivotal role in the fields of emergency and humanitarian assistance. Multilateral assistance by the World Bank and the Asian Development, as well as donor programs funded by Japan, the United States, Canada, the European Community and Australia categorised as overseas development assistance, impacted on the expansion of civil society in important ways. While increasingly aligned with security and governance concerns, funds were also directed to public administration and institutional capacity building particularly for local government, judicial reform, social expenditure, community upliftment, and peace and development programs Substantial funds released by multilateral agencies in the form of grants and loans have been channelled through 'partners' (often specific government agencies and national/regional NGOs that met the rigorous criteria set down by the banks) and disbursed to eligible clients (NGOs, POs and other groups). Local CSOs encounter many challenges in their efforts to source counterpart funds, while savvy and well-connected groups linked to networks within and across different sectors are more favourably positioned to bid for lucrative service delivery programs. Today, CSOs in Mindanao operate within an environment conducive to the building of alliances and networks that straddle the region.[16]

THE ROLE OF CSOS IN CONFLICT INTERVENTION AND PEACE-BUILDING

CSOs working on peace in the Philippines have incorporated a diversity of sources and resources in the implementation of conflict intervention strategies and peace-building. In addition, ICSOs and donor countries have incorporated into their various programmes, ideas on peace-building developed by theorists working in peace studies such as John Galtung, John Paul Lederach and Toh Swee Hin. Filipino writers and peace practitioners have drawn on their own personal experiences as activists during the martial law era and post-EDSA period and on their ongoing engagement with peace in all its multiplicities. Thus, the field of peace studies in the Philippines has historical depth, cultural richness and practical applicability, and encompasses a broad spectrum of individuals and communities from all sectors of Philippine society.

Peace-building, in the most general sense, covers all dimensions of the peace process. Peace-building can be thought of as a creative approach directed to intensifying efforts to establish lasting peace and to resolve conflicts peacefully, focusing on the political and socio-

economic context of the conflict rather than on the military or humanitarian aspects (CIDA 2002). Galtung (1996:103) writing on ways to prevent conflict and resolve conflict peacefully, suggested three interventions: peace-keeping, peace-making and peace-building. At the risk of simplification, categorising peace-work on the basis of these three intervention types is helpful for contextualising the different strategies and activities implemented by CSOs. The three types are regarded as interrelated and intervention strategies are applied concurrently in order to promote goodwill and community support in order to lessen the possibility of conflict re-occurring in the future.

Galtung (1996:103) defines *peace-keeping* as an intervention that entails controlling the actors so that they at least stop destroying things, others, and themselves. Peacekeeping strategies focus on conflict prevention strategies in the following areas: 1) the implementation of bilateral ceasefire agreements, 2) the establishment of military and/or civil monitoring missions to investigative ceasefire violations, 3) demilitarisation including the setting up of zones of peace respected by the government and the combatant groups, and 4) codification of warfare acts in accordance with international law and custom leading to formalisation of procedures with regard to the care of the dead and treatment of the injured, accountability regarding damage to property, particularly mosques, and human rights violations. CSOs have been extremely important in all areas of peace-keeping and have contributed to the reduction in the level and effect of actual and direct violence. Peace-keeping indicators include the number and types of incidents that have occurred within a specified period including the number of persons killed and injured; the extent of damage to property, livestock etc.; and the number of persons displaced. NGOs working in this area have developed a range of indicators including involuntary disappearances, sexual violence, human rights violations and restrictions on civil liberties to monitor acts of war, armed conflict and harassments.

Civil society groups working in conjunction with Church groups or through consortiums and supra-networks such as Peace Weavers[17] were instrumental in stopping military attacks on MILF camps and in pressuring the government and the MILF to agree to ceasefire agreements during 2000 and 2003.[18] With regard to the establishment of monitoring missions, civil society groups built on issues raised in peace talks concerning the creation of monitoring committees, namely the Joint Committee on the Ceasefire of Hostilities (JCCH). An independent monitoring committee known as the Independent Fact Finding Committee composed of representatives from Notre Dame University, the Maguindanaon Professional and Employees Association, the Protestant Lawyers League and Cotabato City Media Multi-Purpose Cooperative was established and worked with the Quick Response Team to investigate ceasefire violations. Significant progress was made following the introduction of Local Monitoring Teams at the provincial level during 2003 with assistance provided by the JCCH and the local community. The formation of Bantay Ceasefire, a Mindanao-based NGO, raised awareness of the role of the monitoring teams when

it assumed responsibility for undertaking independent fact-finding missions. Finally, the implementation of the International Monitoring Team during October 2004 was regarded by all parties and the local community as an important step in ensuring the observation of the ceasefire agreement. Since then, other NGOs have also assumed monitoring roles. Demilitarisation strategies have been partially effective, particularly with regard to the formation of peace zones during 2000-2004 (Santos 2005). In some instances, peace zones were established by communities at the barangay level, often with the support of the Church in an attempt to eliminate armed conflict within specific localities. In other cases, influential NGOs such as Tabang Mindanao (Help Mindanao) have been instrumental in establishing many such zones.[19] With regard to codification issues, attention was directed to the rules of war (including compensation to the injured and the families of the dead), the setting up of procedures to peacefully resolve human rights violations and abuses. In addition to the above, emergency, humanitarian and rehabilitation assistance was provided by ICSOs and nationally-based NGOs such as Tabang Mindanao, Balay and Community and Family Services International. The Mindanao Emergency Response Network established during this period facilitated over 20 organisations' disaster response activities and emergency assistance.

Peace-making, according to Galtung (1996:103), embeds actors in a new formulation in order to reach some form of resolution on the perceived conflicts between the parties and may entail transformation of attitudes and assumptions of the parties. These resolutions are facilitated through dialogue, informal and formal negotiations and mediation. Peace theorists refer to the role of third party mediation by civil society groups but recognise that in some instances they will be excluded from talks, particularly informal, high-level discussions. When formal peace talks were established between the MNLF and the government and in subsequent years, between the MILF and the government, many local people including a number of civic society groups and Indigenous People's organisations, expressed their misgivings on their exclusion. Unable to scrutinise or comment on specific aspects of the talks, interested stakeholders expressed their concerns on the lack of transparency and accountability.

The establishment of officially recognised peace panels helped formalise procedures during formal talks. While talks had in the past been held under conditions of distrust, the strategy of calibrated reciprocity or confidence building interventions by both parties, via specific 'deliverables' within a designated time-limit helped foster trust. Peace panels not only helped systematise negotiations resulting in greater transparency between the parties, the process provided more meaningful avenues for civil society to observe and participate (in a limited and indirect sense) in the formal peace talks.[20] Civil society's engagement with the peace panels has at times been quite critical and at other times, supportive. For example, civil society groups expressed concerns on the representatives of the government peace panel, specifically referring to the exclusion of representatives from

Indigenous People and women's organisations from the negotiations. Both issues have been subsequently addressed in terms of the current members of the peace panel.

Concerns have also been raised with regard to delays in the holding of formal talks and the possibility that 'deals' would be settled informally rather than through formalised procedures. Raising such concerns does highlight the sensitivity between CSOs and the official parties engaged in peace talks, particularly given the claims by CSOs that they act on behalf of a wider constituency, when they themselves are relatively recent stakeholders in the peace process. Interestingly, the number of NGOs who have sought accreditation with the peace panels to attend the opening ceremonies of the formal peace talks has increased to at least ten groups during 2004-2005. Some observers have attributed this increase in accreditation requests as a strategy to claim legitimacy as active participants in the peace talks. However, civil society groups that have sought accreditation have in nearly all instances been involved in peace-building activities and may have submitted submission papers on issues under consideration by the peace panels.[21]

In addition to the formal peace talks, CSOs have engaged with the possibilities of peace-making in a more general sense by examining causes of conflict within the wider community and the ways through which armed groups may be drawn into grievances and feuds at the local level. Interesting interventions have been instigated to address feuding through alternative grievance procedures. Multilateral agencies such as the UNDP have also liaised with the MILF and the wider community to formalise conflict resolution procedures in those cases where the MILF had been drawn into conflict between non-combatant parties. In the past, these incidences had a tendency to escalate into more deadly violence and/or feuding. As well, local NGOs and local universities working with the Asia Foundation, a recipient of USAID funding, have undertaken research on the impact of feuding among local communities.

During the past few years, numerous conferences, workshops, seminars and other activities have been held by foreign-based foundations such as the Konrad Adenauer Foundation and the Asia Foundation etc., as well as national and local universities working on peace and conflict studies in conjunction with provincial governments and local CSOs. Both the government and the MILF have been invited to participate in these forums. They have been extremely important in communicating ideas on the peace process to different groups and to the various coalitions working for peace. However, as many of these activities are held in English or Filipino, the level of local people's involvement in such debates, particularly those who have not been able to avail of educational opportunities or who may lack competency in English and/or Filipino, would be limited. Strategies to deal with these constraints have been implemented through availing of broadcast opportunities, particularly those provided by local radio. Today, there are many programmes devoted to peace themes and human rights issues designed by local radio commentators and broadcasted in local Muslim and Indigenous languages.

The third component, *peace-building*, aims to overcome the contradictory aspects inherent within conflict formation and the destructive practices associated with conflict (Galtung 1996:103). While socio-economic reconstruction and development are considered to be one of the most appropriate ways of achieving societal reform, attention has also focused on cultural transformation. The interface between economics and sociology during the past 20 years has generated considerable interest in both these components and had lead to the formulation of new ways of thinking about the deployment and enhancement of capital. Human/cultural capital and social capital have emerged as important concepts that if operationalised, it is argued, will promote both knowledge-production and organisational capacities within and between CSOs, with positive economic benefits flowing to the state and the market. Thus, multilateral agencies such as the World Bank are supportive of measures to strengthen social capital at the national level, as it is associated with improvements in the economic welfare of societies as measured by growth, investment, and poverty indicators (Knack 2001:42, 45).

An implicit assumption of World Bank analysts is that interventions that strengthen social capital will also enhance social cohesion (associational activities that cross societal and cultural differences) and minimise the probability of conflict re-occurring.[22] As social capital facilitates certain flows of knowledge and information sharing through associational organisational forms, the specific mechanisms through which economic development and growth can be encouraged often focus on the types of relationships (and power dynamics) between NGOs and their beneficiaries/ clients. Strengthening the processes inherent in networking in order to enhance institutional structures and the sustainability of development programmes oriented to peace are also prioritised.[23] It is to be expected that CSOs and multilateral agencies may differ in the ways they conceptualise social capital. A consequence of this ambiguity is that the positionality of civil society groups when they are perceived to be the agents of and the embodiment of instruments such as social capital. In conjunction with these practices is a strong emphasis placed on strengthening social capital through development projects.

Indicators of social capital have assumed a pivotal role in determining the directionality and forms of financial grants and loans provided by multilateral agencies and donor countries.

The World Bank-administered multi-donor Mindanao Trust Fund[24] will be the conduit funding post-conflict reconstruction and development in conflict-affected areas of Mindanao. Supported by the World Bank and the Australian, Canadian, New Zealand, and Swedish governments with funding totalling US$2.7 million, Phase I was launched on 27 March 2006, with funds directed to capacity-building. Phase 2 of around US$50 million or more will be activated following the signing of a formal peace agreement between the MILF and Philippine government. It is anticipated that the program, in the words of the World Bank Philippines Country Director, Joachim von Amsberg, "...

unleash the even greater social and economic benefits that Mindanao can experience through lasting peace."

The Philippine government has espoused the view that development should be undertaken in conjunction with the peace process. It has institutionalised this relationship through enhancing the role played by the Mindanao Economic Development Council (MEDCo) and more recently, the reactivation of the Southern Philippines Development Authority. This stance is consistent with the government's Medium-Term Philippine Development Plan (2001-2004), with Mindanao identified as the exporter of high value agriculture and fishery products. Invariably, proponents of Mindanao's development including international financial institutions and donor countries are supportive of neo-liberal policies that facilitate trade liberalisation, foreign direct investment and export-oriented agricultural and mining industries. Multilateral agencies and donor countries have adopted a range of interventions to strengthen economic development in post-conflict communities. USAID's approach to development in Mindanao embodies many of these strategies, particularly the idea of 'growth with equity.' Only limited information is currently available on the effectiveness (or not) of overseas development aid in addressing poverty alleviation, promoting investment and increasing economic growth, however, the considerable level of funds directed to provincial and local governments within SZOPAD, and the continual very high levels of poverty as measured by basic needs indicators, must be of concern to multilateral agencies. While the MILF's economic policies have not yet been clearly stated, agreement was reached between the MILF and the Philippine government to set up the Bangsamoro Development Agency in 2002 with the task to manage the rehabilitation and development projects in the conflict-affected areas of Mindanao.

The second component of peace-building relates to cultural transformation which encompasses many of the entities associated with cognitive social capital. Cultural transformation essentially relates to value transformation by means of enhancing trust and civic cooperation through changing negative and/or stereotypical perceptions of the parties in conflict. Interventions focus on education in the broadest sense and are implicitly supportive of the transferral of the idea of peace to advocacy and socio-economic reform (in an abstract sense). Women have emerged as active participants in peace-building, managing many of the influential CSOs and coordinating national and international networks. In addition, women have been active in establishing NGOs and POs that specifically meet the needs of women (and their families), organising agencies such as the Mindanao Commission on Women and in forming networks such as the Mothers for Peace.

Teachers and educators have also framed civil society's engagement in peace education and peace training in the Philippines through fostering collaborative arrangements between educational institutes across the country. The attention devoted to education and capacity training on peace and conflict resolution by CSOs has been remarkable. In addition, specific individuals such as Fr. Jun Mercado, formerly of Notre Dame

University and Fr. Sebastiano D'Ambra, of the Silsilah Dialogue Movement, and organisations such as Peace Advocates Zamboanga as well as religious institutes, centers of learning and spiritual/ interfaith groups have proven to be remarkably influential in transforming perceptions towards promoting peace-work through the publication of training manuals, the promotion of value education and the holding of intensive training courses such as that run by the Mindanao Peacebuilding Institute in 2005. Ideas embodied within the 'Culture of Peace' paradigm as designed by Toh Swee Hin (2001, 2002) has been widely integrated into the curriculum of many schools as well as training manuals on value transformation through capacity building on local governance, human rights, women and development and peace-building. Of particular significance are activities that promote peace as a value (and increasingly as a right) such as civic functions like Peace Week, held annually during the month of December, and the government sponsored National Peace Consciousness Month. The UNDP programme has also funded research as a strategy to promote a greater understanding of local histories and the valuation of different Islamised and Indigenous cultures in the region. It is difficult to measure how effective the philosophies espoused by peace education has been in peace-building but in terms of development practitioners' understandings of local community politics and empowerment ideals, it has been effective (with some qualification) in resolving conflict, minimising the occurrence of violence and strengthening social cohesion within communities.

One of the most important stakeholders in the Bangsamoro struggle for self-determination is the Church. At the risk of condensing the diversity of opinions expressed by the different churches in the Philippines and by different church officials as members of these congregations, a least one influential church official has publicly stated that a conscious effort was made to *not* make the 'all-out-war' of 2000 a religious and ethnic war. The church through its pastoral letters, membership on various committees and councils, relations with church affiliated or funded NGOs and POs, ownership of print media and radio stations and administration of various education institutions has assumed an active role in advocating for peace. The 'moral' voice in the Philippine public sphere, it has publicly recognised the Bangsamoro right to self-determinations and has supported processes conducive to a just and lasting peace. The mainstreaming of these ideas by Church groups, the academe and to some extent, the media, has significantly increased the level of awareness with respect to the peace process. There are indications that the *ulama* will become increasingly important in terms of presenting community views on peace, religion and education to the wider public and in some instances, may liaise with CSOs when appropriate. NGOs such as the Philippine Center on Islam and Democracy (a recipient of funds from the Asia Foundation) have also been active in promoting discussions on Islam and civil society.

With reservations relating to socio-economic and political reform, CSOs involvement in developing and

implementing peace-building interventions focusing on cultural transformation has been very successful in building societal awareness on peace and social justice. Locally-based peace-oriented CSOs joined wider coalitions and consortiums such as the Mindanao Peace Solidarity Group, MINCODE, Mindanao Peace Educator's Network, Mindanao People's Caucus, Mindanao Peoples Peace Movement, and Peace Weavers. As well, networks and consortiums were set up to advocate on behalf of their members and wider community interests, such as the Consortium of Bangsamoro Civil Society and the PANAGTAGBO-Mindanao Indigenous People's Consultative Assembly. These consortiums have been effective in mobilising support on a range of issues pertaining to conflict prevention, peace-building, local governance and development. However the linkages between the various CSOs within these respective networks may, under different circumstances, be quite fragile.

The density of vertical and horizontal networks within CSOs and across CSOs through the formation of consortiums and alliances has ensured that civil society has the capacity to exert considerable political pressure on national and provincial governments, the military, the respective peace panels, the combatant parties as well as non-combatants directly or indirectly affected by armed conflict and insurgency. The dissemination of information pertaining to peace talks and peace-building in general through information communication technology has significantly increased community understanding of the MILF peace process. Such forms of information-sharing have ensured that peace-oriented coalitions are highly conversant of the various strategies, interventions and emerging issues relevant to peace-building. Networking has also fostered conditions conducive to the strengthening of the Philippine peace movement by forging new alliances within the regional and international arena.

CIVIL SOCIETY AS 'PARTNERS' IN PEACE?

While CSOs in Mindanao have manifested their willingness and commitment to work for peace, the relationship between the government and civil society has been complicated by the differing stances adopted by the government during the protracted peace negotiations. CSOs speak of 'partnerships' with government when referring to the peace process, however, government officials working under the auspices of the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process would like civil society to 'accompany the peace process.' These linguistic differences are indicative of differing conceptualisations of agency in terms of civil society's relationship to the government's peace agenda. Accompaniment, in some sense, implies a willingness to go with established or formulated procedures or structures and is suggestive of a prevailing view in some circles of the importance to institutionalise the peace process.

The institutionalisation of the peace process within a 'peace and development' agenda was strongly advocated by UNDP officials. Institutional transformation and development, it was argued, would require policy coherence and continuity as well as recognised and sustainable

'citizen's peace constituency' (Oquist 2002:8). Such a process, it was suggested, would build on the (already existing) implicit peace movement grounded in civil society structures, and would require financial security in terms of project implementation and the involvement of multiple actors (Congress, public administrators, international financial institutions and other donors). This type of relationship raises the issue of institutional complementarily and dependency, and increases the possibilities for the privatisation and commercialisation of CSOs as their future sustainability is tied to the servicing the needs of their constituencies. While civil society groups, particularly NGOs are commonly positioned as autonomous entities in tension with the State, this may be open to contestation as many NGOs have entered into collaborative relations with government agencies, particularly with regard to service delivery. Also, the willingness of CSOs to participate in such an institutionalisation process, the forms of cooption entailed, and their capacity to design and implement development projects as independent agents, was not interrogated. It is apparent from a perusal of the government's six point comprehensive peace process agenda released in September 2004 and known as the 'Peace Plan to Achieve a Just End to the Peace Process', that a high level of cooperation with CSOs is assumed, however, the future involvement of civil society in peace-work is dependent on the government's recognition of its future role in security and peace-building.

As the involvement of CSOs in the GRP-MNLF and GRP-MILF peace processes has been relatively recent (with the exception of interfaith organisations affiliated with religious institutions and locally-based professional organisations), relationships with the government, particularly the military, and the MILF Central Committee had to be established. The setting up of formalised peace-keeping procedures with CSOs assuming an active role in monitoring ceasefire agreements necessitated communication channels with the combatant groups. CSOs also forged closer contacts with MILF leaders during 2000 and 2003 when peace-oriented coalitions lobbied both the government and the MILF for the imposition of ceasefire agreements.

Civil society's support for peace-work offers real possibilities for genuine collaboration for peace-building at the community level through consultation with local government officials and through dialogue with traditional and/or community elders and the local *ulama* although there has been a tendency by multilateral agencies and some NGOs to formalise these 'informal' groupings for the purposes of aid delivery. The Local Government Code of 1991 provides for the establishment of local development councils (with not less than one-fourth membership of CSO representatives) at all levels of local government – provincial, municipal/city and barangay. Complementing the code are training and capacity building programmes held for local government administrators and other personnel designed by bilateral aid agencies such as the Canadian International Development Agency under its Local Government Support Program. While the code facilitates civil society's entry into participatory decision-making processes and encourages local government to work jointly with NGOs and POs as partners in development, in

actuality the effectiveness of CSOs engagement with LGUs in conflict-affected areas has not been promising. Interested observers have noted that not all CSOs are conversant with the code; that cooption of CSOs by government officials may undermine the effectiveness of CSOs input into local government decision-making, and that in cases where CSOs are placed in adversarial positions with government officials and local politicians, personal and family safety concerns may arise.

While this paper traces the involvement of CSOs in peace-work, it would be naive not to recognise that CSOs are vulnerable to ethnic and class factionalism or internal manipulation for ideological purposes. CSOs may be coopted by the state, local political and economic elites or by donor countries aggressively pursing their national interests. While many donor countries continue to prioritise poverty alleviation, some governments have embarked on funding or indirectly supporting counter-terrorism programs. These programs may include components that incorporate training local police and military, implementation of anti-money laundering guidelines, cross-border surveillance of peoples and commodities and practices for good governance. While these funds have been directed to specific government departments for project implementation, the mainstreaming of counter-terrorism into development aid channelled through civil society organisations into specific civic-humanitarian projects will undoubtedly undermine the trust inherent within social capital that is so important for peace-building.

CONCLUSION

While CSOs involvement in peace-keeping, peace-making and peace-building has contributed significantly to the peace process, we need to reflect on the appropriateness and effectiveness of peace-building interventions in strengthening structural and institutional processes, and whether such processes have positively contributed to the Bansamoro struggle for a 'just and lasting peace.' The increased militarisation in the region accompanied by CAFGU/CVO recruitment campaigns and the deteriorating human rights situation in the Philippines, challenges CSOs capacity to meaningfully address the structural causes of conflict and war. How effective can such interventions be in stopping violence when militarisation is fostered by government policies under their 'war on terror' campaign? Given the high levels of poverty and inequality within the region, and the very real human security concerns, the contemporary challenge facing CSOs relates to the efficacy of interventions that foster peace and development in the short-term as well as democratisation and social justice processes in the longer-term. Despite the considerable success that CSOs have achieved in strengthening peace-building in all its complexities, if CSOs interventions are not accompanied by mechanisms to protect human rights, meaningful social justice policies and political reform, then it is likely that their constituencies will become increasingly disillusioned with the promises inherent in the struggle for peace.

NOTES

1 A draft of this paper was presented at the International Conference on Peace Justice and Reconciliation in the Asia-Pacific Region, University of Queensland, 1st - 3rd April 2005.

2 John Keane considers civil society to be an ideal-typical category that both describes and envisages a complex and dynamic ensemble of legally protected non-government institutions that tend to be non-violent, self-organising, self-reflexive and permanently in tension with each other and with the state institutions that frame, construct and enable their activities (Cited by Edwards 2004:20). Recognising that civil society encompasses a diversity of associational forms, many theorists have focused on the commonalities rather than differences between groups. For example Edwards (2004) suggests that civil society groups share a number of common features: membership is consensual rather than legal, exit is possible without loss of status or public rights or benefits and voluntaristic mechanisms are used to achieve objectives, and dialogue, bargaining or persuasion are used instead of enforced compliance by governments or market incentives by firms.

3 It can be argued that in spite of the considerable attention devoted to social capital remarkably little attention has been given to the transformative elements within civic social capital and government social capital and between civil social capital and economic capital.

4 While cooperatives are considered to part of the economic sphere of society, many of the values embraced by cooperative members emanate from POs and members of cooperatives may be active in alliances and other networks that straddle civil society and the market.

5 Civil society activists and academics working in civil society have sought to untangle some of strands that interlink NGO activity in the Philippines. According to Korten (1990, cited by Coronel-Ferrer 1997:19) NGOs are categorised as 1) public service contractors that are regarded as market-oriented non-profit businesses servicing donors and public services, 2) voluntary organisations, 3) people's organisations and 4) government/non-government organisations which are private entities created by government and/or non-government organisations to serve as instruments of government policies POs share many similarities with NGOs but there are important differences in terms of typology. POs are first-party organisations in that they act as a 'mutual benefit association in that the purpose of their existence is to advance the interests of members.' NGOs are private non-profit organisations with a third party orientation i.e. social legitimacy on the basis they exist to serve the need of third parties/ persons who are not themselves members of the organisation' (Coronel-Ferrer 1997:19-20).

6 MINCODE is comprised of ten participating networks representing various sectors, namely, cooperatives, social agencies, intermediary organisations and sectoral groups: Agri-Aqua Development Coalition, Association of Foundations, Consortium of Bangsamoro Civil Society, Council of Organised Social Services Agencies in

Mindanao, Kahugpongan sa Mindanaw, Mindanao Alliance of Self-Help Societies, Southern Philippines Educational Cooperative Center, Mindanao Congress of Development, Philippine Business for Social Progress, Partnership of Philippine Support Services Agencies, and the Philippine Partnership for the Development of Human Resources in Rural Areas.

7 Coalitions included the Coalition for Peace, the Multi-Sectorial Peace Advocates, the Philippine Independence Peace Advocates, the Philippine Independence Peace Advocates, the Philippine Peace Consortium and the National Peace Conference.

8 On 19 December 2006, the Philippine government and the *Rebolusyonaryong Partido ng Manggagawa ng Mindanao* signed the 'Guidelines and Ground Rules for the Implementation and Monitoring of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities' and a 'Joint Resolution to Further Advance the Gains of the GRP-RPM-M Peace Process.'

9 Media reports identify the factions as the MNLF headed by Misuari, the MNLF-Committee of 15, the MNLF under Isnaji Alvarez, and MNLF-Islamic Command Council.

10 Chairman Nur Misuari's registration as a voter for the forthcoming May 2007 election heightened speculation concerning his political intentions when his lawyer, Arthur Lim, remarked that ' ... [his] detention pending trial should not bar him from exercising his right to vote or even to run for public office.' Quismundo,Tarra 'Misuari gets 1-day pass to register as voter' 24 November 2006 *Inquirer Express [http://services.inquirer.net/express/06/11/25/html_output/xmlhtml/20061124-34594-xml.html]*[http:/www.luwaran.commodules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=129].

11 The overview of the MILF peace process has been complied from many sources however Oquist's (2002) summary has been particularly helpful.

12 Military officers involved in the Oakwood Mutiny accused former National Defense Secretary Angelo Reyes and former ISAFP chief Brig. Gen. Victor Corpus of masterminding the Davao and Sasa wharf bombings. Reyes denied the accusation and refused to resign. Corpus tendered his resignation, which President Arroyo accepted.

13 During 2004, the government continued to allege that the MILF provided shelter to foreign members of the Jemaah Islamiyah terror network blamed for the October 2002 Bali bombings. Pressure has been placed on the MILF to 'turn-over' persons identified by the Philippine government as Jemaah Islamiyah supporters. The MILF has refuted any official ties with the Jemaah Islamiyah.

14 Armed clashes left more than a dozen people dead in Shariff Aguak during February 2006. An attempted assassination attempt in Shariff Aguak on 23 June 2006 left five persons killed and 14 persons injured. This precipitated a serious of armed incidents in Mamasapano and Koloy in Shariff Aguak during late June 2006 that continued into the early weeks of July 2006. Unverified reports listed over 50

persons killed with significant losses incurred by government militias; four MILF members were killed and ten wounded, and at least 30,000 civilians directly affected by the ongoing conflict. Armed skirmishes between the 105th Base Command of the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Force of the MILF and the 4th Infantry Battalion Bravo Company during October and November 2006 in the barangays of Kuloy and Tapikan, Shariff Aguak affected more than 50,000 civilians, with significant loss of livelihood and property damage/destruction recorded. Armed clashes between the military and MILF forces were reported in Midsayap, Cotabato province during 25-27 January 2007 with three militiamen and two soldiers killed, and more than 6000 persons displaced. Bombing incidents were also reported during 2006. On 10 October 2006, a bomb exploded in Tacurong, Sultan Kudarat province injuring four persons and later that day, six persons were killed, and 32 wounded in a bombing in Makilala North Cotabato. The MILF refuted the government's allegation of MILF involvement, and protested the filing of a case in December 2006 of multiple murders and multiple frustrated murders against 23 MILF members as accomplishes to the Makilala bombing. Also, bombings in early January 2007 in the cities of General Santos, Kidapawan and Cotabato left six people dead and 30 persons wounded. The MILF denied involvement.

15 Provisions concerning the implementation of the 1996 Peace Agreement will be reviewed during a tripartite meeting between the MNLF, the government, and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia on 6-8 February 2007.

16 Any attempt to set up an inventory of CSOs working on peace or peace-related issues immediately encounters difficulties. This is attributed to: 1) the openness and fluidity in civil society formation and fragmentation, 2) the realisation that CSOs are not required to register with SEC (although the specifications and regulations pertaining to finance effectively ensures NGOs and many POs have done so), 3) the diverse range of services and assistance that CSOs may provide, and the areas covered, 4) the effectiveness of CSOs in fulfilling their objectives.

17 The Mindanao Peace Weavers is comprised of seven peace groups: Agong Peace Network, the Consortium of Bangsamoro Civil Society, the Mindanao Peace Advocates Conference, the Mindanao Peoples Caucus, the Mindanao Peoples Peace Movement, the Mindanao Solidarity Network, and Peace Advocates of Zamboanga.

18 Peace Weavers was conceived in recognition of the need for a joint-coordinated peace advocacy stance, initially calling for a Bilateral Ceasefire between the GRP and MILF. The supra-network was conceived during the 'Peace in MindaNOW Conference' held in May 2003. *[http://www.mindanaopeaceweavers.org].*

19 There are also interesting cases where communities have dealt with the violence resulting from local feuding by declaring their locality a zone of peace.

20 With some qualification, the process can be described as conforming to Habermas' idea of communicative action through which attempts to reach a mutual

understanding about a practical situation confronting disputing parties can be achieved through the elimination of constraints. This process of reaching mutual understanding is achieved through long-term, cooperative process that seeks to expand the possibilities for parties to determine, and live according to their own claims, or in the language of the Bangsamoro struggle, a just and lasting peace.

21 While CSOs have increasing adopted the stance of the third party mediator, such an approach may result in contradictory stances. For example, a CSO may have achieved 'legitimacy' in terms of representation on behalf of their constituencies through advocacy, mediation and facilitation in conflict resolution and service provision, yet their perceived involvement as an active stakeholder in the peace process may undermine their 'neutrality' as third-party mediators.

22 The displacement and dispersion of previously cohesive communities also contribute to the loss of social capital, although it is important to note that certain types of social capital can be conducive to the building and reproduction of war-oriented and/or criminal economies. Associational life in many respects has contributed to conflict. For example, documentation on associational life in Rwanda has revealed discriminatory membership practices on the basis of ethnicity, contributing to community tensions (Colletta & Cullen 2002:297-299).

23 These types of programmes include the provision of financial assistance to war-affected communities and/or to ex-combatants in the form of small-scale livelihood projects, microlending programmes and health services including trauma healing.

24 The Office of the President for Peace Process and the Mindanao Economic Development Council (MEDCo) will be the key government counterparts for MTF-RDP. The local counterparts are the BDA and the ARMM Regional Government.

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1. Standard length of papers is 6000 words (approximately 20 pages typed double spaced with generous margins at the top, bottom, and sides of the page), but shorter contributions are also welcomed.
2. Include a brief abstract of 100-200 words summarizing the findings and at most five key words on a separate sheet of paper (without author information).
3. Title, author's name, affiliation(s), full address (including telephone and email address) and a brief biographical note should be typed on a separate sheet.
4. *Notes* should contain more than a mere reference, although it is recommended to use notes only for substantive observation and to limit the length. They must be numbered serially and presented at the end of the article in a separate endnotes section that appears before the References.
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   a) The following examples illustrate the format for referencing in the text:

   (Banzon-Bautista 1998: 21)
   (Lynch & Makil 1968)
   Zialcita (2005)

   For Filipinos, the "outside" world is "a place of power, wealth, cleanliness, beauty, glamour and enjoyment" (Cannell 1995: 223).
   Source: Saloma 2001

   "After all," he said, "*pinoy* can be seen along national lines."
   Source: Saloma 2001

   b) List two or more works by different authors who are cited within the same parentheses in alphabetical order by the first author's surname. Separate the citations with semicolons.

   For example:

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Newspaper Article

Estopace, D. 2005. "The business of poverty." *Today*. 25 January, p. B3

Article from the Internet

Mershon, D. H. 1998. "Star Trek on the Brain: Alien Minds, Human Minds." *American Scientist* 86, 585. Retrieved 29 July 1999, from Expanded Academic ASAP database.

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Berner, E. 1997. *Defending a Place in the City*. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press.

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PREFACE

The appreciation of forms of capital other than those understood in economic terms—symbolic, cultural, social—is now relatively widespread among students of society and culture. The papers in this issue shed new dimensions into our understanding of social capital and raise new questions on the potentials of social capital in bringing about social change and development. By bringing attention to its specific forms in particular contexts, certain factors explain why the foundations, dynamics, and consequences of social capital may vary from one group or social setting to another.

Definitions of social capital invariably emphasize the value of networks, trust, and community. Social capital refers to "features of social organization such as networks, norms, and trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit" (Putnam 1993:35) and reflects one's ability to secure resources by virtue of membership in social networks or in larger social structures. Trust, social networks and the reciprocities that arise from these social relationships and the value of these in achieving mutual goals among members of particular groups have become central in scholarly as well as development discourses. For the past decade or so, social capital has been associated with initiatives towards community development and economic renewal (Schuller et al. 1997). It has also been associated with providing the foundations for democratic institutions and economic development (Putnam 1993).

Ricardo G. Abad's study points out that Filipinos possess an abundance of bonding social capital among family, relatives, and friends (i.e., trust and reciprocities among horizontal networks in the private sphere) but low on bridging/linking social capital with organizations/associations or institutions (i.e., vertical networks/contacts in the public sphere). And among those few who belong to associations or institutionally-based networks, they are likely to be male, older, have higher education, come from higher income families/households, and reside in cities or urban areas. Thus, the higher the socio-economic status of the person, the more likely that he has contacts and networks with institutions that can provide information, support or services. These findings reinforce Coleman's (1990) thesis that social capital provide a particular avenue in understanding the relationship between education achievement and social inequality. Accordingly, those with access to economic, education, and other socio-cultural resources stay in power by virtue of their access to contacts and information with other powerful people (Bourdieu 1986).

Abad's research is particularly significant because it suggests a strong linkage between social capital and the reproduction of social hierarchies and the unequal distribution of resources in Philippine society. Most contemporary works on social capital celebrates its potential in empowering marginalized groups and communities and increasing their claims on societal resources (e.g., Narayan 2000). These celebratory works on social capital mask its oppressive potentials in structuring patterns of social

relations such that it favor those in dominant positions and consequently shape the distribution of resources in a community/society. They ignore the fact that the construction and mobilization of social capital can be structured along gender, income, and education lines, in the process reproducing these social hierarchies. Abad's findings, then, unmask some of the negative potentials of social capital in reproducing social inequities. It alerts us to the social and political implications of uneven distribution of social capital and resources across socio-economic groups and its potentials for social conflict, social exclusion, and power in Philippine society.

Leslie V. Advincula-Lopez's adaptation of Portes and Sensenbrenner's (1993) concept of social capital and Porio's (2006) articulation of global householding shows the role of remittances in creating and mobilizing social capital in households and communities of overseas Filipino workers (OFWs). Refusing to uncritically subscribe to prevailing notions that OFWs' patterns of consumption and investments do not significantly contribute to national development, Lopez argues on the basis of existing case studies that the "seemingly irrational investment decisions made by migrant workers make much more sense when goals other than economic are considered." Rather, she points out that the group's consumption patterns are strongly mediated by the need of migrant households and communities to construct, reinforce, and expand their social capital among family members, relatives and other community members both in the place of origin and destination. Investments in housing, household appliances, education of family members, micro-enterprises, and the purchase of vehicles enable migrant workers to generate gratitude and indebtedness among family and friends, which the migrant worker and his/her family can mobilize for future help or assistance. As a form of transnational philanthropy, funds given by migrant workers for community activities such as sports festivals and beauty contests, and improvement of the town's infrastructure (e.g., public school, plaza, chapel) likewise enable a migrant worker to uplift his or her status within the family and in the community. Mutually reinforcing each other, migrant workers' understandings of social capital therefore create particular forms of consumption and investments. Advincula-Lopez reminds us of the significance of resources spent by Filipinos in constructing bonding social capital (e.g., blow-outs for birthdays and drinking sprees, sponsorships in baptisms/weddings) and the paucity of investments in linking/bridging social capital (vertical networks with associations and institutions). Among migrants, the construction of social capital follow along educational, occupational, and destination lines. Filipino migrants in the United States who are mostly from the professional class send more remittances (and therefore have more potential for mobilizing social capital) compared to those working the Middle East and East Asia (Porio 2006).

Like Lopez, **Corazon B. Lamug** reminds us that sociological phenomena are locally accomplished by members' practices and actions. By looking at how fisherfolks create community through the practice and culture of sharing, Lamug shows ethnomethodology's contribution to the understanding of social action in any context. Fishing communities, which provide access to the sea and its resources, underscore a main point in the nature of social capital: one's membership in a community requires

that one acts according to principles of generosity, fairness, and interdependence, and implies the ability to draw on social resources that behave like monetary capital in coping with risk and future needs. Thus, the practice of sharing the resources of the sea, sharing the catch with fishing companions and with people on the shore after a fishing trip, and commensality after a successful fishing trip indicate that in the case of the fishers, structures of the community and processes of community-building both complement and exclude each other.

Aileen Toohey provides a detailed description of the role of social capital and civil society in the peace-making process in Southern Philippines. Drawing on contemporary debates on social capital and civil society, Toohey interrogates the relationships of civil society organizations (CSOs), the state, and combatant groups in Mindanao. She argues that their relationships have transformed, and in turn, being changed by the dynamics of the Philippine peace movement. She raises questions on the role of civil society interventions in the peace negotiations and the peace-building process and their effectiveness in conflict prevention. She also hints that social capital among civil society actors has structured the flows of development assistance to CSOs associated with peace and development. Despite the growth of CSOs in the Philippines, their role in effecting positively the outcomes of the peace-process is not clearly discernible.

All these articles point to the "thickness" of social capital among Filipinos with their friends, families, and allied networks and the paucity of their contacts and networks with associations and other institution-based networks. Despite the growth and expansion of state institutions and CSOs during the last few decades, Filipinos still have to construct trust and reciprocity networks beyond their immediate kin and kindred groups. Is it because these institutions have yet to demonstrate their reliability for support when Filipinos really need them?

Emma E. Porio
Czarina Saloma-Akpedonu
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